Voters lose out in House-member selection

Voters lose out in House-member selection

The political parties have recently submitted their lists of
candidates for next year's general election. Arbi Sanit argues
that the process of legislator nomination is marred by tensions
which put the people's interests last.

JAKARTA (JP): The submission by the three political parties of
their lists of prospective legislators last month and the current
screening of those nominees is but one of three potential
conflicts in Indonesian politics.

The other two are matters related to the General Elections
Institute and the political parties' campaigning period.

The ruling Golkar organization and the Moslem-oriented United
Development Party (PPP) have each submitted 850 candidates while
the tiny Christian-nationalist alliance of the Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDI) has put up 903 names for scrutiny. The
three are competing for 425 of the House's seats. The other 75
are reserved for the Armed Forces (ABRI).

The institute will allocate seats according to the votes won
by each of the parties in the general election and pick the
nominees according to their place on the lists.

The potential for political conflict at the candidacy level
works in two stages. The first is the internal conflict within
each political party; between party members and their leaders as
well as the conflict among the party elites themselves. It is the
latter which is often the most intense.

The second stage of potential conflict is between the
political parties and the government. As has become obvious from
elections throughout the New Order period, it is this which
determines the final results of the candidate-selection process.

However, from the first stage of conflict onward, government
intervention cannot be ruled out entirely. Golkar, however, is
fortunate to have the autonomy to conduct its own political
screening (to ensure that none of the candidates have past links
with the outlawed Indonesian Communist Party).

It has been common practice for the two other parties, the PPP
and the PDI, to accommodate requests from outside their
membership when drafting their candidate lists.

The second stage of conflict occurs during the screening
process by the party committees and the security apparatus.

Additionally there are two basic forms of conflict of House
members' nomination: group and constitutional. Group conflict
occurs among various political mainstream factions within the PPP
and PDI, as both are coalitions of various smaller political
parties, as well as among the various functional groupings within
Golkar.

Institutional conflict refers to conflict between
organizational units within the political parties, such as
between regional offices and branch offices or with the party's
leadership board.

Although officially all conflicts will be resolved by
institutional means, the real resolution is achieved through
personal meetings between party-member hopefuls and the party
leader - who has the final say.

There is a difference in the social base of the conflict in
PPP and PDI on the one hand and Golkar on the other. Candidacy
conflict within PPP and PDI is strongly colored by the interests
of the various political groupings comprising the umbrella
parties.

Resolution of their conflicts is usually achieved through the
fulfillment of those interests. Although various factors, such as
generation gaps, length of service of party officials, cliques,
"primordialism" and nepotism come into play, the end composition
of the candidate lists will reflect the various political
streamlines.

This is so because not only is the political mainstream
entrenched in the history of both political parties it is also
more quantifiable.

On the other hand, inter-departmental conflict is not inherent
in Golkar's process of House-member selection. The force at play
here is the conflict of interests between ABRI's dual-function
role (defense and sociopolitics), the regeneration of its
political actors and the power of its businessmen.

The shrinking of the Armed Forces (ABRI) representation in the
House of Representatives from 100 to 75 and the adoption of the
"leading from the shadows" (tut wuri handayani) style of
leadership, which in effect puts senior leaders in the
background, has forced the military to seek new trustworthy
candidates.

This process is very similar to that adopted by Golkar. ABRI's
obvious source of candidates is KBA, a collection of
organizations under the aegis of ABRI. These include the
association of the ABRI children, the ABRI wives and many others.

On the other hand, the increasingly affluent but youthful KBA
members are pushing to enter the House of Representatives in
order to have a say in future policy making. And the door is wide
open for them as the ruling Golkar also needs new blood to
replace 70 percent of its 300-odd members.

It is indeed disheartening that the system of resolving
conflicts in the selection of prospective legislators has not
resulted in equal benefits for the four political elements:
namely the voters, the government, the political parties and the
candidates.

Should one try to make a list of those who will benefit most
from the system, the government would come out on the top,
followed by the political parties and the candidates. The people,
who are said to possess the sovereignty of the state, come last.

The government is in the most advantageous position because
the candidates have been screened to become government
supporters. They are neither partners nor challengers.

Political parties benefit because they can expect their
candidates to become "party troops". They are not independent and
less willing to side with the "enemy".

The candidates also accrue an advantage because the
possibility is open for them to hold certain government positions
along with social benefits such as prestige, financial benefits
and political benefits.

It is the people, or the voters, who have nothing to gain
politically because the candidates will become autonomous
representatives whose performance is uncontrollable.

The writer is a lecturer of political science at the
University of Indonesia.