We must exhaust all non-military efforts for Aceh

We must exhaust all non-military efforts for Aceh

On May 9 The Jakarta Post held a panel discussion on Aceh with
former Indonesian Military (TNI) general affairs chief Lt. Gen.
(ret) Suadi Marasabessy, former state minister of human rights
Hasballah M. Saad, sociologist Otto Syamsuddin Ishak -- the last
two being Acehnese -- and analyst Kusnanto Anggoro. After
publishing on Monday the view of Suadi, today the Post is running
two articles taken from Hasballah's presentation:

The integrity of the republic for many, with regard to the
problem of Aceh is not an issue; it is that of how one maintains
it. Some are for the shortcut way of a military approach while
others refer to the experience of the 10-year military operation,
during which the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) did not become
significantly weaker.

This was because an entire generation with no previous
affinity toward GAM also became sympathetic to it because of
their anger, having become victims of the military operation.

This is the main lesson referred to by leaders in Aceh; that
various past operations, whatever their names, such as Operasi
Rencong, Operasi Cinta Meunasah and others which mainly involved
significant military engagements, have not quelled the
resistance.

GAM could even become bigger because those who are not GAM so
often also became victims. Nowadays, the media reports two or
three people killed on a daily basis and the perpetrators can
never be found. They are always OTK (unidentified, orang tak
dikenal). So those who suffer most have been civilians and it is
this trauma that haunts Acehnese in Aceh and elsewhere ...

So what now? We are now racing against time, if before May 12
GAM gives no sign of complying to the government's ultimatum
there will be no other choice apart from a military operation.

Yet, however small the chance, we must seize it.

If we can save the peace process, if the President and Cabinet
can see the people's aspirations, they might be able to decide
something other than a military operation. I would suggest, in
the search for a peace process, that the actors no longer only
comprise just GAM and the TNI, for both sides are armed and can
protect themselves, and each only speaks for their own interests.

If there is some space to involve Aceh's leaders; who on one
side still retain pride of being cited as among the republic's
pioneers but are in trauma and are even more prone to become
victims than GAM members -- if there is such space the atmosphere
in the dialog might not merely (lead to answers) A or B but
interests that can accommodate those who suffer most -- the
people. Maybe their expressions would be able to touch the hearts
on the side of GAM and TNI ...

But the difficulties are, first, that civilians are divided,
as reflected in East and Central Aceh. There are civilian groups
said to be artificially manufactured just to resist others. For
instance, in the attacks on the office of the Joint Security
Council in East Aceh, according to available information there, a
number of strange things were evident, but no proof has yet been
shown of "engineering."

Second, there are many civilian groups trying to interpret the
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), in a way that suits
their needs. One is the Aceh Referendum Information Center (SIRA)
which claims that the agreement's phrase "democratic and fair
elections in Aceh", means a referendum (for self determination).
That a neutral phrase in the Agreement can be interpreted loosely
for a group's own interest is very chaotic in the absence of a
single authoritative interpretation ...

In Aceh, they say that we cannot adopt the wrong policy or
else the spirit of Aceh's pioneers of the republic will be angry;
and because we closed our eyes, our children will later curse
us ... for losing opportunities because of the degrading of
intellectuality, the loss of creativity, of culture ...

If there is still no other option (than a military one), the
question remains: Is there an indicator to measure this choice? I
would suggest that the indicator be whether casualties decrease.

Ironically, whenever the TNI and police come to Aceh with the
noble mission of saving the people from GAM, with all their
equipment, ammunition and large budget, casualties among the
people increase.

Both sides claim to act in the interest of the people -- yet
they suffer the most. How does one explain that? Hence the need
for an objective indicator -- whether a military operation can be
done with minimum casualties. And whether there are still murders
by unidentified people; from May 2-6 there were still such cases.

A second indicator would be a loss of property. Further, from
Dec. 9 to Feb. 9 the intercity bus from Aceh to Medan was still
operating at night time, now it has stopped. Another indication
of safety is whether the coffee stalls stay open all along the
road until 1 a.m. -- Acehnese can drink coffee up to eight times
a day.

Third, whether crimes such as armed robberies decrease.

A legislator from East Aceh was one of the most recent victims
of an unidentified shooter.

How much will we be spending for all this (military
operation)? What if all the funds were not spent on ammunition,
military logistics, but for the operation to conquer the people's
hearts -- this is worth a try.

And how long will this operation be? After what situation will
it stop? These must be answered or it will become out of control
and we will be like Palestine.

Further, we have made a number of policies on Aceh such as a
number of presidential instructions; are they all still relevant,
and do the new policies complement the earlier ones?

And in 2000, the People's Consultative Assembly had given two
mandates to the government: To settle the Aceh conflict with
peaceful means and to set up a truth and reconciliation
commission for cases which cannot be resolved in court. Yet even
the law on the commission does not exist yet.

And various policies always get stuck at the regional level
maybe because of lack of commitment or capability, or claims of
lack of security. This is why I see weaknesses; all government
efforts apart from the military approach have not been exhausted.

We might still be able to delay a military option ... We could
form local truth and reconciliation teams ...

The then coordinating minister for political and security
affairs had agreed to a national commission on the settlement of
the Aceh issue which included civilian and military members and
also non Acehnese such as (former foreign minister) Ali Alatas,
(former home affairs minister) Surjadi Soedirdja, (Islamic
scholar) Nurcholish Madjid and military figures who understood
Aceh but who would seek a settlement within the framework of the
republic's integrity, so the commission could be balanced. ...

But there has been no consistency for long term and
systmematic planning.

The (government) has said we'll set up refugee camps in the
event of a military operation -- but for how long? How about the
children's schooling? I cried when I saw how in Maluku those who
fled (the conflict) returned and realized that they no longer had
control over their own property ...

So there is so much to be considered and if only the funds
were used to conquer people's hearts, we might have a different
story. So I'm optimistic as long as we have a little patience ...

True, no nation can ignore an armed uprising against its
legitimate government, but if we look back a little, and a little
bit beyond, maybe the decisions can be slightly altered.

If we agreed to split up the nation, we wouldn't be here. I
wouldn't have joined in initiating the law on Aceh's special
autonomy. But I'm disappointed with the legislators. We discussed
the law dozens of times but with an added comma here and a phrase
there, the substance has been ruined. We agreed on a direct
election of the governor but then it says this would be done five
years after the law is passed, or in 2006 while the president can
be directly elected in 2004. This law was meant for a settlement
for Aceh!

So this makes it clear about those who sincerely want the
issue resolved and those in are pursuit of their own interests.