We need clarifications

The The Jakarta Post's editorial of Nov. 23, 1999, reports on the latest progress on the truth about East Timor and the urgency to question Gen. Wiranto on this matter.

Since his ascent to the military's top job I have continuously regarded Wiranto with esteem. Imagine his three predecessors being put into Wiranto's shoes: They would probably not have succeeded so well. The way Wiranto stepped aside as a vice presidential candidate confirmed my earlier feelings. But within the whole picture there appears to be a black spot: the East Timor campaign of terror and destruction after the Aug. 30, 1999, ballot. How is it possible that the high profile Gen. Wiranto could endure such a failure! A number of reasons remain unassessed and call for clarifications:

1. Delusion and lack of knowledge of the feelings of the East Timorese. Was local government reporting on the issue of the referendum in a self-delusory way, up to the point of taking for granted a pro-Jakarta victory? I would be extremely careful to assert that the majority of the Acehnese, or the Irianese, would opt to stay within a unitary state if given a chance to express their wishes in a referendum about independence or not. There are many parallel cases in which the political elite was sure of victory which later proved to be a totally wrong assessment.

2. An absence of military strategy. Because of a possible impact of "psychological obstacles in curbing or shooting the rampaging pro-Indonesia militias" -- after 23 years of common fight against the separatists -- TNI's command should have withdrawn in advance all unreliable elements in the military and replace them with soldiers from other military commands, as those would not have any emotional ties with East Timor.

3. Irresponsible TNI conduct in East Timor. The announcement of the results of the ballot on Sept. 4, 1999 and the imposition of martial law were interspersed by the arrival of Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri on Sept. 8, 1999. During five full days a combination of rogue TNI elements and militias were allowed to go on a rampage of unrestrained destruction, burning, raping and killing (National Committee of Human Rights Report, Nov. 20, 1999).

4. Was the inaction of TNI's top brass in Jakarta a conscious tactical move so as to direct the blame for the East Timor mess solely on Habibie as the initiator of East Timorese independence, and thus kill off his last chances for reelection?

5. Am I right in my assessment that TNI top brass allowed the military and pro-Jakarta militias a free hand for a couple of days to take revenge and then reluctantly took control of the situation again, having been pressured by the international community?

There will remain much speculation why Habibie opted for a U-turn in the government's policy on East Timor, and whether Ali Alatas and Wiranto were fully consulted or not on this policy prior to its announcement. All the bloodshed and pain could have been avoided if the government had had a "sincere" intention to draft and promote first a "special autonomy" package before considering the possibility of independence. But after 32 years of Soeharto it seemed psychologically unthinkable and too early for the Habibie administration to consider such a move. As soon as the possibility of independence was declared an option in January, the alternative of a special autonomy was in fact killed. How much "face" would've been lost if the government had appointed Xanana Gusmao as governor of the province of East Timor within the framework of the unitary state, with the TNI consequently pulling out.

However, the new team under President Abdurrahman Wahid could eventually have succeeded in implementing such a scenario. East Timor's independence simply came at least a year or so too early!

B. COOMANS

Jakarta