Weighing the costs and benefits of separation from RI

Outside powers are no longer interested in separatist causes in Indonesia, says historian Merle Calvin Ricklefs, a professor of Asian Studies and director of Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Societies at the University of Melbourne. Below is an excerpt from an e-mail interview with The Jakarta Post:

Question: How much greater is the prospect for or threat of disintegration of Indonesia today?

Answer: Let us not forget that something like three generations of Indonesians have been raised with the idea of Indonesia, have been inspired, indoctrinated and educated in that idea.

The force of nationalism has been strong in Indonesia, growing since the 1920s and truly powerful since the (independence) Revolution. ... The threat of breakup of the country was at its greatest in the 1950s, with resistance to Jakarta ranging from the Republic of South Maluku to the PRRI (movement in Sumatra) and Darul Islam (in a number of regions). In some circumstances, the United States and other powers were prepared to support anti- Jakarta regions then.

That is not so now. Except for the very special case of East Timor, no outside power has an interest in seeing Indonesia break up into several states: no one can see any benefit in what happened in the Soviet Union also happening in RI... So there is much which holds the country together -- much more than 40 years ago.

But there are clearly visible regional resentments, worsened by the excessive centralization and oppression of the Soeharto years. Much depends on whether the democratic government of today's Indonesia can accommodate legitimate demands of regions while also maintaining national unity.

No state can in the end be held together only by force; any state must have the acquiescence of at least some significant part of the population or it will eventually be unable to suppress resistance.

Thus, much depends on President Abdurrahman's ability to balance legitimate centrifugal forces with legitimate national- level centripetal forces. I am sure it can be done, and I am sure he intends to do it, but it will be a difficult balancing act that could go drastically wrong.

Q: Will other outer regions be pushing for self-determination intensively?

A: I feel that most of the other regions that have made noises about greater independence from Jakarta, places like Riau, will be able to be accommodated with greater devolution of authority in political and financial matters.

That may not, however, provide the improvement in local conditions which many people seek; for local administrative capacities, the rule of law, the availability of qualified and competent and honest leadership may not be anywhere near the level needed.

Q: What are the social, economic and political impacts of "losing" Aceh and Irian Jaya? Would it be good or bad for Indonesia?

A: It is better to think in terms of costs and benefits to both sides. If Aceh ceased to be a part of Indonesia, the Acehnese would have control of their own affairs and a great deal of resources with which to run their country. But they would cease to be part of the world's fourth-largest country, of the Islamic world's most populous nation, of the world's third-largest democracy.

They would become a wealthy small country which, for all its wealth, would be more exposed to international pressures, probably. And it might be that one or more of Aceh's immediate neighbors -- Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia -- would be not particularly friendly, possibly even hostile ...

The Papuans would also have more resources, but if we look eastward and say that the best they could hope for was a country with the problems of Papua New Guinea, then we would have to say there would also be costs.

And, given Irian's natural resources, it would be the target (the right word I think) of unscrupulous exploitative interests, which it would be ill placed to resist.

For Indonesia as a whole, the cost of losing Aceh and Irian would be the loss of resources, the widening precedent of national break-up and a severe blow to national pride and international standing.

The benefits might be the ending of an ongoing resistance movement in both places: no doubt in Jakarta there are some people who say it would be a relief to watch the Acehnese and the Papuans fighting themselves instead of Jakarta's forces.

I think the cost-benefit analysis is clear enough for Indonesia as a whole: the costs would be greater than the benefits. But for Aceh and Papua themselves, the equation is not so easily resolved.

Q: How ready are Aceh and Irian Jaya (West Papua) for independence?

A: On balance, I think Aceh could run its own affairs tomorrow. Papua could not, in my view, and hence, would be prey to all sorts of unscrupulous outside influences. There simply has not been the chance to develop Papuan leadership and local political structures to sustain a modern state -- and that is itself another legacy of the repressive Soeharto years, of course.

Q: Should the government just let the Acehnese and West Papuans enjoy their democratic rights and be independent of Indonesia?

A: Here we have a classic case of a truly difficult issue, for two sound principles collide. One is the principle of maintaining the national integrity of Indonesia, for which so many people -- including notably Acehnese -- struggled and sacrificed. The other is the principle of self-determination.

The difficulty is enhanced because of the Soeharto legacy. I agree with those -- including Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri --- who have said that if places like East Timor (or Aceh, or Papua, etc) had experienced a benign, enlightened, democratic Indonesia they might well have wished to remain a part of it. Instead they suffered under Soeharto.

And naturally, they lack the patience or optimism, which is required to wait and see how the new democratic Indonesia turns out. They all no doubt say to themselves, "If we don't make our move now, we may see the democratic government in Jakarta collapse into some sort of dictatorship again and we will have several more decades like the last ones."

One can understand such a view. Much depends on enlightened leadership both in Jakarta and in the regions.

Q: How do you read the TNI's response to demands of separatism?

A: My impression is that TNI is so divided and demoralized that it is unlikely to do anything repressive in response to some unilateral central command decision, but it is very likely that in particular places it will do so if it can. And if Gus Dur (Abdurrahman) orders military repression of separatist movements in particular places, there will be plenty of military men who will enjoy carrying out the order.

TNI bears much of the responsibility for the intensity of anti-Indonesian feeling in Aceh and Papua. (The military do) not seem to have drawn the lesson which is obvious there (as it was in Vietnam and elsewhere) that the more violence they use, the more local hatred and resistance they will engender.

Q: What is your comment on speculation of Soeharto's role behind the religious strife, and that of rogue elements of TNI?

A: I don't know anything beyond the same rumors you hear... But I think we must accept that throughout the country there are many people who benefited from the Soeharto regime, who are losing wealth and influence in the new Indonesia, and who would be happy to see circumstances arise which would allow a return to an authoritarian state which they could again serve and benefit from.

There are some among the cronies, of course, who seem to have accepted that Soeharto and his family are gone for good and who are trying now to corrupt the new system.

(About rogue elements) .... Quite possible. Some of those "rogues" might, of course, be quite high ranking. (Santi W.E. Soekanto)