What went wrong?
Considering the suffering that the recent floods have inflicted on hundreds of thousands of city residents, the government's decision on Wednesday to halt all housing development in the Jakarta-Bogor-Tangerang-Bekasi (Jabotabek) area for the next six months is a good beginning.
In the meantime, the city administration will make a thorough re-evaluation of all housing projects -- both still under construction and those already in use -- in the Jabotabek area to see if they conform to environmental analyses and comply with general land use and conservation plans, said Minister of Resettlement and Regional Infrastructure, Soenarno.
In truth, as pleased as we are with this official reaction, we find reason to be skeptical that it will succeed in improving -- much less rehabilitating -- environmental conditions in the most flood-stricken areas to prevent last week's tragedy from repeating itself.
It's not that we doubt the minister's resolve or ability.
The problem is that a carefully worked-out plan to limit the impact of serious flooding in Jakarta has already been conceived and ready to be implemented.
They go as far back as the presidency of Sukarno.
Under a presidential decree issued by Sukarno in 1963, the land stretching from Jakarta through Bogor, Ciawi and the Puncak resort area towards Cianjur, was declared a protected zone, designated as a water catchment area in which construction was strictly limited by law.
This was not only to protect Jakarta against flooding, but to ensure that growth in and around the capital city would be sustainable so as to ensure adequate support for a continually growing population.
Sukarno did not stay in power long enough to realize this plan. But his successor, Soeharto, did follow through, and even issued a follow-up decree in 1983 which expanded the protected area to cover a total of 14 districts.
Thus, the idea that growth and development are strictly resource-based and that resources are limited and hence need to be protected has been well-realized from the very beginning.
The way things have worked out in reality, however, is glaringly obvious to anyone willing to suffer the hardships of a weekend trip to the resort of Puncak during weekends and holidays.
What went wrong? It seems that, over time, a string of coincidental circumstances, which combined to thwart these plans, began to materialize.
First, the state minister for the environment whom Soeharto appointed to oversee environmental protection efforts was denied the authority needed to enforce the existing concepts and decisions.
A second, perhaps even more harmful factor was that dispensations were extended to privileged people and parties, frequently in return for monetary gain.
The state bureaucracy was either too corrupt or too weak to stop this activity from taking place.
Two examples worth mentioning are the Pantai Indah Kapuk luxury housing development project on Jakarta Bay, and the Rindu Alam restaurant at Puncak.
In the case of Rindu Alam, the high-profile restaurant overlooking a valley on the road towards Puncak was allowed to continue operating amid protests that it was owned by a prominent and powerful individual close to the New Order regime.
It remains there today; years before, the site had a lookout pavilion where people could gather to admire the panoramic mountain views.
The Pantai Indah Kapuk housing project presents an even more egregious example of law-bending in favor of a well-connected developer.
In this case, a nature reserve and stretch of protected mangrove stands were sacrificed on orders from the highest level in favor of a housing development with a golf course. Needless to say, all that goes on in Jakarta takes place other places across the archipelago as well.
The message which all this conveys is that even the best of intentions and meticulously worked out plans will have little or no effect in real conditions on the ground as long as the law remains for sale.