What do Kosovo, China and Indonesia have in common?

By Terry Russel

JAKARTA (JP): Concern for oppressed Kosovars is not the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) main reason for bombing Serbia. Professor Noam Chomsky noted recently that NATO countries have not intervened physically to stop similar acts of oppression in Turkey or Columbia. Nor have they intervened in the last decade to stop acts of oppression in Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Algeria, Angola, Congo, Sierra Leonne, Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor or Mexico. So why is NATO intervening in Kosovo?

One myth circulating in the media is that NATO is scared of Serb expansionism in eastern Europe. If that is true, surely NATO should wait until Serbia attacks another country. Kosovo is a province of Serbia, not another country.

Another reason suggested is NATO's fear of a refugee problem from Serbian oppression. Yet by its bombing actions, NATO has increased Serb oppression and, consequently, increased the flow of refugees. Moreover, NATO spokespeople predicted this consequence long before the bombing started.

A more credible explanation for the bombing can be found in an emerging U.S. view of the world as one breaking into three political blocks. In this view, publicized by Samuel Huntington in his book, Clash of Civilizations, the post-Cold War divisions are not based on communist-noncommunist divisions. They are based on cultural divisions.

The emerging political blocks are Islam, China and the West. The Islamic block comprises Iraq, Iran, Syria, Malaysia, Sudan and the people, not the governments, of many other Middle Eastern, north African and southeast Asian countries. The Chinese block includes China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar.

The Western block comprises Western Europe and the United States as well as other wealthy, Christian countries. It does not, however, include two militarily powerful Christian countries: Serbia and Russia. Here lies one possible reason for the Western block's attack on Serbia.

The economic collapse of Russia has destabilized its president, Boris Yeltsin. He may be prepared to be replaced by a pro-Western president as soon as Russia becomes sufficiently desperate for Western economic aid.

In contrast to Yeltsin, President Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia was politically and economically stable. NATO bombing will have the effect of devastating the Serbian economy, distracting Milosevic from watching his internal political enemies and provoking Serb persecution of Kosovars.

How will this destabilize Milosevic? Serb persecution of Albanian Kosovars has greatly increased the number of young Albanian Kosovars willing to fight Milosevic. NATO troops are currently in position along Kosovo's borders, ostensibly to help refugees but probably to train and equip the growing Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). With NATO logistics support, they could soon return to Kosovo and inflict a morale-shattering defeat on the Serbs.

A military loss in Kosovo, coupled with an economic crisis brought about by the bombing, would raise anti-Milosevic feelings in Serbia. There could then be a democratic or military take over by a pro-Western Serb, just as pro-Western leaders have been installed in many parts of the Middle East and South America.

Under this plan, Kosovar troops are important propaganda tools. Dead American soldiers on television would lead Americans to demand peace, as they did with the Vietnam War. Dead Kosovar soldiers would not. Also, Kosovar soldiers could not be accused of "invading" Kosovo. The U.S. normal source of "propaganda troops", United Nations (UN) forces could not be used this time because of a Russian and Chinese veto.

The Serbs have realized this threat and stopped the flow of refugees to the KLA. They have even begun launching raids on KLA camps across the border in Albania.

A second reason for NATO bombing is the strategic location of Kosovo.

Historically, Europeans have feared Muslim penetration through two gateways: Spain and Yugoslavia-Hungary. While the last Afro- Arabic Muslims were being pushed out of Spain five hundred years ago, a new group of Muslims, the Ottoman Turks, were sweeping north west through Yugoslavia and Hungary.

Europe's need for control of these gateways may explain NATO's lack of response when the army in Algeria, just south of Spain, canceled elections in the early 1990s that "hard line' Muslims were expected to win. It may explain NATO's lack of response when the Serbs in Basin began expelling Bosnia's Muslims in the mid- 1990s. If the three-block view of the world is correct, NATO does not want Muslim governments or large Muslim populations on its door step.

A third reason for NATO bombing is simply to unify NATO. The war will strengthen the relationship between the European Union and United Sates paving the way for closer economic and political ties. It will also allow NATO to practice co-ordinating its forces as a single military unit, in preparation for large- scale conflicts with China.

Finally, the NATO attack serves as a deterrent for China. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji's frosty visit to the U.S recently showed evidence of the growing assertiveness of China. He was unwilling to make sufficient trade concessions in exchange for entry into the World Trade Organization. Nor would he make human rights concessions.

It is Chinese rather than Serbian expansionism which NATO fears. The West has already ceded Hong Kong to China, will soon cede Macao and is now facing Chinese demands to cede Taiwan. On top of this, there is rising domestic pressure in South Korea and Japan for the United States to close its bases there. The United States may fear increasing Chinese influence in, if not an outright military takeover of, these two gateways to the West.

So how does all this involve South East Asia? Malaysia's Anwar Ibrahim is strongly supported by Western governments because, though a Muslim, he is more receptive than Mahathir to Western ownership of Malaysian resources.

The same was true of Soeharto being supported ahead of Sukarno. With Western ownership of resources comes Western culture, encouraging Malaysia's and Indonesia's integration into the Western block.

The three-block theory may also be affecting the Western media. Western media reporting of the Anwar-Mahathir conflict has focused on Mahathir's brazen dishonesty, which draws a strong anti-Mahathir response, rather than on the reasons for the conflict, which will not attract a strong anti-Mahathir response.

If we accept that the West fears an Islamic political block, the West will want Indonesia to retain a secular government. Any signs of an upcoming electoral victory or a military coup by "hard line" Muslims this year may invite Western intervention. Certainly, signs of electoral or military victories by leftists in Chile, Nicaragua, Grenada, El Salvador, Angola, Mozambique and East Timor in the 1970s and 1980s, and in Indonesia in 1965, led to Western intervention.

Interestingly, this switch from a fear of communism to a fear of Islam may be East Timor's and Irian Jaya's biggest chance to gain independence. In the unlikely event of a hard-line Muslim government gaining power in Indonesia this year, Western support for the two provinces' secession would reach a crescendo.

The above consequences of the new three-block view are only speculation. This speculation allows us to analyze world events more thoughtfully. Only then can we decide where Indonesia should position itself in this new three-block world.

Terry Russel has an arts degree (hons), majoring in world history. He has been teaching in Jakarta for the past two years.