Was violence needed in Peru drama?

By Arief Budiman

SALATIGA, Central Java (JP): The hostage crisis in Peru ended dramatically. On April 22, Peruvian military special forces stormed the Japanese embassy in which 72 hostages had been held for 126 days. One hostage and two military men died and all 14 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) guerrillas, including two young women, were killed.

President Alberto Fujimori has been applauded by the majority of his own people as well as the international community for this successful military operation. As the echoes of this dramatic event fade, maybe it is time now to rethink this whole tragedy: what lesson can be learned, who gets what and who are the victims?

One lesson is clear; today's society is quite vulnerable to terrorism. Despite more sophisticated technology being developed to increase security, terrorism can't be wiped out entirely. Airplanes can still be hijacked, top state officials kidnapped and embassies stormed. We must increase our awareness to anticipate any possible act of terrorism, we must be aware that terrorism cannot be abolished 100 percent from modern society.

Due to this, it is equally important to think about the root cause of terrorism. Broadly speaking, there are two possible causes: criminal and political. It is clear that we have to deal toughly with criminal terrorism. Nobody, except the terrorists, has sympathy for this kind of terrorism.

However, the case is different with political terrorism. The causes of political terrorism can vary, from religious fanaticism to the demand for social justice. Like criminal terrorism, we may not agree with the way it is carried out, namely by force and endangering the lives of innocent people, but with the cause. We may be sympathetic to the cause fought by the guerrillas, such as the demand for social justice. Thus our attitude to terrorism may differ depending on the kind of cause believed in by different groups. To agree with the cause doesn't necessarily mean that we agree with the method.

The cause fought by the MRTA is for the poor in Peru. After invading the Japanese embassy, their demands not only included asking for the release of their jailed comrades but also that the government improve the living conditions of the poor. This demand was very much in line with their Marxist ideology, which always tries to help the so-called "oppressed class".

Peru is a classic case of an underdeveloped country trying to develop its economy by adopting the capitalist route. The macroeconomic indicators have shown that under President Fujimori, Peru's economy has been improving. In 1990, when he first assumed power, inflation was 7,750 percent and the economy grew negatively by 4.5 percent. In 1995, inflation was only 15.4 percent and the economy grew by 12.5 percent (Kompas, April 24, 1997).

However, as in other developing countries, the poor have become the victims of this kind of development. Therefore, the struggles to help the poor do not come from the leftist movements only, but also from the right. The radical Catholic "liberation theology" movement has strong roots in this country. One of the first and most important thinkers of this theology is Gustavo Gutierez, a Peruvian Catholic priest. Thus, the social injustices that have existed in Peru for many years have been fought against by both the left and the right. MRTA is only one of them, not the only one.

President Fujimori was elected, among other issues, based on his strong campaign against terrorism. He was quite successful in weakening terrorist groups in Peru, many of their leaders now are in jail. When he had to face the hostage drama, he was really in a very difficult position. His problem became more complicated because the Japanese government, to which he was dependent for economic aid, was pressing him not to use violence to solve this hostage problem.

For Prime Minister Hashimoto of Japan, if the Japanese ambassador or some other Japanese high official got killed or seriously injured, he would have faced serious political problem in his country. So, what he did was to put pressure to Fujimori not to use violence and to compromise with the MRTA group. For this, Hashimoto was ready to provide millions of dollars for the guerrillas.

It is clear that this could not be accepted by Fujimori. This was the reason why Fujimori never made a clear statement from the beginning that he would not use violence to solve this problem. Neither did he say that he would compromise with the MRTA because if he did, he would have lost his popularity in Peru. Similarly, the MRTA did not want to step back from their demand that some of their jailed friends be released and the poor be helped economically. They only compromised on the number. This was still unacceptable to Fujimori.

The only way opened for Fujimori was to use the military to release the hostages. And he had better be successful; to make sure that no Japanese hostages got injured, or, as was said before, his political career would have ended at this point. If he failed, both the Japanese and his own people would have blamed him. The military option was even more unlikely to be chosen because there had been an estimate that 70 percent of the hostages could have been killed if this option was taken.

