Voters lose out in House-member selection

The political parties have recently submitted their lists of candidates for next year's general election. Arbi Sanit argues that the process of legislator nomination is marred by tensions which put the people's interests last.

JAKARTA (JP): The submission by the three political parties of their lists of prospective legislators last month and the current screening of those nominees is but one of three potential conflicts in Indonesian politics.

The other two are matters related to the General Elections Institute and the political parties' campaigning period.

The ruling Golkar organization and the Moslem-oriented United Development Party (PPP) have each submitted 850 candidates while the tiny Christian-nationalist alliance of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) has put up 903 names for scrutiny. The three are competing for 425 of the House's seats. The other 75 are reserved for the Armed Forces (ABRI).

The institute will allocate seats according to the votes won by each of the parties in the general election and pick the nominees according to their place on the lists.

The potential for political conflict at the candidacy level works in two stages. The first is the internal conflict within each political party; between party members and their leaders as well as the conflict among the party elites themselves. It is the latter which is often the most intense.

The second stage of potential conflict is between the political parties and the government. As has become obvious from elections throughout the New Order period, it is this which determines the final results of the candidate-selection process.

However, from the first stage of conflict onward, government intervention cannot be ruled out entirely. Golkar, however, is fortunate to have the autonomy to conduct its own political screening (to ensure that none of the candidates have past links with the outlawed Indonesian Communist Party).

It has been common practice for the two other parties, the PPP and the PDI, to accommodate requests from outside their membership when drafting their candidate lists.

The second stage of conflict occurs during the screening process by the party committees and the security apparatus.

Additionally there are two basic forms of conflict of House members' nomination: group and constitutional. Group conflict occurs among various political mainstream factions within the PPP and PDI, as both are coalitions of various smaller political parties, as well as among the various functional groupings within Golkar.

Institutional conflict refers to conflict between organizational units within the political parties, such as between regional offices and branch offices or with the party's leadership board.

Although officially all conflicts will be resolved by institutional means, the real resolution is achieved through personal meetings between party-member hopefuls and the party leader - who has the final say.

There is a difference in the social base of the conflict in PPP and PDI on the one hand and Golkar on the other. Candidacy conflict within PPP and PDI is strongly colored by the interests of the various political groupings comprising the umbrella parties.

Resolution of their conflicts is usually achieved through the fulfillment of those interests. Although various factors, such as generation gaps, length of service of party officials, cliques, "primordialism" and nepotism come into play, the end composition of the candidate lists will reflect the various political streamlines.

This is so because not only is the political mainstream entrenched in the history of both political parties it is also more quantifiable.

On the other hand, inter-departmental conflict is not inherent in Golkar's process of House-member selection. The force at play here is the conflict of interests between ABRI's dual-function role (defense and sociopolitics), the regeneration of its political actors and the power of its businessmen.

The shrinking of the Armed Forces (ABRI) representation in the House of Representatives from 100 to 75 and the adoption of the "leading from the shadows" (tut wuri handayani) style of leadership, which in effect puts senior leaders in the background, has forced the military to seek new trustworthy candidates.

This process is very similar to that adopted by Golkar. ABRI's obvious source of candidates is KBA, a collection of organizations under the aegis of ABRI. These include the association of the ABRI children, the ABRI wives and many others.

On the other hand, the increasingly affluent but youthful KBA members are pushing to enter the House of Representatives in order to have a say in future policy making. And the door is wide open for them as the ruling Golkar also needs new blood to replace 70 percent of its 300-odd members.

It is indeed disheartening that the system of resolving conflicts in the selection of prospective legislators has not resulted in equal benefits for the four political elements: namely the voters, the government, the political parties and the candidates.

Should one try to make a list of those who will benefit most from the system, the government would come out on the top, followed by the political parties and the candidates. The people, who are said to possess the sovereignty of the state, come last.

The government is in the most advantageous position because the candidates have been screened to become government supporters. They are neither partners nor challengers.

Political parties benefit because they can expect their candidates to become "party troops". They are not independent and less willing to side with the "enemy".

The candidates also accrue an advantage because the possibility is open for them to hold certain government positions along with social benefits such as prestige, financial benefits and political benefits.

It is the people, or the voters, who have nothing to gain politically because the candidates will become autonomous representatives whose performance is uncontrollable.

The writer is a lecturer of political science at the University of Indonesia.