What's new in Aceh?
What's new in Aceh?
The executive order signed last week by President Abdurrahman
Wahid to restore law and order in Aceh essentially contained
nothing new in terms of policy, except for his formal approval to
involve the Indonesian Military (TNI) in this endeavor.
The order calls for a comprehensive and coordinated approach
to the Aceh problem, involving no less than 17 members of his
Cabinet, including Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri.
While seemingly comprehensive, the executive order made two
crucial omissions. It made no mention of the negotiations for a
political settlement pursued and explored by the administration
these past 10 months. The instruction made no reference to a long
standing demand from the people of Aceh to bring to justice TNI
soldiers responsible for human rights atrocities in the past.
Acehnese, therefore, have every right to be suspicious that
the real motive behind the executive order was simply to provide
legal validity for the TNI to resume operations in Aceh to quell
the armed rebellion. Considering the recent history of TNI
operations in Aceh, Acehnese apprehension is understandable.
The hawks in TNI had originally sought for the declaration of
a state of military emergency in Aceh, which would effectively
transfer power from civilian to military authority.
After months of putting pressure on the government, the TNI
got a breakthrough last month when the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
was formally declared an outlawed separatist movement, even
though the administration had opened negotiations with the group
to explore opportunities for peace these past 10 months.
The executive order last week stated that the National Police
should cooperate with the TNI in restoring law and order. To
allay concerns, Minister of Defense Mahfud MD said any security
operation -- he avoided using the term "military operation" --
would be "target specific" to avoid civilian casualties.
While the TNI did not necessarily get the carte blanche it
desires, it does now have one foot in the door. It won't be long
before the TNI asks for greater legal cover to go after GAM
rebels, arguing that a limited, or target specific, operation
simply cannot be effective in fighting guerrillas.
It is, however, doubtful that a full scale military operation
will be any more effective. This is the riddle that proponents of
a military option must answer: If the military failed to crush
GAM during the nine years it had sweeping authority in Aceh
between 1991 and 1999, what chance of success will a limited,
target specific operation have today?
The military may claim to have a new leadership, adopted a new
name and a new doctrine, but it is going to take a lot more than
that to convince us that it has a remote chance of success.
Some of the legacies from those nine years of botched military
operations are still visible and widely felt, perhaps not by
people in Jakarta, but certainly by people in Aceh. Wounds from
the atrocities committed by the military have not healed. Their
anger runs deep, attested by the growing support that GAM now
enjoys.
With such little support from the very people whom TNI
professes to protect, any military operation, whether full-scale,
limited or target specific, will be unlikely to succeed. On the
contrary, given the hatred that Acehnese harbor against the
military, many more of them will join, or at least assist the GAM
rebels, in waging the guerrilla warfare.
Negotiations with GAM, an option that was missing from the
president's executive order, remains the best and only viable
option if the government ever hopes to resolve the Aceh problem.
It may be arduous and cumbersome, but it is at least peaceful.
The government had not given the negotiations a chance to
work. The humanitarian pause agreement it signed with GAM in May
was only intended to bring a momentary truce to allow for
negotiations to take place. Even with all of its shortcomings,
the humanitarian pause should have been followed up with real
negotiations for a political settlement.
Any negotiation must involve all forces existing in Aceh, and
not restricted only to the government and GAM. Many people in
Aceh have taken the middle ground in this conflict. They are not
taking up arms or even demanding independence. They are simply
asking for a referendum to determine their own fate.