What's new in Aceh?

The executive order signed last week by President Abdurrahman Wahid to restore law and order in Aceh essentially contained nothing new in terms of policy, except for his formal approval to involve the Indonesian Military (TNI) in this endeavor.

The order calls for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to the Aceh problem, involving no less than 17 members of his Cabinet, including Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri.

While seemingly comprehensive, the executive order made two crucial omissions. It made no mention of the negotiations for a political settlement pursued and explored by the administration these past 10 months. The instruction made no reference to a long standing demand from the people of Aceh to bring to justice TNI soldiers responsible for human rights atrocities in the past.

Acehnese, therefore, have every right to be suspicious that the real motive behind the executive order was simply to provide legal validity for the TNI to resume operations in Aceh to quell the armed rebellion. Considering the recent history of TNI operations in Aceh, Acehnese apprehension is understandable.

The hawks in TNI had originally sought for the declaration of a state of military emergency in Aceh, which would effectively transfer power from civilian to military authority.

After months of putting pressure on the government, the TNI got a breakthrough last month when the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was formally declared an outlawed separatist movement, even though the administration had opened negotiations with the group to explore opportunities for peace these past 10 months.

The executive order last week stated that the National Police should cooperate with the TNI in restoring law and order. To allay concerns, Minister of Defense Mahfud MD said any security operation -- he avoided using the term "military operation" -- would be "target specific" to avoid civilian casualties.

While the TNI did not necessarily get the carte blanche it desires, it does now have one foot in the door. It won't be long before the TNI asks for greater legal cover to go after GAM rebels, arguing that a limited, or target specific, operation simply cannot be effective in fighting guerrillas.

It is, however, doubtful that a full scale military operation will be any more effective. This is the riddle that proponents of a military option must answer: If the military failed to crush GAM during the nine years it had sweeping authority in Aceh between 1991 and 1999, what chance of success will a limited, target specific operation have today?

The military may claim to have a new leadership, adopted a new name and a new doctrine, but it is going to take a lot more than that to convince us that it has a remote chance of success.

Some of the legacies from those nine years of botched military operations are still visible and widely felt, perhaps not by people in Jakarta, but certainly by people in Aceh. Wounds from the atrocities committed by the military have not healed. Their anger runs deep, attested by the growing support that GAM now enjoys.

With such little support from the very people whom TNI professes to protect, any military operation, whether full-scale, limited or target specific, will be unlikely to succeed. On the contrary, given the hatred that Acehnese harbor against the military, many more of them will join, or at least assist the GAM rebels, in waging the guerrilla warfare.

Negotiations with GAM, an option that was missing from the president's executive order, remains the best and only viable option if the government ever hopes to resolve the Aceh problem. It may be arduous and cumbersome, but it is at least peaceful.

The government had not given the negotiations a chance to work. The humanitarian pause agreement it signed with GAM in May was only intended to bring a momentary truce to allow for negotiations to take place. Even with all of its shortcomings, the humanitarian pause should have been followed up with real negotiations for a political settlement.

Any negotiation must involve all forces existing in Aceh, and not restricted only to the government and GAM. Many people in Aceh have taken the middle ground in this conflict. They are not taking up arms or even demanding independence. They are simply asking for a referendum to determine their own fate.