What Middle East means to RI

What Middle East means to RI

By Riza Sihbudi

JAKARTA (JP): President Abdurrahman Wahid is scheduled soon to
visit a number of Middle East countries including the United Arab
Emirates and Saudi Arabia. This trip to the volatile region would
be his third during the one and a half years of his
administration: he has previously visited Jordan, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Egypt and Iran.

But what would be the significance of Abdurrahman's trip,
beginning on Feb. 22, to the region?

For Indonesia, the Middle East is a special place. Egypt, for
instance, was the first country to recognize Indonesia's
sovereignty after its proclamation of Independence in 1945.
Historically, the Egypt-Indonesia religious-cultural ties already
existed in the 20th century -- there was a common bond of Islam
and educational activities.

The Islamic revivalism movement in Indonesia, such as
Muhammadiyah, was for long influenced by the same movement led by
Jamaluddin Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in Egypt.

During the Sukarno era, Indonesia enjoyed strong ties with the
Middle East, and with Egypt in particular. The significant role
that Sukarno and Egyptian President Gammal Abdul Nasser played
during the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung -- which gave
birth to the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 -- testified to this
good relationship.

Under Soeharto, however, no significant progress was recorded
in Indonesia's relations with the Middle East countries -- in all
probability because Jakarta tended to disregard the region while
keeping its sight focused on the West.

This is despite the fact that its neighbors in the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations such as Singapore and Malaysia, and
other Asian countries such as South Korea and Japan actually have
very good ties with the Middle East.

Malaysia is a good case in point. When the Lebanon war ended
in 1995, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad visited Beirut along
with a large entourage of Malaysian businesses people. Mahathir
offered Beirut whatever assistance he could for the
reconstruction of post-war Lebanon, thus exemplifying the kind of
proactive stance a government could take toward a war-ravaged
friend.

When the Iran-Iraq War ended, it was business people from
Korea, Singapore and Malaysia who ventured into the region.
Indonesia always lagged behind, ignoring the great market
potential there.

Another evidence of Indonesia's neglect of the Middle East can
be found in the minimal role that Jakarta has been playing in the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) -- which is
dominated by the Middle East countries.

Despite his long rule of 32 years, Soeharto only once attended
the OIC summit despite its strategic role in the strengthening of
ties with the Middle East. It thus became obvious to the Middle
East countries how Indonesia regarded them.

One explanation of this stance is: Soeharto was responding to
the domestic situation and his fears of "political Islam." He
might have assumed that building ties with the Middle East, which
are predominately Muslim, would be tantamount to letting
"political Islam" grow strong.

It was probably for this reason that Indonesia became the last
country to open a Palestinian embassy here, after Malaysia and
other Muslim countries.

One thing to note, however, is that Egypt was the last country
that Soeharto visited before his fall from grace in 1998.

When Abdurrahman, or Gus Dur, came to power and appointed Alwi
Shihab -- a native of Makassar, South Sulawesi of Arabic descent
-- as foreign minister, there was hope that this would bring
better ties with the Middle East.

This expectation was boosted because Abdurrahman himself
declared his intention to "re-orient" Indonesian foreign policy.

Instead, he made a blunder and announced his intention to open
ties with Israel, the great enemy of Arab countries.

There were at least three possible reasons for Gus Dur's
intention, the first being his and Alwi's wish to be seen as
committed to pluralism and inter-faith tolerance.

Secondly, their hope that an opening of trade ties with Israel
could be a "short-cut" to the restoration of the Indonesian
economy. Thirdly, by opening ties with Israel, Jakarta wished to
help find solutions to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

In the context of Indonesia-Middle East relations however, any
plans to open ties with Israel could instead bring the following
consequences:

* Indonesia would be seen as inconsistent in its support of
the Palestinians;

* Indonesia might be accused of violating its own
constitution, which explicitly rejects all forms of occupation;

* A weakening of the economic and political relations between
Indonesia and the Middle East;

* Indonesia might be accused of further undermining the
economic and political position of Palestine. Israel, for
example, has continued in its campaign to sever trade relations
between Palestine and the European Union;

* No less damaging is the flaring-up of controversies within
Indonesia, which could be counter-productive to the campaign to
restore social, political and economic conditions.

Fortunately, Gus Dur called off his plan for Indonesia-Israel
relations, thus restoring the hope for better ties with the
Middle East.

At least one positive sign was seen when in May 2000, economic
ministers of some Arab countries such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen held a meeting
with the then Indonesian economic minister Kwik Kian Gie to study
investments here.

As reported, the government wanted to invite the Arab
countries' investment by offering three types of projects;
privatization of state-owned companies, ventures in companies
that were being "dealt with" by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring
Agency, and ventures in the private sector.

The initial target of the expected US$500 million investment
fund was the purchase of state-owned companies and IBRA-
controlled assets.

Among the sectors on offer included mining, banking,
manufacturing, agriculture, infrastructure, telecommunications,
tourism and transportation. There were plans, for instance, for
Saudi Arabian investment in Bank Central Asia.

The proposed investment fund began with a Kuwait loan in the
Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) package that has yet to be
disbursed. Jakarta suggested that the loan be turned into
investment and Kuwait agreed, as did Qatar and Abu Dhabi.

Meanwhile, Indonesia and Syria enjoy good trade prospects as
trade volume between the two countries keeps increasing.
Indonesia's exports to Syria in 1995, for example, were only
US$15 million; they increased to US$ 65 million in 1999.

Indonesia's imports from Syria were US$16 million in 1995, but
increased to US$25 million in 1999.

Politically, Palestinian President Yasser Arafat's visit to
Jakarta in August 2000 lent a boost to the Indonesian image in
the Middle East. Although it would still be difficult for Jakarta
to play a role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, given how it has yet
to settle various conflicts at home, the government should not
stop its efforts to improve both political and economic ties with
the Middle East.

The President must not repeat the mistakes of his predecessors
of placing greater attention to relations with the West at the
expense of its ties with the Middle East.

Aside from his blunder, Gus Dur has actually stepped in the
right direction. Together with Morocco and Algiers, Indonesia
passed a resolution that condemned Israel during the Inter-
Parliamentary Union in October 2000 in Jakarta.

The resolution helped clean up Gus Dur's image after it was
tarnished by reports of his closeness with some of Israel's
political elite and his wish to open trade ties with the Jewish
state. The President's speech during the OIC summit in Doha,
Qatar in November 2000 also helped, as it attested to Indonesia's
commitment to the interests of the Palestinians.

In conclusion, Gus Dur's administration has brought relatively
improved ties between Indonesia and the Middle East. The
remaining question is: How will Jakarta continue from this point
onward?

Today, when ties with the West, especially the United States
and Australia, are of questionable benefit, the Middle East could
certainly be a good alternative.

It would do Abdurrahman good to emulate Mahathir's stance on
the Middle East. Hopefully he will start doing so during his
forthcoming trip to the region.

The writer is chairman of the Indonesian Society for Middle
East Studies (ISMES) based in Jakarta.