Urgent, an exit strategy for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam

Urgent, an exit strategy for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam

Kirsten E. Schulze
Senior Lecturer
International History
London School of Economics

The military operation against the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
has entered the fourth month of what increasingly looks like an
indeterminate period. Politicians have ruled out returning to
negotiations in the near future. Indonesian Military (TNI)
commanders on the ground and in Jakarta have stated that a year
or more may be required to achieve their aims.

These military, and above all, political goals, however,
remain unclear in many ways. Beyond the immediate security
objectives of dismantling GAM's shadow government, reducing the
movement's military capacity, and cutting its finance, logistics
and communications lines, there does not seem to be a long-term
strategic game plan. So not surprisingly there has been little
talk of an exit strategy.

Why, one may ask, is there a need for an exit strategy? After
all TNI has already registered a number of successes such as
securing the urban areas and breaking down GAM into smaller
units. The simple answer is because no military operation,
irrespective of success and professionalism, is sustainable in
the long-term without a political end-goal.

For one, there is the issue of decreasing returns. Once an
insurgent movement has been broken down into smaller groups and
pushed into the jungle, they are more difficult to hunt down and
tend to have the operational advantage.

Alongside decreasing returns are rising costs, the actual
financial expenditure as well as the human and ultimately
political cost. The salaries and special allowances for an
estimated 43,000-45,000 troops are only a small part compared to
the financial sting from the logistics support chain, which
includes high cost items such as aircraft and ship resupplies.

The human costs are even greater as they are borne by the
civilian population. Not only are they on the receiving end of
violence by GAM but they are also the main victims of erosion of
discipline by TNI and the police.

This undermines the operation by losing the hearts and minds
of exactly those people the state purports to defend. Above all,
an exit strategy is needed because it is not possible to resolve
the insurgency in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) by force alone.
The conflict is a political one and thus any military operation
is by definition limited in scope, remit and length. It can only
ever be a means to a political end not an end in itself.

So if the military operation is only a means to an end, what
is that end? Here there are broadly three politico-military
strategies for which the current military operation could be
instrumental.

The first is to return to the negotiating table in the hope of
reaching an agreement with GAM. If this is the political goal
then the military aim is to reduce GAM's capacity on the ground
to such an extent that the leadership will be more open to
compromise and ultimately sign up to autonomy.

TNI seems to prefer a variation on this option, namely using
its operation as a means to compel GAM to renounce separatism and
to accept what had been previously on offer by Indonesia -- an
autonomy agreement -- but without further negotiations.

The possibility of getting GAM to sign up to autonomy either
through negotiations or force is, of course, predicated upon
GAM's ideological and psychological ability to conclude an
agreement that falls short of independence. According to most
estimates this is unlikely to happen.

However, even if GAM did conclude such a deal, it would never
be more than the product of the movement's lack of choices, in
particular, the absence of a credible military option. In that
sense the decision to enter a political agreement could be purely
tactical. It may only postpone further armed confrontation. Yet
it may also transform the struggle into a purely political one
fought through the ballot box.

The second option is a variation upon the first in the sense
that negotiations are central. These negotiations, however, are
not bilaterally with GAM and the aim is not an agreement with the
separatists. Instead, the dialog is with the people of NAD and
the aim is to reach consensus in NAD, amongst the Acehnese, on
the governance of NAD. In such a dialog there is, of course, no
reason for not including GAM as part of the Acehnese people
provided it plays by democratic rules for which at least a
credible ceasefire is necessary.

In support of this option the aim of the military operation
beyond reducing GAM's capacity on the ground is to increase the
people's options and to create the space for open dialog with and
among the Acehnese.

Yet this option, too, has drawbacks. GAM may not be interested
in pursuing a dialog in which it is only one among many players.
It may not agree to a ceasefire or to an internal negotiation
process in NAD rather than overseas.

The movement may even resort to violence in an attempt to
sabotage this kind of dialog. But that does not mean this option
is not worth pursuing. In fact, it could be argued that the
broadening of the negotiations is a way to marginalize GAM.

The third option assumes that negotiations of any type are
either not desirable or possible. In that case, the political
goal is to stabilize NAD as an integral part of the Republic of
Indonesia. This means a narrowly defined and carefully executed
security operation to reduce GAM's military capacity and to
create the space for a broad policy of development -- roads,
education, public health, and sanitation as well as providing
opportunities for a better future such as scholarships, micro
credit, and vocational training.

Key to the success of this strategy is to win the hearts and
minds of the people of NAD -- not GAM and not the Acehnese
political elite.

On the difficult side, this option requires the strength to
ignore GAM provocations on the ground and statements by the
leadership in exile. Equally, if not more important, is an
absolute commitment to cleaner and more effective government in
NAD.

These options show clearly that there is no easy answer for
managing the conflict in NAD but that it is, nevertheless,
possible. For a successful outcome a clear political goal, a
definition of acceptable level of violence, and an exit strategy
are needed.

Another crucial factor is socio-economic development. However,
the choice of strategy -- and they are not mutually exclusive --
will to a large degree depend upon the assessment of whether GAM
is capable of compromise as well as the inherent "price" of each
of the strategies.

The writer is currently a visiting fellow at the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.