U.S. policy on Kosovo: Powell's vs Clinton's

U.S. policy on Kosovo: Powell's vs Clinton's

By Landry Haryo Subianto

JAKARTA (JP): The latest NATO attack on the Serbs has
triggered controversy, mostly in the United States. But the
United States continues to squander sophisticated weaponry
against Belgrade to hammer so-called Serb military installations.

This has resulted in criticism of U.S. President Bill
Clinton's administration. Most critics strongly opposed the U.S.-
led NATO initiative to carry out air strikes as a means to end
the crisis. Their question is simple: what next?

One might find the crisis in Kosovo a classical example of
morality-based versus strategic-calculations of actions.
Clinton's historical reference, which might stem from a
humanitarian motive, sounds so aspiring and convincing as his
basis of action.

Charles Krauthammer succinctly labels Clinton's humanitarian
motive as the Clinton Doctrine (Time, April 5, 1999). The tenets
are simple. It is imperative for the United States to oppose
ethnic cleansing and the slaughter of innocent people. President
Clinton maintains the claim that acting is inevitable to avoid
bigger losses in the future.

Accordingly, he barely adopts the lesson of the two world wars
as his major reference. At last, from his point of view, war is
necessary to sustainable peace. Avoiding worst atrocities, ethnic
cleansing and unacceptable human rights violations in the Balkans
is a hoped for outcome.

Henry A. Kissinger has warned Clinton and his European allies
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that a possible
solution to the Kosovo crisis must begin by rejecting false
analogies to the traumas of the past.

This is an impartable response to the president's argument
over the decision to impinge the Serbs by commencing a heavy air
campaign, the biggest on European soil since the 1950s. For an
eminent scholar and practitioner like Kissinger, the president's
intention was nobly aspiring.

However, a polity also needs a proper and soluble strategy,
one thing that is said to be absent from Clinton's agenda. He and
Krauthammer are among those who think that Clinton's reiteration
on his righteous goals simply do not apply to other cases e.g.
the Croatian attack on Krajina or the Serbs' on Bosnia. Their
question is not on the motive itself, but beyond. It is about the
sustainability of the action and the solution to the crisis.

This essay intends not to judge whether or not the attack is
justified, but to assess Clinton's raison d'etre and describe in
brief some of the possible ending scenarios of the Kosovo crisis.

From a more skeptical point of view, some argue that the
attack, which begun on the night of NATO's 50th anniversary, has
been anything but clear and sensible. More importantly, despite
the question of NATO unanimity over air strikes, the action might
also endanger the stability of East Europe and trigger a more
complex and difficult situation.

Opposing voices in the Pentagon, as well as on Capitol Hill,
are getting more intense. They accuse politicians in the White
House of having "little knowledge" of the Balkan terrain.

Thus, there seems to be no outstanding preparation for the air
strikes. One F-117 from the U.S. Air Force was shot down, with
many more estimated to follow. Avoiding more casualties on the
NATO (or the United States) side is futile. Americans are now
plunged into some sort of enigmatic situation in Europe caused by
the conflict in Kosovo.

However, one way or another, the strikes have also
precipitated the killings in Kosovo. The protracted conflicts
have put the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and unarmed Kosovar
civilians in a more dangerous position. Fleeing refugees have
became sitting ducks for experienced Serbs policemen and troops.

As Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon revealed, the U.S. military
has for the first time obtained satellite images that "indicate
atrocities have taken place" by Serb troops against ethnic
Albanians (The Washington Post, April 5, 1999). It has inevitably
propelled new post-bombing strategies for NATO. Airlifting nearly
100,000 ethnic Albanians out of the spot. The picture is becoming
more and more blurred.

The air strikes are now entering the fourth week, and yet, for
many analysts, no obvious exit is in sight. People can guess but
they have no firm clues. People are screaming about the Powell
Doctrine, which has two basic tenets: America should enter fights
with every available force or not at all; and the United States
should never start a fight it does not know how to end.

