We need clarifications

We need clarifications

The The Jakarta Post's editorial of Nov. 23, 1999, reports on
the latest progress on the truth about East Timor and the urgency
to question Gen. Wiranto on this matter.

Since his ascent to the military's top job I have continuously
regarded Wiranto with esteem. Imagine his three predecessors
being put into Wiranto's shoes: They would probably not have
succeeded so well. The way Wiranto stepped aside as a vice
presidential candidate confirmed my earlier feelings. But within
the whole picture there appears to be a black spot: the East
Timor campaign of terror and destruction after the Aug. 30, 1999,
ballot. How is it possible that the high profile Gen. Wiranto
could endure such a failure! A number of reasons remain
unassessed and call for clarifications:

1. Delusion and lack of knowledge of the feelings of the East
Timorese. Was local government reporting on the issue of the
referendum in a self-delusory way, up to the point of taking for
granted a pro-Jakarta victory? I would be extremely careful to
assert that the majority of the Acehnese, or the Irianese, would
opt to stay within a unitary state if given a chance to express
their wishes in a referendum about independence or not. There are
many parallel cases in which the political elite was sure of
victory which later proved to be a totally wrong assessment.

2. An absence of military strategy. Because of a possible impact
of "psychological obstacles in curbing or shooting the rampaging
pro-Indonesia militias" -- after 23 years of common fight against
the separatists -- TNI's command should have withdrawn in advance
all unreliable elements in the military and replace them with
soldiers from other military commands, as those would not have
any emotional ties with East Timor.

3. Irresponsible TNI conduct in East Timor. The announcement of
the results of the ballot on Sept. 4, 1999 and the imposition of
martial law were interspersed by the arrival of Maj. Gen. Kiki
Syahnakri on Sept. 8, 1999. During five full days a combination
of rogue TNI elements and militias were allowed to go on a
rampage of unrestrained destruction, burning, raping and killing
(National Committee of Human Rights Report, Nov. 20, 1999).

4. Was the inaction of TNI's top brass in Jakarta a conscious
tactical move so as to direct the blame for the East Timor mess
solely on Habibie as the initiator of East Timorese independence,
and thus kill off his last chances for reelection?

5. Am I right in my assessment that TNI top brass allowed the
military and pro-Jakarta militias a free hand for a couple of
days to take revenge and then reluctantly took control of the
situation again, having been pressured by the international
community?

There will remain much speculation why Habibie opted for a
U-turn in the government's policy on East Timor, and whether Ali
Alatas and Wiranto were fully consulted or not on this policy
prior to its announcement. All the bloodshed and pain could have
been avoided if the government had had a "sincere" intention to
draft and promote first a "special autonomy" package before
considering the possibility of independence. But after 32 years
of Soeharto it seemed psychologically unthinkable and too early
for the Habibie administration to consider such a move. As soon
as the possibility of independence was declared an option in
January, the alternative of a special autonomy was in fact
killed. How much "face" would've been lost if the government had
appointed Xanana Gusmao as governor of the province of East Timor
within the framework of the unitary state, with the TNI
consequently pulling out.

However, the new team under President Abdurrahman Wahid could
eventually have succeeded in implementing such a scenario.
East Timor's independence simply came at least a year or so too
early!

B. COOMANS

Jakarta