U.S. policy on Kosovo: Powell's vs Clinton's

By Landry Haryo Subianto

JAKARTA (JP): The latest NATO attack on the Serbs has triggered controversy, mostly in the United States. But the United States continues to squander sophisticated weaponry against Belgrade to hammer so-called Serb military installations.

This has resulted in criticism of U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration. Most critics strongly opposed the U.S.- led NATO initiative to carry out air strikes as a means to end the crisis. Their question is simple: what next?

One might find the crisis in Kosovo a classical example of morality-based versus strategic-calculations of actions. Clinton's historical reference, which might stem from a humanitarian motive, sounds so aspiring and convincing as his basis of action.

Charles Krauthammer succinctly labels Clinton's humanitarian motive as the Clinton Doctrine (Time, April 5, 1999). The tenets are simple. It is imperative for the United States to oppose ethnic cleansing and the slaughter of innocent people. President Clinton maintains the claim that acting is inevitable to avoid bigger losses in the future.

Accordingly, he barely adopts the lesson of the two world wars as his major reference. At last, from his point of view, war is necessary to sustainable peace. Avoiding worst atrocities, ethnic cleansing and unacceptable human rights violations in the Balkans is a hoped for outcome.

Henry A. Kissinger has warned Clinton and his European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that a possible solution to the Kosovo crisis must begin by rejecting false analogies to the traumas of the past.

This is an impartable response to the president's argument over the decision to impinge the Serbs by commencing a heavy air campaign, the biggest on European soil since the 1950s. For an eminent scholar and practitioner like Kissinger, the president's intention was nobly aspiring.

However, a polity also needs a proper and soluble strategy, one thing that is said to be absent from Clinton's agenda. He and Krauthammer are among those who think that Clinton's reiteration on his righteous goals simply do not apply to other cases e.g. the Croatian attack on Krajina or the Serbs' on Bosnia. Their question is not on the motive itself, but beyond. It is about the sustainability of the action and the solution to the crisis.

This essay intends not to judge whether or not the attack is justified, but to assess Clinton's raison d'etre and describe in brief some of the possible ending scenarios of the Kosovo crisis.

From a more skeptical point of view, some argue that the attack, which begun on the night of NATO's 50th anniversary, has been anything but clear and sensible. More importantly, despite the question of NATO unanimity over air strikes, the action might also endanger the stability of East Europe and trigger a more complex and difficult situation.

Opposing voices in the Pentagon, as well as on Capitol Hill, are getting more intense. They accuse politicians in the White House of having "little knowledge" of the Balkan terrain.

Thus, there seems to be no outstanding preparation for the air strikes. One F-117 from the U.S. Air Force was shot down, with many more estimated to follow. Avoiding more casualties on the NATO (or the United States) side is futile. Americans are now plunged into some sort of enigmatic situation in Europe caused by the conflict in Kosovo.

However, one way or another, the strikes have also precipitated the killings in Kosovo. The protracted conflicts have put the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and unarmed Kosovar civilians in a more dangerous position. Fleeing refugees have became sitting ducks for experienced Serbs policemen and troops.

As Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon revealed, the U.S. military has for the first time obtained satellite images that "indicate atrocities have taken place" by Serb troops against ethnic Albanians (The Washington Post, April 5, 1999). It has inevitably propelled new post-bombing strategies for NATO. Airlifting nearly 100,000 ethnic Albanians out of the spot. The picture is becoming more and more blurred.

The air strikes are now entering the fourth week, and yet, for many analysts, no obvious exit is in sight. People can guess but they have no firm clues. People are screaming about the Powell Doctrine, which has two basic tenets: America should enter fights with every available force or not at all; and the United States should never start a fight it does not know how to end.

Recent developments have brought America to many possible ways out. There are at least six possible scenarios at the president's disposal, namely, send in ground troops, increase bombing, arm the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), go back to the negotiation table, expel the outrageous Milosevic from power or pulling out with a black eye (Time, April 12, 1999). All attract pros and cons inside and outside the U.S. because they all could lead to an open-ended exit.

Nonetheless, those six scenarios are also likely to end up at two major obstacles, namely President Clinton's strict measures on "collateral casualties" and NATO's reluctance to give independence to Kosovo.

At this very point, Kosovo is a chimera of morality on one country's foreign policy and strategic valuation. It is likely that an escalation of war remains a big possibility and will become even bigger.

For some realist analysts such as Kissinger, sending in ground troops is the most realistic option that NATO can take since it hopefully could mitigate more casualties on the Kosovar side. However, the White House and some Pentagon generals have ruled out the idea because it contains the highest risk to America.

As a matter of fact, minimizing casualties (especially young American soldiers) in war is one crucial issue that is tacitly maintained. Accordingly, they prefer bombing to other alternatives because it will presumably not endanger too many lives.

For many soft-hearted politicians, the safest way out is to go back to negotiations and optimize diplomatic means. Yet, there is no guarantee that Milosevic is willing to stop the brutality toward ethnic Albanians.

More importantly, there is likely no assurance from whatsoever belligerent parties in Kosovo to retain a cease-fire following last Milosevic's decision to replace less-loyal Serb generals in the field. Intertemporal peace during negotiations would advantage the Serb army because, as the "under attack" side, it could reconsolidate its power.

This would in return make NATO's objective more difficult to obtain. Accordingly, NATO has been thrown into a deep dilemma. It must reconsider its strategies while at the same time maintaining credibility in its own backyard.

Perhaps both military officers on the battlefield and diplomats at the table should undertake more thorough and simultaneous actions. This could be done by forcing Milosevic to negotiate. At this point, ground attack is inevitable to overcome the escalating conflicts in the Balkans. Recent intelligence observation reports that the Serbs have also entered Albanian soil. Surely protracted development should be subdued, not to mention Russia's growing intention to back up the Serbs against NATO strikes.

Once again, the U.S. "humanitarian motive" is being challenged by Russia, a traditional rival since World War II. This idealistic motive which springs from Clinton's doctrine is again facing difficult terrain. Avoiding atrocities could be easily slipped into another war, respectively for the United States.

However, if Washington is not ready to march its ground troops into Kosovo, then why did it start a war it knows not how to end? It will remain a big question for the next couple of weeks.

NATO (or the United States) could argue that airlifting the refugees is the next priority. However, this strategy is not supported by clear and liable tactics. Indeed, this could not be successfully done unless ground forces are wisely used. Airlifts would be more effective if "a safe corridor" could be created. This corridor could even be widened to include all Kosovar borders. This could effectively be guarded by ground forces. The concept is to some extent different from the no-fly zone in North Iraq where no airlifting operation was undertaken.

Moreover, airlifts also would be implausible for long-term regional stability. For many analysts, this could be interpreted as expelling ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. This could become another "Palestine" in South Europe and could lead to a fragile peace in the future. As a result, NATO (or the United States) would be blamed by future generation for helping the Serbs clear the Albanians out of Kosovo.

The conflict that NATO now faces is not easy to overcome, especially for the Americans. However, one thing that America should firmly hold onto is consistency and justice. Consistent policies might yield more support, and just action would certainly strengthen international order. It is perhaps the time for the Americans to reconsider the value of consistency and justice in formulating and executing their global strategies. Kosovo is really an ordeal for the White House.

The writer works with the Department of International Affairs, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.