Tue, 11 Jun 2002

When Indonesia's unity is no longer voluntary

Max Lane, Visiting Fellow, Center for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies, University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia

The persistence of the movement for a self-determination referendum in Aceh, the emergence of the Papuan Peoples Council and the troubles in Ambon have all raised concerns about whether Indonesian unity can be maintained.

Indonesia's process of achieving a national unity during the first six decades, and especially the first four decades, of the 20th century is somewhat unique. There are indeed very few countries where the national unification of a multi-ethnic territory occurred without war.

Of course the territorial boundaries and basic economic structure -- taxes, treasury, customs, a single currency etc -- were created by the Dutch. But the fundamental components of a national language, a national culture and a common perspective for an independent Indonesia was created in the face of extreme hostility from the Dutch.

Dutch policy fostered local tradition over any new national political or general Indonesian culture. Dutch policy suppressed the main instruments of national unification: The political movements and political parties. Finally when the Dutch realized in 1949 that independence was inevitable, they insisted on a federal structure and tried to carry out a divide and rule policy.

A unitary state, reflecting a state based on a nation building process aimed at completing the creation of a single Indonesian nation was voluntarily accepted by the vast majority of all the independence movement, from Sabang to Merauke.

Maintaining the voluntary character of struggle to establish an Indonesian state, build a single Indonesian nation and all the associated political institutions meant one thing: Democracy. Democracy was Sukarno's reply to Muslims who called for an Islamic state. He called on them to win majority support. Relations between center and province also required open and democratic processes, reflected in the open competition between political parties for influence in the provinces as well as in the national parliament.

The emergence of self-determination movements in Aceh and West Papua have been caused by the escalating violation of the principles of democracy and voluntary unity since the 1950s, but most particularly during the repressive years of the New Order regime. Any violation of the orginal voluntary character destroys the original basis of unity.

In West Papua, the original Act of Free Choice was a manipulation which completely violated the principle of voluntary unity. In Aceh, the period of military operations in the 1980s, reactivated in a new form today, also completely broke the the principle of voluntary unity. The early calls for independence were not answered in the way that Sukarno, or first Mohammad Hatta, or Mohammed Yamin or other nationalist leaders would have answered such calls.

They would have answered with argument and visions for a democratic future for Indonesia. All the early nationalist leaders were able to take that approach because most of them were indeed democrats.

Soeharto was a militarist with no convincing vision of a democratic future. The New Order's dictatorship contradicted all talk of "Panca Sila" democracy. Soeharto used coercion by arms almost immediately any sign of a desire for independence surfaced.

And so it became inevitable that popular commitment to the vision of Indonesia, began to diminish in Aceh and West Papua. Acehnese and Papuan nationalism developed -- these were not realities in 1945.

The New Order also weakened nation building everywhere. The essential engines of nation building since the 1920s have been the political parties and political movements. These parties and movements, representing different interests in society, were divided sharply by ideological outlook, from left to right. They fought and struggled hard. But they fought and struggled hard about the future of Indonesia, about their vision of how an independent Indonesian nation and state should develop.

They involved tens of millions of people in this great battle for the future of Indonesia. It may have been a bitter struggle but it was based on participation and commitment and a passion about the future of the new country.

When Soeharto destroyed the political parties, by crushing the left-wing parties and by "simplification" of the center and right-wing parties. All the old parties of the 1950s, except for the left, have resurfaced in one form or another today but they are all bankrupt of their ideological commitment.

They are infected with all the diseases of the New Order: Self-seeking and only looking for the immediate gain. Only the genuinely new formations, like the Peoples Democratic Party (PRD) and some worker, peasant, student and women's organizations are free of the New Order political culture.

There are no more vehicles that provide for genuine mass participation in determining the future. The economic crisis means that Indonesia's very future is being redefined. But mas commitment to "Indonesia" weakens, hence the many demands for special treatment for provinces and regencies. Autonomy has become an excuse for localism. The political elite, created by the New Order, cannot solve this problem.

The peoples of the archipelago decided to unite in the 1920s to build a new nation and state as an answer to colonialism. The cry "From Sabang to Marauke" was a cry for unity against a marauding and oppressive Western colonialism. Marauding and oppressive Western colonialism is still here. Now it is not the Dutch, but the United States, the IMF and the "War against Terror". The IMF now wages economic war against the Indonesian people in the interests of U.S. and Western businesses greedy for cheap assets and minerals and access to the Indonesian mass market.

Unity from "Sabang to Merauke" is still needed. But, as in the 1920s, it can not be achieved by force but only voluntarily. But today there are also new realities: Acehnese nationalism and Papuan nationalism. A democratic approach to this reality cannot avoid the holding of self-determination referendums. Of course, this carries the risk that the Acehnese and Papuan people may choose independence -- a decision which must be accepted.

But this does not mean that the struggle for voluntary unity must stop. There can be many forms of unity: Federation, confederation, even alliances between independent states. Perhaps in Aceh, agreement could be reached for a second referendum in 10 years time to confirm whatever decision the people made after experiencing the new reality.

But the strongest and most effective unity that can help the people in their fight for sovereignty against the IMF marauders is one based on a voluntary acceptance and commitment to both the idea of unity itself and the form of that unity. Unity can only be achieved if all forms of coercion stop.

The writer is the translator of the Buru Quartet series of novels by Pramoedya Ananta Toer and of the plays and poems of W.S. Rendra.