U.S. should draw in its military horns

By Jonathan Power

LONDON (JP): At the height of the Cold War, an admiral briefed the U.S. Army's War Plans Directorate on why America had to maintain its build up of naval forces. After a slide show, illustrating the new ships being deployed by the Soviet navy, the admiral asked for questions and comments. "Very interesting," one army general wryly observed. "But what you've just said is that if the Soviet navy sank tomorrow we could do away with the U.S. Navy." "No, no," replied the admiral, "I'd just get me a new set of slides."

This apparently true story is told in Harvard University's quarterly, International Security, in a path breaking article written by political science professor, Harvey Sapolsky (and associates).

Many expected and hoped that with a Vietnam war-protester, Bill Clinton, becoming president just after his predecessor had safely concluded the Cold War there might be some significant winding down of the military-industrial complex. But it is now very apparent that Clinton, rather than giving his energies and time to, say, cutting the Soviet-American nuclear arsenal, has chosen to concentrate his scarce resources on a single-minded effort to expand NATO, to deter imaginary foes at vast expense.

What exactly are America's threats? I summarize Prof. Sapolsky's 45 pages of shrewd and detailed argument: "To the north and south are weak, friendly neighbors. To the east and west are fish...The greatest foreign policy threat to U.S. prosperity is that America will spend too much on the military."

The only tangible threat to America comes not from Russia, nor China but from the possibility of a hostile country in the Persian Gulf conquering enough of its neighbors so that it would be in a position to consolidate the world's major oil reserves and use this as a devastating lever. That demands a continued American military presence in the region. But where else?

For the first time in five decades America's core national interests are relatively easy to deal with. There will be small wars all over the place, as there are in Sierre Leone and Afghanistan right now, but they don't affect America's security and no power balance is adversely tilted.

The marginal increment of security that the U.S. wins from outspending Russia by a factor of three is vanishingly small. It is the law of diminishing returns writ large. The U.S. can spend much, much less on defense and still be a lot more secure than it was during the Cold War.

Yet although there has been some small drop in the defense budget during the Clinton presidency, the U.S. is still spending at Cold War rates. If America were to cut its annual military budget by half from its present US$240 billion to $120 billion it would still be way ahead of every other nation and quite capable of dealing with a Persian Gulf grab, maintaining essential defenses at home and contributing to UN and NATO peacekeeping. (Although European problems such as Bosnia should be left entirely to the Europeans themselves to shoulder).

Why should the U.S. be engaged this past week in an effort to "sell" the recently strengthened U.S.-Japan security pact, even though Washington evidently fears a backlash from China? What is more, why should the U.S. still be subsidizing Japan's defense, reducing, in effect, the country's tax burden? Why should Japan, sheltering under the guardianship of the U.S., duck its responsibilities for coming to terms with its neighbors for its evil conduct during World War II? Without this American underpinning, Japan could well find that reconciliation is cheaper than confrontation.

Likewise in the rest of Asia, there is no longer a reason for America's military to be deployed there. Not just Japan, but Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Australia are all wealthy enough to look after their own defense. (As the Philippines so wisely decided a few years ago when it closed its American bases.)

Without the American umbrella over these countries we would probably witness a new political tone in much of Asia. In Seoul we would see a greater readiness to negotiate with North Korea. Taiwan wouldn't unnecessarily provoke China as it did last year. If China one day did become expansionist, which is doubtful, these two countries, together with Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore would have to bury their differences and pull together.

In Europe the issue of retrenchment is even more pressing. If NATO is not to be turned into a continent-stabilizing arrangement by including Russia as a full member it should disband. What is not needed after the Cold War is over is an expanded alliance right up to Russia's doorstep. This is a provocation that the West will live to rue and that will become all too quickly apparent once President Boris Yeltsin leaves the scene.

If Americans want peace, want to be free and want to concentrate on the big mountain of barely tended problems at home the choice is clear: it is time to come home, America.