U.S. should propose to N. Korea a fair interim agreement

Morton Abramowitz and Jessica Gingerich, The Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo

Dealing with North Korea has always been difficult. North Korea's admission of a secret uranium enrichment (HEU) program in October and its possible reprocessing of its spent fuel rods has created an even more dangerous situation on the Korean Peninsula.

There is uncertainty over intentions -- whether North Korea is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability as a deterrent to an American attack or whether it is prepared to negotiate away its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for economic aid and security assurances. Equally difficult is the absence of good options for dealing with North Korea's nuclear escalation.

Three interrelated issues are crucial in trying to find a peaceful solution. First, how much time do we have to solve this problem before North Korea proceeds to build multiple nuclear weapons and creates the capacity for exporting fissile materials? Secondly, can we find ways to get North Korea to stop its nuclear weapons program? Thirdly, how should the U.S. and concerned regional states work together to produce a satisfactory outcome to the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula?

In its most recent report, the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Korea provides answers to these questions.

First, as to the question of timing, North Korea has asserted it possesses nuclear weapons, has a major HEU program under way, and has a plutonium program that can be restarted at any time. If Pyongyang proceeds to reprocess its spent fuel rods, it can produce as many as five nuclear bombs before the end of the year. Thereafter serial production of nuclear material becomes possible. Conceivably, Pyongyang is interested in negotiations and might wait to advance its nuclear program in hopes of achieving some sort of agreement providing American security guarantees, diplomatic relations, and economic assistance from either the U.S. or other countries. We do not know and have not yet tried to find out.

What we do know is if North Korea does reprocess its spent fuel and produces nuclear weapons, we may never be able to recover that material. (Indeed, recently North Korean officials told a U.S. Congressional delegation that it has begun and is almost finished reprocessing its spent fuel rods). This substantially increases the risk of fissile material being available for export and poses grave threats to international security.

The Task Force concludes that given these uncertainties the North Korean nuclear problem demands urgency and it is dangerous to simply sit back and wait for "pressures" to build on North Korea to force it to cooperate.

Secondly, how should we proceed to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons capability? The international community is divided. Some believe a policy of isolation and strangulation will force North Korea into concessions. Some believe North Korea will collapse under the weight of its own failed economy. Others argue that the North can be transformed through engagement and foreign assistance.

The Task Force argues that these approaches cannot produce with some certainty an acceptable, peaceful outcome. The Task Force argues that North Korea be presented quickly with a strong regionally supported proposal to test their willingness to stop their nuclear weapons program.

Thirdly, this issue is not simply an American one. The Bush administration has correctly insisted that a mafia state like North Korea with nuclear weapons is a crucial problem for all countries, particularly for the regional ones.

South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia all have serious stakes in the means pursued to deal with this crisis. They share the Bush administration's purported goal of a nonnuclear North Korea, but are not united on how to achieve that end. The administration's insistence on a multilateral strategy has worked to a degree as we saw with the trilateral talks held in Beijing in April. Japan recently has aligned itself more strongly with the Bush administration and agreed to support stronger measures should North Korea advance further its nuclear program.

It is essential, however, that South Korea and China also commit to a common and coordinated strategy to deal with North Korea. China in particular holds a critical role. Given Beijing's unique economic and diplomatic relationship with Pyongyang, it must take greater responsibility to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs.

The Task Force argues that to deal with North Korea we need a concerted coalition strategy. Otherwise nations will work at cross-purposes. To forge a wider coalition with its regional partners, the U.S. must make a commitment to serious negotiations with Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Neither China nor U.S. allies will support the tougher measures that may be necessary to deal with North Korea unless the U.S. first makes a real effort to negotiate a peaceful end to the nuclear issue.

The Task Force proposes that North Korea's seriousness toward negotiations be tested by posing a tough but fair interim agreement. Such an interim agreement would require North Korea to freeze its nuclear facilities, allow IAEA inspectors to return to the country, and turn over all spent fuel and any plutonium that might have been separated from it.

In exchange, the U.S. would agree not to attack North Korea while subsequent talks on a more comprehensive settlement are in progress nor prevent other countries from providing foreign assistance to the North. Interim talks would provide information on North Korean intentions, assure regional partners of the U.S. commitment to peacefully resolve this issue, and slow the hemorrhaging provoked by North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear capability.

Should negotiations prove unsuccessful and North Korea fail to accept a reasonable interim agreement, the U.S. and its regional partners must unite to take tougher measures, starting with an embargo, to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programs.

Morton Abramowitz is co-chair of Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Korea, and Jessica Gingerich is a research associate at The Century Foundation.