Viewing Australia's Papua policy

By Siswo Pramono

JAKARTA (JP): After East Timor, Papua, officially Irian Jaya, is another potential obstacle for Indonesia-Australia relations. Many Indonesians are suspicious of Australia's motives relating to Papua.

What, if any, is Australian policy on Papua?

The early Australian policy on the island of New Guinea was formulated at the end of the 19th century, in response to rivalry between the big powers to the north of Australia.

The Dutch established its first settlement in Western New Guinea, or the current Indonesian province of Irian Jaya, in 1828. The Germans claimed the north eastern part of the island, then called New Guinea, in 1884.

Persuaded by Australia, the British counter-balanced the German presence by declaring a protectorate over the southeast of New Guinea.

The British handed over its protectorate to Australia in 1906. Following Germany's defeat in World War I, Australia received a mandate from the League of Nations to govern the former German domain of New Guinea. Australia administered the two colonies together as a single territory, hereafter called Papua New Guinea (PNG).

Australia used PNG as a buffer zone against possible Japanese invasion of its mainland during World War II.

The end of that war marked the dawn of decolonization. The Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed independent in 1945, becoming the rightful heir of the former Netherlands East Indie.

The 1950s saw waves of instability in Southeast Asia. Indonesia was involved in confrontations with the Dutch over Papua and later with Malaysia. In Indochina, the Vietminh asserted its victory against the French.

Australia formulated a dual policy towards Indonesia. It recognized Indonesia's integrity and independence but supported Dutch occupation of Papua. For Australia, Papua would function better as a buffer zone under the Dutch than under Indonesia.

The ensuing Australian Papua policy led to a deal with the Dutch, and in 1957 the establishment of a joint statement of administrative cooperation in New Guinea.

This arrangement triggered speculation about a plan to establish a Melanesian Federation stretching from (Dutch) Papua, (Australian) Papua New Guinea to, perhaps, the Solomon Islands. This policy in fact accentuated Melanesian identity in Papua and in the broader region of the South West Pacific.

The Cold War accelerated the integration of Papua within Indonesia's territorial boundaries. America's Cold War politics dictated that Australia, the U.S.'s main ally under the Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) mutual security treaty, abandon the Dutch and instead support Indonesia's claim.

American containment policies suggested that the West must give Papua to Indonesia as a token to influence the termination of Sukarno's pro-China policy. Australia, since then, has adopted a policy pursuant to the New York Agreement of 1962 and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution in 1969, which recognized Papua as an integral part of Indonesia.

Notwithstanding the Cold War and Australia's pro-Indonesia policy, an echo of the aborted Melanesian Federation remains strong in Papua. The secessionist movements, spearheaded by the Free Papua Organization (OPM), have used the echo as a wake-up call for Melanesian nationalism in Papua.

The hardening of Melanesian nationalism has also been partly, if not mostly, fostered by Indonesia's enduring mismanagement in Papua. Economic exploitation has resulted in environmental degradation. Local grievances have been addressed militarily and, as a consequence, various human rights violations have been perpetrated.

Improper transmigration programs brought cultural conflicts into the already strained environment. But all were well accepted by Australia and the United States, the main investors in mining in the eastern part of Indonesia, so long as Indonesia was friendly to the West.

Decades of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations have caused an influx of refugees across the border of Papua New Guinea. Feverish pursuit of OPM members by the Indonesian army has strained bilateral relations.

As a precaution, Papua New Guinea established security cooperation with Australia in 1987. By then Australia could be dragged in if conflict were to develop along the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea borders. Coordinated policies between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea regarding trans-border issues minimized such risks.

Dramatic changes at the turn of the 20th century provides two levels of opportunity for the Papuan course. At the domestic level, following the fall of Soeharto in 1998, political reform in Indonesia has enabled Papuans to channel grievances through domestic and international forums.

At the international level, the post Cold War politics of humanitarian intervention encouraged the OPM to imitate the success story of Fretilin's independence struggle in East Timor. At this point, the OPM turned to Australia for help, considering this country's role in the post-ballot crisis of East Timor.

Australia's longstanding policy on Papua has been reactive and pragmatic. It is reactive in the sense that the policy is formulated to attain an immediate, rather than enduring, political gain. It is pragmatic, meaning that the policy bends to the global politics of the major powers, particularly the U.S..

So what are the implications of Australia's stance?

Unfortunately they are not clear. First, New Guinea always functions as a buffer zone to the north of Australia: against the Germans in the 1880s, against the Japanese in the 1940s, against Southeast Asian turbulence in the 1950s and against the communists during the Cold War.

A closed meeting in Canberra arranged by the Australian National University last month concluded that Indonesia now had implications for Australia in a negative sense: a breakdown inside the country would impact on Australia or Australia- Indonesia relations, developing from coolness to hostility, The Sydney Morning Herald reported.

The question is, if Indonesia represented turbulence right at Australia's doorstep, would New Guinea function as a buffer zone? Which would have served better for Australia as a buffer zone: A Papua under Indonesia or a Papua under a Melanesian regime with close attachment to the South West Pacific? The South West Pacific is always within the Australian traditional sphere of influence.

Second, Australia's policy toward New Guinea, including Papua, is always one with special attachment to the Western powers: to the British in the 1880s, to the Dutch in the 1950s and to the US during the Cold War.

Furthermore, if the U.S. asked for Australian leadership in a Papua crisis militarily or otherwise, with U.S. support, would Australia take such a role as it did with considerable success in East Timor?

Speculation aside, the formal Australian policy on Papua is one in favor of Indonesia. Its last stance on East Timor was that the territory was never part of the Netherlands East Indie, while Papua was. The U.N. never recognized the integration of East Timor into Indonesia but they overwhelmingly consider Papua as an integral part of Indonesia.

As such, Australia will never question Indonesia's sovereignty over Papua. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has stated: "Australia has always [supported] and continues to support and to recognize the integration of West Papua within the Republic of Indonesia".

An Australian parliamentary brief on current issues concludes: "Recognizing that so much of Indonesian stability generally could hinge on economic progress, [the above support] could include a major diplomatic effort to generate practical support for Indonesia as it seeks to meet the demands, in particular, of its Papuan ... constituents".

For an optimistic view of bilateral relations, perhaps, it is timely and important for Indonesia and Australia to transform the rhetoric of support into practical cooperation to the benefit of the Papuan people.

The writer is a postgraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, in Canberra.