Vietnam needs vision to build peaceful and affluent society

Vietnam needs vision to build peaceful and affluent society

By Asvi Warman Adam

JAKARTA (JP): For Vietnam's leaders, these days are full of
worries. Indeed, the times of war have long past, but strangely
enough it is during this peacetime that they are facing an
extremely difficult decision to make.

If we took a close look at the long history of this nation, we
would understand that this nation has long been one of never-
ending struggles.

A lot of things have occurred, but one recurrent issue
involves the contrast between the vitality of the national
culture of the Vietnamese and the discontinuity in their
political construction. It seems that the capacity of the
Vietnamese as a people has constantly had to collide with the
instability of the country's political structure.

In the wake of the eras of the Ly, Tran and Le dynasties, as
well as the upheavals of the last half of a century, the
Vietnamese state has literally functioned in a fragmented
fashion. As noted by Daniel Hemery, an expert on the history of
Vietnam at the University of Paris, during the entire period of
four and a half centuries, namely, between 1558 and 1990, the
country has had the chance to be united politically for a total
of only 70 years.

Outside of these seven decades, Vietnam has had to undergo
periods of fragmentation, tensions and conflicts, both internal
and external. Internal wars seem to have been their hallmark.

As a political society that wishes to build national unity and
solidarity, the Vietnamese have had to face a huge obstacle in
their fight to continue to exist. Up until today, the divergence
between the north and the south is still felt in Vietnam in
various aspects of life.

This problem stems partially from outside pressure coinciding
with the flaring of internal tensions. This can be seen in the
fact that the division of Vietnam into two distinct entities
after its independence, between 1954 and 1966, was made possible
by the lack of unity in social consensus among the Vietnamese
themselves.

This fragmented internal situation was aggravated by the
foreign intervention by the United States, China and the Soviet
Union that for all intents and purposes functioned as an
extension of the French colonial actions.

But perhaps the most consistent and influential of these
external pressures was that exerted by China for as long as two
thousand years.

To the Vietnamese, living next door to the much larger state
of China, with its burgeoning population, has meant living
constantly under threat. Any strong Chinese presence exerts
constraints on Vietnam.

In this geo-historical situation that is as disadvantageous to
Vietnam as it is, we see a historical paradox: The Vietnamese
national community has proved itself to be an enduring one, far
from being destroyed. And for all the fear of China, the
traditional structure of Vietnamese society consists of a
triangle of powers: the state or monarch, the educated elite
(mandarin) and the peasant community.

It is no accident that the essence of this system originated
from the state model of Chinese Confucianism. Borrowing the
Chinese model, while at the same time trying to break loose from
its influence has been one of Vietnam's biggest dilemmas.

To the Vietnamese, China has been a long-time foe, while at
the same time functioning their mentor. The modern Vietnamese
state has continued socializing these old values: The structure
of peasant community and family, myths, religious rituals, farmer
patriotism, as well as a total bond to the native land and the
ancestors.

Yet Vietnam has remained a clear and unique entity through the
long periods of collision with the Chinese civilization, and with
its briefer encounters in the 20th century with some of the
world's mightier powers such as France and the United States.

In 1976, one year after the fall of Saigon, the culmination of
the efforts at reunification of Vietnam took place. And this
should have been seen as the most appropriate time for the
Vietnamese to think of their future.

Instead, what they did was invade Cambodia. This left them
entrapped in that neighboring country over a decade. Their
economic development was neglected, their dependence on the
Soviet Union grew. And finally there was nobody they could rely
on as the Soviet Union itself collapsed.

Looking to the past for answers is clearly futile. Nowadays,
what the Vietnamese may need most is a future-oriented outlook
that could redefine the directions to be taken toward reaching
the goals of a peaceful and affluent society.

What is missing in Vietnam today is a social consensus, that
is, a shared understanding between everybody in the community --
including party members -- of what the Vietnamese community
itself now is, what it is to become, and how to bring it from
here to there.

This is what is termed "social vision" by Douglas Pike, an
expert on Vietnam at the University of California, Berkeley. He
is adamant that a nation requires leaders, but a nation also
needs a vision.

Without leaders, a nation will not advance. However, without a
vision, a nation will vacillate without a clear direction despite
the fact that leaders exist.

Vietnam has several questions to answer in relation to this
social vision:

Is the class-struggle still relevant? Can the history and the
future of Vietnam be explained in terms of dialectics-
materialism?

Does the market economy suit socialism and can they go
hand-in-hand? Will the Communist Party be able to retain the
monopoly of power? How far should iron-clad discipline be
exercised and how much freedom should be allowed within the
party? And how about individual and private property?

Social vision is also related to the ability to question any
number of aspects of a situation with which, up to now, no one
has been able to or allowed to take issue.

After the end of the Cold War, as well as the collapse of both
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Vietnam is faced with a
dilemma: Should they maintain socialism -- like China, or should
they open themselves up to political pluralism that will be
accompanied by economic reformation?

What they have apparently decided to do is the latter:
Economic development now, and political development later.

After all, following the example of China means maintaining
the supremacy of the party.

Political renovation will always take casualties. A greater
political openness will inevitably shake the existing regime.

One more time we are witnessing the actualization of the
eternal model that Vietnam has followed in the walk of its
history: To follow the example of China and to keep a safe
distance from that very mentor.

Regardless of whichever model Vietnam follows, there is merit
in reminding ourselves of what De Tocqueville said more than a
century ago: "The most critical moment for a regime is when it
starts reformation ..."

Dr. Asvi Warman Adam is an observer of Vietnam at the
Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI).