What about China's new warship?

What about China's new warship?

By Santo Darmosumarto

JAKARTA (JP): Two weeks ago the Chinese navy (PLAN) showed off
its most recent acquisition when the Russian-built Sovremenny
class destroyer sailed through the Taiwan Strait en route to its
base in south China (The Jakarta Post, Feb. 12). Although the
overall capabilities of this 7,600-tonne warship -- the first of
two procured by the Chinese -- may not compare to most Western
vessels of its class, much has been talked about its weapon
system, which includes Sunburn cruise missiles that can hit
targets up to 120 kilometers away.

As soon as news of the Sovremenny's voyage broke out, there
were arguments and claims that the addition of a single vessel to
the navy's outdated inventory should not be seen as cause for
concern.

This may be true if one is to focus solely on the vessel's
delivery and view matters within a short-term period. However,
such an analysis fails to recognize fully the significance of the
purchase within the larger context of China's naval development
program and its implications on regional security in the long
term. Doing so will allow us to understand why so much fuss has
come out of this seemingly insubstantial event.

The Sovremmeny's acquisition is part of a scheme to achieve
greater maritime influence, which in turn stems from an overall
shift in China's strategic focus. Because of growing cordial
relations with India and Russia, China has been allowed to
redirect its attention towards what it increasingly sees as more
immediate security concerns: Taiwan and the China Seas.

In addition to this, the Allied Forces' tactical supremacy
during the Gulf War was a wake-up call for Chinese leaders as
they realized that the military, especially its naval branch,
seriously needed technological and doctrinal improvements.
Although numerous issues may have influenced China's greater
regard for naval supremacy, analysts usually identify these two
as major factors.

In the last decade, growing "sea power mentality" in Beijing
has been at the bottom of efforts to reassess the navy's
doctrine, which had been based on Mao Zedong's defensive,
protracted guerrilla warfare.

The "active green water defense strategy" now emphasizes the
primacy of China's maritime claims -- some almost 1,000 nautical
miles away from the mainland -- within the scope of the People's
Liberation Army's defense planning. Ultimately, this strategy is
a transition towards obtaining blue water capabilities comparable
to those of the French or the Americans. Although such a plan may
seem overly ambitious, many Chinese military leaders continue to
regard it as viable and attainable.

The navy's doctrinal transformation is important, as it lays
the basis for an objective-oriented program of hardware
acquisitions. This program has mostly been carried out through
purchasing weapons and technology from foreign countries, thus
indicating the limits of China's indigenous defense industry.

Nevertheless, there are continued efforts to support local
weapons assembly through acquiring production licenses and
engagement in reverse engineering. With Russia strapped for cash
and seeking markets for its weapons surplus, the Chinese have not
only been able to make quality purchases at rock-bottom prices,
but have also benefited from the exodus of Russian scientists and
technicians.

With the aircraft carrier program presently unattainable,
China's maritime development has focused on the modernization of
the navy's surface combatants and submarines. Plans for these, as
well as modern surface-to-air missiles and sensor arrays --
radar, sonar, communications and navigation equipment -- indicate
a move towards enhancing power-projection capabilities, as they
address not only the navy's weaknesses in firepower but also its
inability to sustain long-range operations.

Recent developments feature Luhu and Sovremenny class
destroyers as well as Jiangwei class frigates, some of which have
been equipped with state-of-the-art missile and communication
systems. The acquisition and development of Kilo and Song class
submarines will undoubtedly enhance the capabilities of a naval
force that also possesses nuclear-powered, ballistic missile
submarines. The enhancement of maritime air surveillance, on the
other hand, has mostly been channeled through building up the air
force (PLAAF).

Although its success remains debatable, China's efforts at
naval development have already raised concerns among Asian
countries, especially when considering the region's uncertain
security climate. In Southeast Asia, added destabilizing factors
such as maritime territorial disputes and enduring historical
rivalries have compounded fears regarding the navy's
modernization program.

China's intentions in the area are often ambiguous, thus
forcing governments to assume the worst in formulating their
foreign and military policies. For example, although officials
have not openly identified China's posture as potentially
destabilizing, Malaysia and the Philippines' emphasis on beefing-
up maritime surveillance and defense capabilities have frequently
been linked to perceptions of growing Chinese threat in the South
China Sea.

Recognizing the commotion that its military modernization may
have stirred, in 1998 the Chinese came up with its first ever
defense white paper. By outlining its intention to promote
international security through regional cooperation, confidence
building, peacekeeping, arms control and disarmament, China
affirms an adherence to norms of conflict solution that are based
on nonmilitary means.

Furthermore, it argues that contrary to popular thinking, its
military development should not be seen as a threat when
considering that its budget is nowhere near that of France, Great
Britain and especially the United States.

In addition to such Chinese assurances, studies of inherent
weaknesses within the military's present conditions have put a
check on an all-out rash of alarm calls against the navy's strive
for greater maritime influence.

Efforts to integrate doctrinal changes and new weapons
acquisitions have been challenging, as they involve a complex
process of familiarization, retraining and maintenance.
Modernization has occurred mostly within certain "pockets of
excellence". By and large, the navy is unable to immediately shed
its defensive, coastal tradition, thus causing continued
difficulties in sustaining long-distance missions for an extended
period.

Nevertheless, concerns among regional policymakers over these
developments should not be treated as overreacting. Although
China claims its new weapons will be deployed mainly as defensive
mechanisms, their potential for projecting power remains real.

This situation is precarious when considering that Beijing has
been very careful not to give away its strategic designs, which
in turn is caused by fears of exposing the military's actual
limitations. In spite of the defense white paper's publication,
China's tendencies towards saber-rattling in its approach to
Taiwan independence and the South China Sea disputes have often
left its neighbors in the dark -- and growingly anxious -- in
efforts to gauge the navy's enhanced capabilities and their
implications for regional security.

Based on aspirations for a revolution in military affairs
comprising integration of forces as well as changes in modes of
operation and combat means and strategy, there is no doubt that
the navy is progressing towards becoming a more streamlined and
effective force.

Whether these developments will make the military, especially
its naval branch, more threatening depends on how China's
intentions in the region are being perceived. From some Southeast
Asian leaders' perspective -- particularly shaped by feelings of
historical distrust and Chinese antagonism in disputes such as
the Spratly Islands -- it does not come as a surprise that navy's
modernization is taken up with much concern.

The Chinese navy -- in spite of its continued upgrading --
will unlikely ever compare to the navies of Great Britain or the
United States, but to Southeast Asian countries it can pose a
potential threat indeed. The concern is especially valid given
that the central government's determination and the country's
growing economy -- complemented by Russia's willing assistance --
will provide the means necessary to sustain such efforts.

The writer is a Jakarta-based researcher and analyst of
Southeast Asian security issues.