What does intervention mean in the Asia-Pacific?

By David Harries

KUALA LUMPUR (JP): Intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state yet again showed its power to generate controversy and discomfort in a recent discussion here.

The topic, not listed on the program, colored almost every session of the 11th annual Asia Pacific Roundtable early this month attended by more than 200 scholars and policy makers.

In Asia, and more specifically ASEAN, the position on such intervention is clear, consistent and absolute: it is prohibited.

In fact, modern globalization has already relegated absolute state sovereignty to the status of history in all but theory. Advancing technology, economics' lack of respect for national borders, and changing institutional circumstances has challenged every country to find and implement an acceptable balance between self-determination and inescapable external forces, and among state and non-state actors.

A state's control of its own facts, fiction and destiny seldom sits comfortably with the imposed demands of crucial relationships with external and non-government actors. At worst, this incompatibility triggers conflict. But its management has now become one of the greatest tests of good governance. Asian states are probably feeling the pressure most. Even as they try to maintain defense and defend state sovereignty, their financial, trade, information and security interdependencies change and weaken it.

The contradiction has real implications on a global scale as well. A failure in Asia to strike and manage a matrix of principles -- an "intervention regime" -- will strike at the heart of confidence and progress in this region; the very one the world is counting on to drive more than 50 percent of global economic growth in the next few decades.

If that growth is stunted or halted before other Asian states establish sustainable and more competent institutional foundations, the region's new and fragile peace and stability which both fosters and draws strength from that growth, will be more vulnerable.

The key to an effective "intervention regime", especially for a state which insists on sovereignty based on national resilience and self-reliance, is regular, substantive dialog.

Its goals should be a sufficient understanding of the nature and limitations of intervention and internal affairs to allow its definition. Such dialog will be difficult to sustain. Concise definitions might not be found. Language, or more accurately, languages, are one obstacle.

English, already the language of business, international politics and security, is neither simple nor concise. Many Asians will be speaking English but thinking in one or more of their own languages; languages which history and culture have invested with their own unique flexibility and nuances.

Definitions will be hard to agree upon because it is difficult to draw a line between internal and international affairs. Some claim that the scope and power, the combination of globalization and human rights has infected every domestic issue with international characteristics, and vice versa.

Be that as it may, a dialog should be attempted. Two early steps should be taken in this process. One is to explore the term "intervention" in the context of its two-sided nature as either an inherently good or an inherently bad action or intention.

An intervention which takes the form of an overwhelming military invasion of one country by another is bad, as was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. On the other hand, intentions or actions which will help another become more capable, or help it stop behavior which damages its own standing and that of neighbors, are good.

As ASEAN embarks on its ambitious and controversial expansion to 10 members, Myanmar comes quickly to mind as a target for good intervention.

A second step in the dialog would be to assemble principles and norms with which to guide the definition of intervention and internal affairs.

The language factor will influence this work as discussants will exploit words and meanings from several languages to present their perceptions of the issues.

In addition, a review of thoughts and experiences of non- Asians on managing and documenting the intervention issue would be useful and not threaten anyone. A set of lists could be opened for displaying the evolving state of agreement on what is and is not intervention and internal affairs. If they were proved successful, a fifth list could be started for methods which encourage good interventions and discourage bad ones.

As Jusuf Wanandi of the Jakarta-based Center for Strategic and International Studies said at the roundtable discussion here, ASEAN expansion will force the association to get its act together.

Part of that act will be to acknowledge that states in this region have been intervening in the affairs of others for years. Absolute sovereignty is a thing of the past, and constructive criticism, whether given, listened to, or accepted, is one of the clearest signs of friendship and equality.

Therefore, it is an excellent time to bring the issue of intervention in internal affairs out of the closet.

Sooner rather than later, the costs of not doing so will be large speed bumps on the path to strengthened peace and to rapid, predictable economic and institutional development.

The writer is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.