Thu, 05 Feb 1998

U.S. security strategy in SE Asia

This is the second of two articles based on a paper delivered by U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in Singapore on Jan. 15, 1998 during the officiating of the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies.

SINGAPORE: The United Sates sees several patterns of change in Asia's security environment in spite of the enduring features of its security landscape -- the high stakes, American engagement and presence, and the strong system of bilateral alliances.

Unlike the cataclysmic changes in Europe at the end of the Cold War, change in Asia has been evolutionary. Thus far, the region has anticipated and adapted well to these changes in the security environment. Yet these remain turbulent times. Our greatest challenge thus remains to anticipate and manage change.

The first of these changes is the emergence of multilateral frameworks for discussion and cooperation, which in a few short years have become an important and permanent feature of the regional security structure.

The United States is actively engaged in a variety of overlapping multilateral channels such as the (ASEAN) Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, the so-called ARF; the sub-regional confidence-building efforts, such as the trilateral dialogues between the United States, China and Japan, and between the United States, South Korea and Japan, and; the conferences on practical security cooperation and groups formed to address specific problems from Cambodia to the Four-Party Talks on the Korean Peninsula.

Some would like to see multilateral security dialogues and cooperation replace bilateral relationships as the primary feature of regional stability in the coming era. The United States views these multilateral mechanisms as important, and having a greater role to play in the future.

But we also believe that they will be successful only if they are built upon the foundation of solid bilateral relationships and a continued U.S. forward presence in the region. That is why the United States will not support efforts that intentionally or otherwise constrain our military posture or operational flexibility efforts that would only undermine, rather than contribute, to the region's security.

Given the high stakes involved, security architectures, even more than financial architectures, must be built on a solid foundation, not shifting sands, if they are to provide protection when the gale winds blow and tremors strike.

A second element of change is the growing importance of Southeast Asia. Over the last 30 years, ASEAN has developed into a multifaceted power center in its own right, one that is integral to the entire Asia-Pacific.

ASEAN has also distinguished itself by tackling such issues as Cambodia and the South China Sea, facilitating region-wide dialogue through the ARF and by serving as a powerful example for the region and the world. Indeed, three decades of solving problems reducing tensions and working cooperatively for mutual benefit bodes well as ASEAN confronts the challenges of today.

Given our shared interests, we look forward to Southeast Asia as an increasingly important partner and facilitators of the U.S. forward presence through such activities as port calls, repair, training and logistics support. Much has been achieved in recent years to enhance our access, and we look forward to building on this cooperation in the future.

Of course, the most anticipated change in Asia has been the emergence of China. In many respects, China has already emerged. Today, China is an Asian power, and rightfully so. The United States does not fear this, nor do we view China as an adversary. Rather, we seek to encourage China to step forward as a responsible and cooperative great nation.

A nation that preserves its unique identity, but is more open on security matters and more respectful of the rule of law -- a nation that adheres to international norms, including peaceful resolution of disputes, the control of weapons of mass destruction and freedom of the seas, and a nation that joins us in rejecting a zero-sum attitude toward security by recognizing the common interests we all share in a stable environment that ensures security and promotes prosperity.

Indeed, no nation has benefited more than China from the stabilizing effect of America's security engagement in Asia.

So the United States seeks to deepen engagement with China. The October summit between Presidents Clinton and Jiang gave great hope that the two nations can work together towards their common goals of stability, security and prosperity.

In the security realm, the two nations have already taken several steps to increase mutual confidence and decrease miscalculation -- exchanging military personnel, conducting reciprocal ship visits, adopting procedures for U.S. Navy ships to continue to call in Hong Kong ports, and, last months at the first-even Sino-American defense talks, signing an agreement to shake information on humanitarian exercises.

Later this week in Beijing, we will take the additional step of signing a Military Maritime Consultative Agreement which will both help avoid incidents at sea and create a venue for dialogue between operational naval officers. Such engagements gives hope that China is willing to work with us to our mutual benefit and the benefit of the entire region.

