U.S. cooperation with Iran urgent

Nasser Hadian, Tehran University, Project Syndicate

No country in the Middle East is monitoring postwar events in Iraq more closely than Iran. Geographical proximity, an intense and bloody history of conflict with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, religious and emotional connections to Shi'a Iraq, and concerns about the United States and its policies in the region are all threads that tie Iran to its western neighbor.

Iran is particularly concerned with the likelihood of a continuing U.S. presence next door, as well as with America's dominant role in shaping Iraq's post-Saddam future.

Three general approaches are recognizable in the evolving Iranian debate on post-Saddam Iraq.

Pragmatists argue that Iran must inevitably cooperate with the U.S. in post-Saddam Iraq, if only to ensure the rights of Iraq's Shi'a population. Thus Iran should win assurances that a new leadership in Iraq will not be hostile to it, and will seek friendly bilateral relations.

Other vital considerations for the pragmatists include preserving Iraq's territorial integrity and repatriation of tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees living in Iran. These moderates think that Iran should press America for extradition of Iraq- based members of the Mujahdin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), as well as its total dismantling.

In exchange, Iran should give its support to ensuring peace, stability, and security in Iraq. In sum, the pragmatists would limit Iranian-American dealings, keeping them focused on an agenda that largely reflects Iran's domestic concerns. By and large, conservative forces in Iran support this approach.

Another approach envisions a more active, cooperative Iranian role in reconstructing Iraq. Advocates of this view argue that Iran is well positioned to make rebuilding easier, owing to its well-established infrastructure of personal and institutional ties in Iraq. They say, the U.S. and the international community will eventually recognize the value of Iranian cooperation.

Iranian cooperation should be repaid with the dismantling of the MKO infrastructure in Iraq, perhaps linked to an Iranian commitment to crack down further on any al-Qaeda activities, as well as expel al-Qaeda members from Iran. Most importantly, Iran ought to press for an American assurance that its cooperation will be reciprocated by an American guarantee that Iran will not be a target of American military action in the future.

In short, advocates of cooperation call for an open and explicit bargain: Iran's support for stability during transition, and its commitment to maintain cooperative relations with whatever permanent government emerges in Iraq, in exchange for an improvement in Iran's regional and international position.

This view is widely held among Iran's reformers, inside and outside government, and the technocratic and business class.

Finally, for Iran's radicals, the possibility of cooperative relations with the U.S. is pure fantasy. They believe that America is bent on undermining Iran's security and compromising its national interests. They say the U.S. will at least seek to dictate major changes in Iranian foreign policy. At most, they argue, America will actively push for regime change. It will work against Iran's acquisition of nuclear knowledge and energy, and may yet attempt to weaken Iran's military capability altogether.

These radicals view the U.S. invasion of Iraq as reflecting America's desire to encircle Iran. They believe that Iran must aggressively defend its interests, forming strategic alliances with Russia and other regional powers, and using Iran's influence in Iraq to prevent a pro-American, anti-Iran government in Baghdad. Hardliners of all factions support this approach.

Overthrowing Saddam's regime was the easy part. Now comes the hard part: Establishing peace and security, winning the war on terrorism, and convincing the Muslim masses that America is not intent on occupying Iraq, siphoning off its oil, and reshaping the Middle East in its image.

Opposition to the U.S., expressed as suicide bombing and other forms of terrorism, will very likely increase.

Iran is destined to remain a major regional player because its political dynamism and Muslim identity resonate widely in the Muslim world. What happens in Iraq has major implications for Iran, and the U.S. is well advised to find ways of recognizing this fact.

American threats, or talk of another war, fuel the fires of resentment and frustration in Iran, strengthening the radicals. If the U.S. wishes to avoid this outcome, it must consider limiting the influence of its own radicals, recognizing that America's interests in Iraq are best served by greater cooperation with Iran.