What does reconciliation mean for E. Timor
By Dewi Anggraeni
CANBERRA (JP): During the three day conference on East Timor at the Australian National University focusing on peace initiatives here last week the word "reconciliation" was de rigueur used by many speakers.
On the last day, James Dunn, a former consul of the Australian government to East Timor, focused on the problem of reconciling the different interpretations of the word itself.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives several options for the word 'to reconcile'. Two of these may be applicable to the different parties to a reconciliation. The first is 'to make friendly after estrangement', and the other is 'to heal, settle (quarrel)' etc.
Dunn pointed out that to the Indonesians "reconciliation" may mean that the East Timorese should come to terms to being part of Indonesia, while to those East Timorese opposed to integration the word may mean being given the right to choose the political status they want. So there are more than one way to settle a conflict.
The whole conference has been devoted to the search for a peaceful settlement for the issue. The keynote speaker, Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University, expressed guarded optimism for the future of East Timor. Falk pointed to the shift in the trend of international politics that would make peaceful settlement possible.
Small nations struggling for self-determination had tended to become pawns in a wider geopolitical power play, said Falk. He compared the continuing opposition to Indonesian integration by East Timorese inside as well as outside East Timor, with the world's prompt reaction to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Apart from the fact that unlike Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, integration of East Timor occurred before the end of the Cold War, there were also other considerations.
In the pre-Cold War ambience, the U.S. and other Western societies were concerned about the likelihood of a left-leaning Marxist emerging nation in East Timor. They therefore gave a tacit agreement to the integration.
On the other hand when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Western societies had vested interest in exposing Iraq as a potential nuclear power. They were also very much aware of the oil wells of Kuwait. So their support of Kuwait was a pretext to accomplish political goals.
Another aspect that helped Kuwait was the international political shift that Falk mentioned, which was overwhelmingly used as an underlining drive in discussions throughout the duration of the conference. Support for self-determination for small nations had grown stronger. There was a definite transnational social movement promoting human rights, which include rights of self determination.
The conference relies on the increasingly powerful human rights lobby to put pressure on Indonesian government to find a peaceful solution to the East Timor issue.
What Indonesia and Western societies failed to predict in December 1975, it seems, was that resistance would continue for decades afterwards.
The conference also took heart in the appointment and subsequent findings of the National Human Rights Commission, that led to sentencing of military officers proven guilty of human rights violations in East Timor.
While the preferred goal of the settlement was independence, some speakers suggested an autonomy arrangement would be more realistic. Dr Herbert Feith proposed an internationally guaranteed autonomy, preceded by a dialog between Indonesian government and the people of East Timor involving Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Belo, for they were recognized as leaders by East Timorese. Feith also believed that international and domestic opinions in Indonesia would eventually hold sway.
In a separate interview, Prof. Falk expressed great faith in the United Nations being able to assist the solution process. "If the reconciliation politics were handled creatively, for instance done gradually, Indonesia might even appear as a winner of the diplomatic struggle," he said.
There was awareness that the UN still needs to develop special skills in conflict solution. Feith specified that conflict solution had to be regional and based on individual assessment of each case. What was good for China and Tibet might not necessarily be good for Indonesia and East Timor, for instance. He dismissed what he called as 'centralistic mentality' as outdated. He called for innovation for an ad hoc style of conflict solution.
At the end of the conference, a resolution was passed, to free Xanana Gusmao, to allow him to participate in future talks. More talks and similar conferences would be necessary to smoothen out differences of opinion among all parties.