However, for Fujimori, this was the only option, no matter the chance was very slight. He really had no other choice. Risking his political career, and without telling Hashimoto, he launched the military attack, and to the surprise of everybody, it was greatly successful. It was not surprising when Fujimori, almost like an exuberant child, "ran" to the streets of Lima publicly showing his happiness after this successful operation.

After this, both Peru and Japan seemed happy because their interests had been served well. Everybody seemed to get what they wanted. Hashimoto, who had insisted on a peaceful solution to the problem as if it was a matter of principle, failed to say anything and congratulated Fujimori for the military operation. No Japanese hostages were seriously injured, so his political career is safe.

Not only did Fujimori escape from a very difficult political situation but he strengthened his political position and made his political future brighter. The ordeal seems to end on a happy note for almost everybody.

While everyone cheers the successful military operation, the family of the MRTA guerrillas are mourning their dead. Some questions have crept up: Was it really necessary to kill all 14 guerrillas? Were they killed because they were endangering the lives of the hostages or the soldiers, or, they were simply executed?

Some of the freed hostages have started telling their stories. Bangkok Post (April 26, 1997) reported that at least two guerrillas were executed by soldiers. These two were unarmed when they were captured. They were told to stand against the wall and shot with separate bursts of gunfire, one after the other.

The soldiers also shot others who begged to surrender. One teenage guerrilla girl was also shot to death despite yelling she wanted to give herself up. Rodolfo Munante, the Peruvian minister of agriculture who was among the hostages, testified: "One rebel surrendered in the room where the judges were ... he told the judges he surrendered, but then (a soldier) entered and machine- gunned (the rebels)."

Even Fujimori denied that he had given instructions to kill all the guerrillas. Many people believe that it is very likely that this instruction was given. It was too risky for Fujimori to have some of these guerrillas get out alive and to put them on trial. The trial would attract world attention and would be a very effective political forum for the cause of the MRTA struggle. It was better for Fujimori to kill them all, while world sympathy was still on his side. Again, the individual political interest of the president was put as more important than human lives.

Sympathy for the MRTA guerrillas grew a little bit more when Munante told another moving story. He said a teenage guerrilla whom he had taught how to sketches during the four-month ordeal, came into his room when the soldiers stormed the embassy, pointing a rifle at him.

"I look at him and he was aiming at me but he did not shoot," Munante said. (Japan Times, April 27, 1997). From this story, it is clear that the MRTA guerrillas were not violent people, even though they had endangered the lives of the hostages.

The leader of the terrorist group, Nestor Cerpa Cartolini, was reported as being a nonviolent intellectual who favored books over bullets and dialog over death. (Japan Times, April 24, 1997). The fact that they released hundreds of hostages, including Fujimori's mother, has strengthened this impression. Combined with the cause of their struggle, namely to help the poor, it is not surprising that the MRTA is getting quite a lot of sympathy, even from those who do not agree with its method of taking innocent people as hostages.

In Peru, as reported by Japan Times (April 27, 1997), a public poll was conducted in Lima one day after the rescue. According to this poll, 55 percent of the poor respondents were upset that the guerrillas died in the assault. Only 33 percent of the wealthy people shared this concern. This has proved that the MRTA has been fighting for the rights of the poor. In a press conference after the rescue operation, Bishop Cipriani, who had acted as mediator to release the hostages, shed tears for the loss of life, soldiers, hostage and guerrillas alike.

The hostage drama has ended. The problems of poverty and injustice for the poor remain. Fujimori has to deal with this. I think, after this tragedy, Fujimori will deal with these problems more seriously. In this sense, the deaths of the 14 MRTA guerrillas are not totally useless. They have served as a sacrifice.

The writer is a sociologist and researcher based in Salatiga.

Window: Not only did Fujimori escape from a very difficult political situation but he strengthened his political position and made his political future brighter. The ordeal seems to end on a happy note for almost everybody.