Recent developments have brought America to many possible ways
out. There are at least six possible scenarios at the president's
disposal, namely, send in ground troops, increase bombing, arm
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), go back to the negotiation
table, expel the outrageous Milosevic from power or pulling out
with a black eye (Time, April 12, 1999). All attract pros and
cons inside and outside the U.S. because they all could lead to
an open-ended exit.

Nonetheless, those six scenarios are also likely to end up at
two major obstacles, namely President Clinton's strict measures
on "collateral casualties" and NATO's reluctance to give
independence to Kosovo.

At this very point, Kosovo is a chimera of morality on one
country's foreign policy and strategic valuation. It is likely
that an escalation of war remains a big possibility and will
become even bigger.

For some realist analysts such as Kissinger, sending in ground
troops is the most realistic option that NATO can take since it
hopefully could mitigate more casualties on the Kosovar side.
However, the White House and some Pentagon generals have ruled
out the idea because it contains the highest risk to America.

As a matter of fact, minimizing casualties (especially young
American soldiers) in war is one crucial issue that is tacitly
maintained. Accordingly, they prefer bombing to other
alternatives because it will presumably not endanger too many
lives.

For many soft-hearted politicians, the safest way out is to go
back to negotiations and optimize diplomatic means. Yet, there is
no guarantee that Milosevic is willing to stop the brutality
toward ethnic Albanians.

More importantly, there is likely no assurance from whatsoever
belligerent parties in Kosovo to retain a cease-fire following
last Milosevic's decision to replace less-loyal Serb generals in
the field. Intertemporal peace during negotiations would
advantage the Serb army because, as the "under attack" side, it
could reconsolidate its power.

This would in return make NATO's objective more difficult to
obtain. Accordingly, NATO has been thrown into a deep dilemma. It
must reconsider its strategies while at the same time maintaining
credibility in its own backyard.

Perhaps both military officers on the battlefield and
diplomats at the table should undertake more thorough and
simultaneous actions. This could be done by forcing Milosevic to
negotiate. At this point, ground attack is inevitable to overcome
the escalating conflicts in the Balkans. Recent intelligence
observation reports that the Serbs have also entered Albanian
soil. Surely protracted development should be subdued, not to
mention Russia's growing intention to back up the Serbs against
NATO strikes.

Once again, the U.S. "humanitarian motive" is being challenged
by Russia, a traditional rival since World War II. This
idealistic motive which springs from Clinton's doctrine is again
facing difficult terrain.
Avoiding atrocities could be easily slipped into another war,
respectively for the United States.

However, if Washington is not ready to march its ground troops
into Kosovo, then why did it start a war it knows not how to end?
It will remain a big question for the next couple of weeks.

NATO (or the United States) could argue that airlifting the
refugees is the next priority. However, this strategy is not
supported by clear and liable tactics. Indeed, this could not be
successfully done unless ground forces are wisely used. Airlifts
would be more effective if "a safe corridor" could be created.
This corridor could even be widened to include all Kosovar
borders. This could effectively be guarded by ground forces. The
concept is to some extent different from the no-fly zone in North
Iraq where no airlifting operation was undertaken.

Moreover, airlifts also would be implausible for long-term
regional stability. For many analysts, this could be interpreted
as expelling ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. This could become
another "Palestine" in South Europe and could lead to a fragile
peace in the future. As a result, NATO (or the United States)
would be blamed by future generation for helping the Serbs clear
the Albanians out of Kosovo.

The conflict that NATO now faces is not easy to overcome,
especially for the Americans. However, one thing that America
should firmly hold onto is consistency and justice. Consistent
policies might yield more support, and just action would
certainly strengthen international order. It is perhaps the time
for the Americans to reconsider the value of consistency and
justice in formulating and executing their global strategies.
Kosovo is really an ordeal for the White House.

The writer works with the Department of International Affairs,
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
Jakarta.