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U.S. security strategy in SE Asia

| Source: JP

U.S. security strategy in SE Asia

This is the second of two articles based on a paper delivered
by U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in Singapore on
Jan. 15, 1998 during the officiating of the Institute for Defense
and Strategic Studies.

SINGAPORE: The United Sates sees several patterns of change in
Asia's security environment in spite of the enduring features of
its security landscape -- the high stakes, American engagement
and presence, and the strong system of bilateral alliances.

Unlike the cataclysmic changes in Europe at the end of the
Cold War, change in Asia has been evolutionary. Thus far, the
region has anticipated and adapted well to these changes in the
security environment. Yet these remain turbulent times. Our
greatest challenge thus remains to anticipate and manage change.

The first of these changes is the emergence of multilateral
frameworks for discussion and cooperation, which in a few short
years have become an important and permanent feature of the
regional security structure.

The United States is actively engaged in a variety of
overlapping multilateral channels such as the (ASEAN) Association
of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, the so-called ARF; the
sub-regional confidence-building efforts, such as the trilateral
dialogues between the United States, China and Japan, and between
the United States, South Korea and Japan, and; the conferences on
practical security cooperation and groups formed to address
specific problems from Cambodia to the Four-Party Talks on the
Korean Peninsula.

Some would like to see multilateral security dialogues and
cooperation replace bilateral relationships as the primary
feature of regional stability in the coming era. The United
States views these multilateral mechanisms as important, and
having a greater role to play in the future.

But we also believe that they will be successful only if they
are built upon the foundation of solid bilateral relationships
and a continued U.S. forward presence in the region. That is why
the United States will not support efforts that intentionally or
otherwise constrain our military posture or operational
flexibility efforts that would only undermine, rather than
contribute, to the region's security.

Given the high stakes involved, security architectures, even
more than financial architectures, must be built on a solid
foundation, not shifting sands, if they are to provide protection
when the gale winds blow and tremors strike.

A second element of change is the growing importance of
Southeast Asia. Over the last 30 years, ASEAN has developed into
a multifaceted power center in its own right, one that is
integral to the entire Asia-Pacific.

ASEAN has also distinguished itself by tackling such issues as
Cambodia and the South China Sea, facilitating region-wide
dialogue through the ARF and by serving as a powerful example for
the region and the world. Indeed, three decades of solving
problems reducing tensions and working cooperatively for mutual
benefit bodes well as ASEAN confronts the challenges of today.

Given our shared interests, we look forward to Southeast Asia
as an increasingly important partner and facilitators of the U.S.
forward presence through such activities as port calls, repair,
training and logistics support. Much has been achieved in recent
years to enhance our access, and we look forward to building on
this cooperation in the future.

Of course, the most anticipated change in Asia has been the
emergence of China. In many respects, China has already emerged.
Today, China is an Asian power, and rightfully so. The United
States does not fear this, nor do we view China as an adversary.
Rather, we seek to encourage China to step forward as a
responsible and cooperative great nation.

A nation that preserves its unique identity, but is more open
on security matters and more respectful of the rule of law -- a
nation that adheres to international norms, including peaceful
resolution of disputes, the control of weapons of mass
destruction and freedom of the seas, and a nation that joins us
in rejecting a zero-sum attitude toward security by recognizing
the common interests we all share in a stable environment that
ensures security and promotes prosperity.

Indeed, no nation has benefited more than China from the
stabilizing effect of America's security engagement in Asia.

So the United States seeks to deepen engagement with China.
The October summit between Presidents Clinton and Jiang gave
great hope that the two nations can work together towards their
common goals of stability, security and prosperity.

In the security realm, the two nations have already taken
several steps to increase mutual confidence and decrease
miscalculation -- exchanging military personnel, conducting
reciprocal ship visits, adopting procedures for U.S. Navy ships
to continue to call in Hong Kong ports, and, last months at the
first-even Sino-American defense talks, signing an agreement to
shake information on humanitarian exercises.

Later this week in Beijing, we will take the additional step
of signing a Military Maritime Consultative Agreement which will
both help avoid incidents at sea and create a venue for dialogue
between operational naval officers. Such engagements gives hope
that China is willing to work with us to our mutual benefit and
the benefit of the entire region.

