War on 'preman': Fighting crime or joining in?

Despite a legacy of organized crime, Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso has said that freeing Jakarta of thugs is "easy." Researcher Tim Lindsey, Associate Professor and Director of the Asian Law Centre at The University of Melbourne, examines whether the policy is effective.

MELBOURNE, Australia (JP): Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso has declared war on crime. "The concept is easy. Let's fight hoodlums together. That's it," he declared recently (The Jakarta Post, April 10).

Unfortunately it's not as simple as that. Setting criminals to get rid of other criminals will not solve Jakarta's spiraling problems of theft, extortion and street violence. Some background is necessary to explain why.

Sutiyoso's target are the preman. From the Dutch for freeman, the term refers to the gangsters found throughout Indonesia who run protection rackets in bus terminals, shopping malls, markets, parking lots, nightclubs, brothels and similar places.

Under the New Order, preman were closely tied in with local government authorities -- especially police and local government -- through a practice known as deking or beking. Beking allowed money extorted from the public to find its way up through President Soeharto's corrupt "franchise system".

The preman thus enriched members of the elite who in turn allowed local officials to protect the standover rackets; everyone received a cut of the money extorted from business operators.

Beking allowed criminal activities to become highly organized. Under Soeharto, almost every shop, bar and nightclub in Jakarta paid money for "protection". Most public spaces and markets were controlled by an "authorized" gang, often defined by its ethnicity. Tanah Abang, for example, was controlled by Madurese, led by Pak Mayor, while Blok M is Surabayan territory.

Since Soeharto, the disintegration of New Order beking structures has led preman to struggle among themselves for territory. Minangkabau gangs are currently fighting to take the Tanah Abang market from the Madurese, who are starting to look elsewhere for pickings.

The situation is worsened by the economic crisis. It has pushed previously law-abiding citizens into becoming preman, as they see no other way of earning a living. This increases turf wars as newcomers fight for a niche. The impression among Jakarta residents is of crime out of control and so rising vigilantism adds to the chaos.

For his war against hoodlums Governor Sutiyoso will deploy some 1,900 civilian police assistants or Banpol, in addition to 800 police officers. Jakarta police chief Insp. Gen. Mulyono Sulaeman says that stern action will be taken and officers will be licensed to shoot any preman who resist arrest "in self- defense".

The problem with this strategy is that Sutiyoso is setting thieves to catch thieves. There is widespread concern that the Banpol are themselves little better than preman.

For example, Azas Tigor Nainggolan, coordinator of Jakarta Street Traders Association, has complained in the past that Banpol frequently use violence against street traders. Likewise, the South Jakarta Public Order Office has been accused of hiring Madurese preman, dressing them as public order recruits (PotMas) members and using them to force street traders out of locations near the Blok M bus terminal.

The South Jakarta mayor claims -- improbably -- that they are not preman but admits paying them Rp 15,000 per day.

Using preman as government recruits by setting up dubious organizations and providing uniforms was a well-established New Order tactic. Pemuda Pancasila and other "youth groups" were -- and still are -- used by the members of the elite and government to attack and intimidate their opponents.

These groups blur the line between non-governmental organizations, gangs and militias and have the potential to influence politics at the highest level. The role of the militias in East Timor is an example of this, as are the President's threats to bring Ansor's civilian security guards (Banser) members to wreak havoc in Jakarta if his opponents continue to seek his impeachment.

When Ali Murtopo's "zoo" of preman -- used to do the then ruling Golkar's dirty work -- got out of control in the mid-1980s Soeharto's response was the notorious petrus killings (extralegal assassinations).

Is Sutiyoso's plan to hire Banpol thugs to push preman out of markets that different to the petrus operation in principle? Will the thugs who are pushed out be replaced by the thugs who pushed them out?

Is this war against preman or will it simply replace one group of preman with another that has backing from the latest set of officials?

Even if Sutiyoso's intentions are good, it will take more than hiring of thugs to stop thugs operating in Jakarta. It is almost impossible to stop crime while state officials like police or local government are involved.

A systematic cleansing and restructuring of the whole state system is necessary before government initiatives to clean up the private sector can offer much hope for ordinary citizens.

Sadly, that's not likely any time soon.