War on 'preman': Fighting crime or joining in?

War on 'preman': Fighting crime or joining in?

Despite a legacy of organized crime, Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso
has said that freeing Jakarta of thugs is "easy." Researcher Tim
Lindsey, Associate Professor and Director of the Asian Law Centre
at The University of Melbourne, examines whether the policy is
effective.

MELBOURNE, Australia (JP): Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso has
declared war on crime. "The concept is easy. Let's fight
hoodlums together. That's it," he declared recently (The Jakarta
Post, April 10).

Unfortunately it's not as simple as that. Setting criminals to
get rid of other criminals will not solve Jakarta's spiraling
problems of theft, extortion and street violence. Some background
is necessary to explain why.

Sutiyoso's target are the preman. From the Dutch for freeman,
the term refers to the gangsters found throughout Indonesia who
run protection rackets in bus terminals, shopping malls, markets,
parking lots, nightclubs, brothels and similar places.

Under the New Order, preman were closely tied in with local
government authorities -- especially police and local government
-- through a practice known as deking or beking. Beking allowed
money extorted from the public to find its way up through
President Soeharto's corrupt "franchise system".

The preman thus enriched members of the elite who in turn
allowed local officials to protect the standover rackets;
everyone received a cut of the money extorted from business
operators.

Beking allowed criminal activities to become highly organized.
Under Soeharto, almost every shop, bar and nightclub in Jakarta
paid money for "protection". Most public spaces and markets were
controlled by an "authorized" gang, often defined by its
ethnicity. Tanah Abang, for example, was controlled by Madurese,
led by Pak Mayor, while Blok M is Surabayan territory.

Since Soeharto, the disintegration of New Order beking
structures has led preman to struggle among themselves for
territory. Minangkabau gangs are currently fighting to take the
Tanah Abang market from the Madurese, who are starting to look
elsewhere for pickings.

The situation is worsened by the economic crisis. It has
pushed previously law-abiding citizens into becoming preman, as
they see no other way of earning a living. This increases turf
wars as newcomers fight for a niche. The impression among Jakarta
residents is of crime out of control and so rising vigilantism
adds to the chaos.

For his war against hoodlums Governor Sutiyoso will deploy
some 1,900 civilian police assistants or Banpol, in addition to
800 police officers. Jakarta police chief Insp. Gen. Mulyono
Sulaeman says that stern action will be taken and officers will
be licensed to shoot any preman who resist arrest "in self-
defense".

The problem with this strategy is that Sutiyoso is setting
thieves to catch thieves. There is widespread concern that the
Banpol are themselves little better than preman.

For example, Azas Tigor Nainggolan, coordinator of Jakarta
Street Traders Association, has complained in the past that
Banpol frequently use violence against street traders. Likewise,
the South Jakarta Public Order Office has been accused of hiring
Madurese preman, dressing them as public order recruits (PotMas)
members and using them to force street traders out of locations
near the Blok M bus terminal.

The South Jakarta mayor claims -- improbably -- that they are
not preman but admits paying them Rp 15,000 per day.

Using preman as government recruits by setting up dubious
organizations and providing uniforms was a well-established New
Order tactic. Pemuda Pancasila and other "youth groups" were --
and still are -- used by the members of the elite and government
to attack and intimidate their opponents.

These groups blur the line between non-governmental
organizations, gangs and militias and have the potential to
influence politics at the highest level. The role of the
militias in East Timor is an example of this, as are the
President's threats to bring Ansor's civilian security guards
(Banser) members to wreak havoc in Jakarta if his opponents
continue to seek his impeachment.

When Ali Murtopo's "zoo" of preman -- used to do the then
ruling Golkar's dirty work -- got out of control in the mid-1980s
Soeharto's response was the notorious petrus killings (extralegal
assassinations).

Is Sutiyoso's plan to hire Banpol thugs to push preman out of
markets that different to the petrus operation in principle?
Will the thugs who are pushed out be replaced by the thugs who
pushed them out?

Is this war against preman or will it simply replace one group
of preman with another that has backing from the latest set of
officials?

Even if Sutiyoso's intentions are good, it will take more than
hiring of thugs to stop thugs operating in Jakarta. It is almost
impossible to stop crime while state officials like police or
local government are involved.

A systematic cleansing and restructuring of the whole state
system is necessary before government initiatives to clean up the
private sector can offer much hope for ordinary citizens.

Sadly, that's not likely any time soon.