We can choose what sort of Chinese invasion we want

Swagato Ganguly The Stateman Asia News Network Calcutta

Why does Chinese premier Zhu Rongji come visiting India on a six-day tour at a time when tensions between India and Pakistan are at their peak, only three months after canceling a scheduled trip to New Delhi out of deference to the sentiments of General Musharraf? The answer is that Delhi is at last learning to play the game that Beijing excels at: economic pragmatism combined with the kind of realpolitik which places above all else the nation's strategic interests.

Consider the manner in which Beijing covertly supplied nuclear materials and knowhow to Islamabad while publicly endorsing the notion of a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia, pointedly excluding itself. By keeping India tied down to its conflict with Pakistan, the strategy effectively precludes India from emerging as an economic and political challenger to China.

The Indian establishment, by contrast, generally pussy-foots when it comes to Beijing. It seldom makes an issue of Beijing's supply of missiles and of nuclear weapon designs and materials to Pakistan, a situation comparable to the Soviets supplying nuclear missiles to Cuba aimed at the U.S. Contrast the vigor of the American response with the preferred option of quite a few Indian media pundits, or of politicians like Subramaniam Swamy, which consists of silencing the Dalai Lama in the hope that this will keep Beijing happy. Delhi reiterates time and again that it considers Tibet a part of China, how often has it been rewarded with a matching response from Beijing that recognizes Kashmir and Sikkim as parts of India?

However, the Beijing-Islamabad relationship is not free of complications either, a fact not often noted in India. One, the Chinese too have been victims of Islamic militants trained in Pakistan. Two, Beijing is uncomfortable with the fact that U.S. forces have been given the use of Jacobabad, Pasni and two other airbases in Pakistan, and may be given listening posts in Gilgit which would enable the U.S. to eavesdrop on Chinese nuclear activities.

Xinjiang, dominated by Uighur Muslims, is one of the poorest provinces that has been left behind by rapidly modernizing China; it also borders Afghanistan and Pakistan's North West Frontier province, from where it has been exposed to radical Islamic influences. Muslim guerrillas have attacked Chinese troops and government buildings; setting off, in September 2000, a massive bomb blast in Urumqi, Xinjiangs main city, which killed hundreds. The Chinese authorities have been equally repressive; only a few months back, dozens of captured Islamic separatists were publicly shot at a city square in Kashgar.

Xinjiang is actually China's Kashmir, with two important differences. One, China is not a democratic country with a free press, and less information leaks to the outside world. Two, there is no external agent interested in sponsoring that insurgency and thus internationalizing the issue. Beijing, however, sees itself as being as much afflicted by terrorism as the U.S., the Russians, or anybody else. Rongji has accordingly set up in cooperation with New Delhi a joint working group on terrorism. He has also made clear during this visit that Beijing considers Kashmir a strictly bilateral issue, to be settled between India and Pakistan, a point of view that leaves Islamabad isolated in its effort to internationalize Kashmir.

What has upped the ante for Beijing is increasing American involvement in both India and Pakistan, which leaves it with the prospect of being isolated in South Asia. And this has to be attributed to some deft footwork by New Delhi, which by making an open-ended offer of cooperation with Washington after September 11, forced Musharraf to do the same and eventually dump the Taliban, the creation of an Islamised Pakistani military looking for "strategic space." Secondly, by mobilizing troops and slamming diplomatic sanctions on Islamabad in response to the Dec. 13 attack on Parliament, pressure that has led Musharraf into issuing unprecedented statements against the Islamic militancy that his army fosters, New Delhi has shown Beijing it has a will of its own, and engagement with it may be a better policy than containment.

The bellwether of Beijing's policy since the 1980s -- and this is the difference between Beijing and Islamabad -- has been its economic pragmatism. If Napoleon once described the British as a nation of shopkeepers, that is certainly true of China today. Its awesome economic machine maintained spectacular rates of growth even when the rest of Asia was failing in 1997, and the world went into quasi-recession in 2001. With American investment in India's budding software sector, and sanctions against India at an end, Beijing senses growing business opportunities here. It must be observed, though, that even at this point Beijing's policy towards New Delhi is a finely calibrated one. While Rongji tours India at its point of maximal tension with Pakistan, Beijing is also shoring up its long-time ally by rushing five shiploads of military hardware and aircraft, including at least 40 F-7B fighter planes.

Delhi must be prepared to be equally flexible in its diplomacy. Following Vajpayee's enunciation of a "look East" policy, a good model to follow in this respect is that of ASEAN countries, which have combined a basically pro-Western policy with efforts to engage China, Japan and Russia. The former has led to open markets for their exports, Western investments and technology transfers, as well as security co-operation from the U.S.; the latter has ensured that each power remains a competitive bidder for influence. Far more effective than grandstanding at non-aligned meets and otherwise contemplating its navel, which has long been Indian diplomacy's forte.

Delhi, in fact, may already be some way along the ASEAN road, if Washington's support for the sale of the Israeli Phalcon Airborne Early Warning Command and Control System (AWACS) to India is any indication. This is one of the most advanced airborne radars in the world which would give India clear air superiority over Pakistan; moreover, it is one that Beijing tried hard to obtain but failed due to opposition from Washington. Depending on the sagacity of the U.S. administration and the ability of both Washington and Delhi to move beyond Cold War mindsets, the end of the hyphenated relationship with Islamabad may be in sight.

In the long run, it is vested interests created by business and trade which obviate the necessity of conflict. Because of China's economic interdependence with ASEAN countries it has no border disputes with them, but goes to great lengths to reassure them about its intentions. The dispute over the Spratly islands may be an exception, but here again the motive is economic: at stake is the exclusive economic zone a nation can claim under maritime law, extending 200 nautical miles from its shoreline. If Beijing develops close trade ties with Delhi, that will lead not only to progress in resolution of the border dispute, but Beijing can be expected to rein in Islamabad's penchant for strategies that destabilize the whole of South Asia.

Deft diplomacy, however, will not work if bereft of an economic backbone, and New Delhi's refusal to fast-track economic reforms could throw a spanner in the works. Power flows not from the barrel of a gun, as Mao Zedong proposed, but from the ability to produce the goods the world wants. Beijing has hit upon this quicker than New Delhi, perhaps precisely because of the excesses of the Maoist years -- China attracts as much FDI in six months as India drew through the whole of the 1990s.

But what could force the issue is the new Chinese "invasion" that is imminent, now that both India and China are members of the WTO. When Rongji was at Mumbai his men surveyed the city's markets, and found household goods there three to six times more expensive than in China. The entry of Chinese goods in Indian markets, necessitated by WTO rules, should have the salutary effect of concentrating policymakers' minds and forcing efficiency on Indian industry, which in turn would make its exports competitive. This needs freedom to engage and shed staff. And this takes us straight back to square one.