A fourth element of change on the security landscape is in Northeast Asia. We cannot say when and we cannot say how, but change will come to the Korean Peninsula. We are working on several fronts to enable change there to be peaceful and orderly. From promoting dialogue on the peninsula in the Four-Party talks that for the first time brought together North and South Korea, the United States and China, to continuing implementation of the 1994 Nuclear Agreed Framework.

While the United States and the Republic of Korea will continue to work side-by-side on these matters, every Asian country has a stake in the outcome and must play a role by providing political support, supporting KEDO and other measures.

Even after the immediate threat to stability has receded on the peninsula, the alliance will serve to keep the peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Following in-depth dialogue, our government agreed last month on the need to maintain our bilateral security alliance for the long-term, while adapting it to changing circumstances.

A fifth change in the Asia-Pacific is the enlargement of the region. As a geographic entity, the region has become more elastic. India is a growing actor, Russia is a potential player, and Europe is increasingly linked to the region through a variety of dialogues and entities.

Anticipating and managing this sea of change will continue to require the stable anchor of American forces that provide certainty and confidence. This has been summarized in our continued commitment to maintain approximately 100,000 U.S. personnel forward-deployed in the Asia-Pacific, although we all recognize this is shorthand for a panoply of measures of our security engagement and military capability in the region.

We seek to enhance both, the former through deepened cooperation, and the latter through new technologies, operational concepts and organizational structures that will transform our forces in the coming decade and beyond.

Managing change also requires us to have more open and candid strategic dialogue, particularly with our defense colleagues in the region, to enhance transparency, confidence and understanding of shared security interests. We will work to encourage appropriate mechanisms for such dialogue.

In closing, let me, as one who was an elected U.S. official for the past quarter century, recount some recent history that seems pertinent to the primary issue of the day. It was not that long ago that American strategic thinkers were debating "the decline of America".

Ronald Reagan persuaded the American people in 1984 that it was morning in America, but by the late 1980s quite serious and thoughtful people argued that America's day in the sun was ending and that the sun was rising on a new global power.

America was in decline, we were told, as part of an historically inevitable "Rise and Fall of Nations." And even many who do not adhere to historical determinism looked at the U.S. federal government's US$200 billion deficits as far as the eye could see and declared defeat in the face of trends that were undermining our economy.

This declinist school among intelligentsia was accompanied by understandably disgruntled portion of our population whose livelihoods were destroyed or endangered by corporate downsizing. Key industries were seemingly being hollowed out, leaving some regions of America so economically desperate that comparisons with the great depression were commonplace.

At both ends of our political spectrum, economic populists and nationalists emerged and, while they offered cures worse than the disease, they gained considerable support. And friends and allies around the world beseeched us to get our house in order.

Just a few years later, this picture has been turned on its head. American industry is vibrant. U.S. unemployment is at its lowest level in over two decades. Our federal budget is about to be in surplus for the first time in three decades, and recent reports suggest there will be large surpluses as far as the eye can see, a string of surpluses not seen since the 1920s. And few speak of an America in decline.

What accounts for the dramatic reversal? One factor undoubtedly is the human tendency to view things more starkly than they really are, both the hard times and the good times. But more fundamentally, we took the advice of our friends around the world to get our house in order.

Our people have adapted to the discipline imposed by markets, despite the difficulty involved at the time and the ongoing anxiety that affects many. And despite significant pressure at times, political factors have not overridden economic and business factors as restructuring has occurred. Will Durant reminded us that, "the present is the past rolled up for action, and the past is the present unrolled for understanding."

It is not hard to find some lessons in this history, as well as a perspective that can justify the statement that we have confidence in the future of Asia notwithstanding the present difficulties.

The energy, creativity and discipline of our Asian partners and allies continue undiminished. And with continued self confidence in these strengths and a determination to pursue the economically sound path, our partners and allies in Asia can emerge from the crucible of current crisis fundamentally stronger.