Uzbekistan raises hard questions

Dmitry Kosyrev, RIA Novosti, Moscow

The European and American public was shocked by the ruthless suppression of the Andizhan revolt by President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov. And this shock in itself became an event of international life.

Most commentators did not know how to react to the situation, which cannot be described in the usual terms understandable in the societies of Europe, the U.S. and Australia.

These are not the ones who, not knowing what went on in Andizhan and unwilling to get down to the roots, described the events there as "a democratic uprising" and branded all Central Asian leaders without exception dictators. This is as ridiculous as describing the violence in Kyrgyzstan as "a democratic revolution." Trying to force events in a country with a specific civilization into the boundaries of another civilization scheme is guaranteed to fail.

What should the politicians, who are monitoring largely similar processes in a vast region embracing Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, do?

Let us formulate the problem even more harshly: Is killing dozens and hundreds of people, many of them innocent civilians, good or bad? In which case would there have been more casualties if the soldiers had opened fire or if they had not been ordered to fire?

It is impossible to answer these questions because history cannot be reproduced in two models, one good and the other bad. Everyone knows that the bad scenario entails the seizure of power in Uzbekistan by Muslim extremists; but nobody can tell how many lost lives it might cost.

Europeans and Americans have already come face to face with the difficult question of "the advantage of killing," in particular in Afghanistan as a country that was indirectly involved in the 9/11 attack at the Twin Brothers in New York. Do the U.S. operations in Afghanistan, which nearly all Western (but not Eastern) countries supported, differ from the actions of Islam Karimov in Andizhan? Is the difference that the Americans brought the European model of democracy to Afghanistan? It does not appear to be much in evidence. Indeed, the international police action forced Afghanistan back into its traditional state and traditional model of society, which can hypothetically engender another Taliban-like threat. The Soviet Union trod on this rake 25 years ago.

One thing is clear, though: There will be no "color" or "velvet" revolutions in Central Asia. It is true that many of the educated residents of capital cities there are advocating the development of democracy according to roughly European models. But the smallest spark in that struggle will ignite all-consuming flames, raising the wrath of the poor and angry people who do not know European languages and have no electricity in their homes. And they are guided not by European-type politicians but by the people called militants-field commanders-terrorists-criminals -- choose a word to your liking.

The U.S. must provide proof that the spread of democracy in the post-Soviet republics helps overcome crises, demands the French newspaper Liberation. But what proof there is points in the opposite direction. The 50,000 victims in Tajikistan in the early 1990s, in Pakistan in recent years, and now in the Ferghana Valley on both sides of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border. This figure prompts conclusions.

The first conclusion is: Nobody can answer questions provoked by the regional events. What should be done about the leaders of Pakistan and Uzbekistan, the allies of the West in the fight against Islamic extremism? Should they be denied assistance if they act too ruthlessly? But who can guarantee that softness in the traditional societies of the region will not bring far more ruthless people to power?

Maybe we should help above all the ordinary people of these countries and only then their leaders, if possible and necessary? And we should not be afraid to invest in the economic development of the Ferghana Valley, whose main problem is transport and whose output cannot be exported.

Judging by the debates engendered by the Andizhan revolt, European societies are growing up, alongside the Russian public and political community, which, though their experience in Central Asia is much greater than the experience of Europe or America, cannot say what exactly should be done there.

What Russians know for sure is what must not be done there under any conditions. The world must not act as the preacher of democracy armed with a long ruler for rapping bad pupils on the knuckles. The East can teach the world a lesson or two, and they may turn out to be very painful.