Using 'soft poer' in southern Thailand

Pavin Chachavalpongpun, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

The violence in the Muslim-majority South is not likely to go away any time soon. The government has been struggling hard to convince the public that the mass killing of more than Islamic insurgents on April 28 will bring lasting peace to the restive region.

Amidst the growing feelings of distrust between the state and Muslims in the South, many have begun to ask whether "hard power" is the only way to win this war.

The government has employed hard power, or the use of force and military capabilities, to suppress Islamic insurgents. The result has been negative in that a picture of the state as being cold-blooded and heavy-handed against poorly armed militant Muslim citizens has emerged.

To alleviate resentment among the Muslims, the government is changing its ways by launching a new strategy -- the use of "soft power".

The idea of "soft power" was developed by Professor Joseph S Nye of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. He suggested that the US' failure to use soft power had weakened its position in the fight against terrorism. But what exactly is soft power?

Nye defines it as the ability to get what one wants by attracting others rather than threatening them. It relies on culture, political ideals and policy. The worsening situation in Iraq and the mounting threat of terrorism is a testimony to how the US has overlooked the importance of such issues.

In the Thai case, the government has begun to exert soft power to win the hearts and minds of Muslims, proposing various socio- economic projects in order to make them feel like they are not being overlooked in terms of development.

In fact, the use of soft power was first introduced in the South in 1989 as part of efforts to end a spate of violent attacks in the area. Known as the Harappanbaru project, the move was designed to generate an atmosphere of understanding and reduce mutual distrust through state-sponsored social and economic development programs.

But the Harappanbaru project lacked long-term political support because it was only a short-term tool for local politicians to use to gain political benefits, rather than a manifestation of a genuine will to upgrade the standard of living of the Islamic community in the South.

The Thaksin government has launched a project similar to the Harappanbaru program because the premier himself realizes that soft power is different from weakness and may be used to cool down the restive South. The Cabinet recently approved a Bt2- billion budget for 74 projects, designed to fulfill five immediate strategies -- peace-making, trust-building, social enforcement, educational promotion, and increasing cooperation with neighboring countries.

A plan to establish a campus of the al-Azhar University of Egypt -- the world's premier college of Islamic theology -- and a center for producing food that meets Islamic dietary rules in the South is being considered under the new program. Such moves reflect the government's response to widespread complaints within the Islamic councils that Muslims have been left in poverty and are suffering from cultural discrimination.

The government has also come out to support indigenous Islamic culture through various programs at regional universities. For example, the history of Islamic culture is being taught at Thaksin University to promote the cultural diversification of people in the South. Modern agricultural techniques are being taught to local Muslim farmers. And new waves of investment are also flowing into the area.

This soft power is more meaningful in places where hard power fails to prevail. The killing of Islamic militants last month may have removed a portion of local extremists, but it did not remove the state's vulnerability to terrorism and acts of violence. Moreover, the harsh reaction to the militants may make younger Muslims more hostile.

What the Thai state needs to understand is that there is a civil war within the Islamic community between extremists, who use violence to spread their vision, and moderates, who want things like jobs, education, healthcare and dignity, as they pursue their faith. The Thai state will not win unless the moderates win.

Soft power plays a significant role in attracting such moderates who refuse to be swayed by extremist ideologies.

But one crucial question emerges: To what extent is the Buddhist-dominated Thai state willing to compromise for religious differences and eradicate the perceived racism?

The violence caused by the radicals through the decades has in many ways led many Buddhists to agree that the killing of the Muslim militants was justified and that the harsh military action would teach the southern population a lesson. Muslims have also been blamed for being unable to overcome their unhealthy attitude towards Buddhists.

On the cultural front, the Thai state continues to impose the Thai language in schools and government offices in the South although the native language of the Muslims is Yawi. Southerners appear more interested in accepting financial support from the Arab world for the construction of the region's 1,500 Islamic schools to sustain their dying local dialect.

The state's ambivalence has undoubtedly helped create the widespread belief among the Muslim community that there is a conspiracy to hold them down. It has also led to mutual distrust between the two sides, which could potentially erode the goodwill of soft power.

For the peace and prosperity of the South, a combination of hard and soft power must be used. Nye calls it "smart power". For smart power to be truly smart, the government must respond to the needs of the Thai Muslim community. This would assure the Muslim minority of their place in Thai society.