A fourth element of change on the security landscape is in
Northeast Asia. We cannot say when and we cannot say how, but
change will come to the Korean Peninsula. We are working on
several fronts to enable change there to be peaceful and orderly.
From promoting dialogue on the peninsula in the Four-Party talks
that for the first time brought together North and South Korea,
the United States and China, to continuing implementation of the
1994 Nuclear Agreed Framework.

While the United States and the Republic of Korea will
continue to work side-by-side on these matters, every Asian
country has a stake in the outcome and must play a role by
providing political support, supporting KEDO and other measures.

Even after the immediate threat to stability has receded on
the peninsula, the alliance will serve to keep the peace and
stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a
whole. Following in-depth dialogue, our government agreed last
month on the need to maintain our bilateral security alliance for
the long-term, while adapting it to changing circumstances.

A fifth change in the Asia-Pacific is the enlargement of the
region. As a geographic entity, the region has become more
elastic. India is a growing actor, Russia is a potential player,
and Europe is increasingly linked to the region through a variety
of dialogues and entities.

Anticipating and managing this sea of change will continue to
require the stable anchor of American forces that provide
certainty and confidence. This has been summarized in our
continued commitment to maintain approximately 100,000 U.S.
personnel forward-deployed in the Asia-Pacific, although we all
recognize this is shorthand for a panoply of measures of our
security engagement and military capability in the region.

We seek to enhance both, the former through deepened
cooperation, and the latter through new technologies, operational
concepts and organizational structures that will transform our
forces in the coming decade and beyond.

Managing change also requires us to have more open and candid
strategic dialogue, particularly with our defense colleagues in
the region, to enhance transparency, confidence and understanding
of shared security interests. We will work to encourage
appropriate mechanisms for such dialogue.

In closing, let me, as one who was an elected U.S. official
for the past quarter century, recount some recent history that
seems pertinent to the primary issue of the day. It was not that
long ago that American strategic thinkers were debating "the
decline of America".

Ronald Reagan persuaded the American people in 1984 that it
was morning in America, but by the late 1980s quite serious and
thoughtful people argued that America's day in the sun was ending
and that the sun was rising on a new global power.

America was in decline, we were told, as part of an
historically inevitable "Rise and Fall of Nations." And even many
who do not adhere to historical determinism looked at the U.S.
federal government's US$200 billion deficits as far as the eye
could see and declared defeat in the face of trends that were
undermining our economy.

This declinist school among intelligentsia was accompanied by
understandably disgruntled portion of our population whose
livelihoods were destroyed or endangered by corporate downsizing.
Key industries were seemingly being hollowed out, leaving some
regions of America so economically desperate that comparisons
with the great depression were commonplace.

At both ends of our political spectrum, economic populists and
nationalists emerged and, while they offered cures worse than the
disease, they gained considerable support. And friends and allies
around the world beseeched us to get our house in order.

Just a few years later, this picture has been turned on its
head. American industry is vibrant. U.S. unemployment is at its
lowest level in over two decades. Our federal budget is about to
be in surplus for the first time in three decades, and recent
reports suggest there will be large surpluses as far as the eye
can see, a string of surpluses not seen since the 1920s. And few
speak of an America in decline.

What accounts for the dramatic reversal? One factor
undoubtedly is the human tendency to view things more starkly
than they really are, both the hard times and the good times. But
more fundamentally, we took the advice of our friends around the
world to get our house in order.

Our people have adapted to the discipline imposed by markets,
despite the difficulty involved at the time and the ongoing
anxiety that affects many. And despite significant pressure at
times, political factors have not overridden economic and
business factors as restructuring has occurred. Will Durant
reminded us that, "the present is the past rolled up for action,
and the past is the present unrolled for understanding."

It is not hard to find some lessons in this history, as well
as a perspective that can justify the statement that we have
confidence in the future of Asia notwithstanding the present
difficulties.

The energy, creativity and discipline of our Asian partners
and allies continue undiminished. And with continued self
confidence in these strengths and a determination to pursue the
economically sound path, our partners and allies in Asia can
emerge from the crucible of current crisis fundamentally
stronger.

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