U.S. nuclear policy remains unclear

Alexei Bogaturov, Russian Academy of Sciences, RIA Novosti, Moscow

Serious differences still exist between Russia and the United States concerning the reduction of offensive armaments. The U.S. continues to uphold the idea of stockpiling nuclear warheads removed from the carriers, asserting that they are sort of guarantee reserve which can be used in case of necessity.

However, the Russian side believes that the warheads which have to be reduced should not be stockpiled after their removal from carriers, but should be scrapped and destroyed, and the carriers themselves should be brought in such a condition which would not make it possible to use them any more. In other words, Moscow stands for a real reduction of the nuclear armaments, while Washington -- for a formal one, because in fact it wants to preserve these armaments, not to destroy them.

A natural question arises: For what purpose or, to be more precise, against whom does the United States intend to carry a knife under its sleeve? There may be two variants of the answer to this question. Either the United States will need these warheads to get indisputable supremacy in nuclear armaments, or they may be used for the needs of the national missile defense systems which the U.S., apparently, has firmly decided to start building if it has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty of 1972. In both cases Washington is entering a dangerous path, at least considerably complicating the conclusion with Moscow of a new Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Armaments (START-3) or even maybe making it impossible.

As was again stated in the course of the Washington consultations, Russia consistently adheres to the principle of equal security of the sides and the predictability of their nuclear policies. It insists on a comprehensive consideration of the issues concerning both offensive and defensive strategic systems. This is the question of the balance of interests, of preserving a strategic stability in the world. One gains the impression that Washington does not need all this and does not intend to disarm at all.

The circumstance that the U.S. Senate has not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty testifies to that as well. Apart from that, a number of officials from the Washington administration spoke recently about the possibility of resuming nuclear weapon tests, though they perfectly well know the firm and consistent position of Moscow which does not intend to violate the moratorium on this kind of tests. The conclusion is obvious -- Washington intends to perfect nuclear weapons, having laid emphasis on creating tiny explosive nuclear devices. The aim is obvious -- to receive a possibility in practice of locally using nuclear weapons on a limited scale without a threat of a global war breaking out.

In short, Washington wants to have a military superiority, to have a full freedom of action and to do whatever it wants, ignoring the opinions and the legitimate interests of other powers. This strategic line perfectly corresponds to the decision of the United States to withdraw from the Moscow ABM Treaty. However, this is a dangerous policy which rests on the conviction of the priority of the law of force. By following this course, Washington does not make an effort apparently to stop and think about its consequences -- the inevitable negative reaction on the part of the biggest leading powers of the world, first of all Russia, China and India -- which may result in a new round of the arms race. But it should have thought about it!

The new tendencies in the U.S. policy have become especially apparent in the past year, with George W. Bush coming to power. Even in the period of the election campaign he promised to be a stronger president than his predecessor -- Bill Clinton, and to prove that the Republicans can uphold the national interests of the United States better than the Democrats. George W. Bush believes that all existing agreements in the sphere of controlling the armaments are the products of the Cold War. But if that period is no more, he reasons, the agreements signed at that time must be annulled, because they do not correspond to the new period of time. The logic of the American president is the following: if we and Russia are no longer enemies, but allies, it is not necessary to conclude any written agreements or treaties. We should trust each other and settle all the matters by directly exchanging views between the two leaders.

A strange logic, to say the least. It does not at all correspond to the U.S.'s wish either to stockpile the warheads removed from missiles and not to destroy them, or to the refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, or to the attempts to upset strategic stability by creating a national missile defense system. The principle -- I do whatever I wish and only then inform you -- cannot be used in relations with the allies. This means that the epoch of relations between Russia and the United States as between true allies who trust each other has not come yet. If this is so, the treaties and agreements are still valid and remain important, more so if they can prevent the arms race, limit the proliferation of nuclear arms and toughen control over them.