Mon, 01 Dec 1997

Upcoming Kyoto summit: Politics of climate change

LONDON: Twelve days of preparatory talks in Bonn on Oct. 20- 31, 1997 failed to bridge divisions between the U.S., the European Union (EU) and Japan on the controversial issue of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of which 80 percent are carbon dioxide (CO2).

The failure brings into question prospects for setting limits on GHG discharges at the third session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP3) to be held in Kyoto this week.

This will be the most important environmental conference since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro on June 3-14, 1992.

Unless substantial progress is made towards consensus on its aims before the conference opens, a legally binding treaty is unlikely to be reached. If participating states do agree on an accord, it would be one of the most significant and wide-ranging international environmental treaties in history.

At the Rio summit, participating states -- divided into 'Annex 1 countries' (the then-24 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), plus the former Warsaw Pact states) and 'non-Annex 1 countries' (the rest of the world) --agreed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

However, they came to no firm decision on the long-term action needed to respond to the climate-change problem. In the short term, the Convention required its 169 signatories to report their GHG transmissions.

Annex 1 countries were also supposed to reduce their emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. The negotiations continued with three interim meetings in Berlin and Geneva -- held on March 28 to April 7, 1995 and July 8-19, 1996 respectively -- and Bonn. COP3 is intended to be the final stage in reaching agreement on GHG transmission levels.

The science of climate change is contentious. The guiding body on the topic is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) set up jointly by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Program in 1988.

This group of scientists is tasked with assessing the possible environmental and economic effects of climate change. According to the IPCC, GHG discharges are rising due to car exhaust fumes and the increased use of coal and gas in power-generation industries.

The IPCC's climate models predict that if discharges continue at their present rate, global temperatures could rise by 1 to 3.5 degrees Celsius by 2100, and the sea level by 15 to 95 centimeters.

In addition, 'climate zones' could shift by 150 to 550 kilometers in the mid-latitude regions. Yet, the IPCC's work, and the models that support the global-warming theory, have been widely contested in the scientific press.

And, the IPCC is not nearly as emphatic as some of its advocates claim it to be. In fact, the IPCC concludes in a September 1997 report entitled Global Warming only that 'the balance of the evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on [the] global climate'.

Unlike fears about the ozone layer confirmed by a gaping hole over the Antarctic the testimony that climate change will be catastrophic is not conclusive.

Scientists, however, do share some common ground. It is clear that GHG emissions are rising, and even many climate-change skeptics agree that higher discharges could cause global warming, although by no more than 1 to 1.5 degrees Celsius by 2100.

There are robust arguments about the best approach, time frame and the economic price worth paying to deal with climate change. The latter point will be the most contentious issue at COP3. While all participating states agree that global warming is a problem worthy of concerted international action, consensus ends there.

Climate change has quickly become a divisive global issue. The targets and measures announced by U.S. President Bill Clinton on Oct. 22, 1997 have only served to deepen U.S. and European differences.

Because only Annex 1 countries have to reduce their GHG emissions, these are the states with the most at stake. The EU has suggested that GHG transmissions in Annex 1 countries should be reduced from 1990 levels by 7.5 percent in 2005 and 15 percent in 2010. (Japan has proposed a complicated formula that envisages a cut of approximately 5 percent by 2012).

Under the EU plan, wealthier members of the Union would have to introduce greater GHG reductions to counterbalance poorer countries such as Ireland and Portugal which would continue to increase their discharges. As a result, states like Germany and the Netherlands would have to reduce their GHG emissions by up to 40 percent.

However, most EU countries have been unable to meet their much more modest commitment under the UNFCCC to keep GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. The UK looks set to achieve this target because of the continuing decline of its coal industry and the subsequent switch to natural gas.

Germany has also managed to cut emissions, largely because it shut down the former German Democratic Republic's polluting industries; to its credit, the former Federal Republic of Germany has now stabilized its release of GHGs.

Apart from Germany and the UK, none of the other EU states have reduced GHG emissions. Central and Eastern European countries, on the other hand, have succeeded in meeting GHG targets because of economic decline -- a situation that they hardly wish to continue. In addition, preliminary figures show that the EU's energy intensity -- the ratio between fuel consumption and wealth -- actually increased slightly from 1990 to 1995.

Consequently, it is questionable whether the EU's target of a 15 percent reduction by 2010 is realistic. The U.S. stated in 1995 that the figure 'lacked credibility'.

President Clinton promised in 1993 that the U.S. would stabilize its GHG emissions. However, a vibrant economy and renewed consumer demand for large cars have resulted in GHG discharges in the U.S. rising by 3.4 percent in 1996 alone.

In addition, U.S. industry has lobbied effectively against dramatic reductions. The Senate also unanimously passed a resolution in August 1997 stating that it would not consent to any treaty -- as it must under the Constitution -- threatening the economy or exempting non-Annex 1 countries from participation.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. position is much more modest than that of the EU. It calls on Annex 1 countries to reduce their GHG discharges to 1990 levels by 2008-2012, and to make further, unspecified reductions in the subsequent five-year period. In addition, Clinton is keen to introduce tax credits for energy efficiency and new technologies.

The proposal also recommends that non-Annex 1 countries should agree eventually to limit their emissions. However, it did not address in any detail how this would happen. The EU's response to this idea was scathing.

The U.S. advocates a system in which permits to release CO2 could be bought and sold on international financial markets. Europe believes that the U.S., as the only superpower and the largest polluter, should provide a more robust international lead. However, neither Congress nor U.S. industry will agree to a more decisive stance.

GHG discharges are rising fastest in regions experiencing the greatest economic growth, such as East Asia and Latin America. Developing countries argue that the developed world accounts for 70 percent of current and 66 percent of past emissions, and should therefore bear responsibility for solving the problem.

They believe that the underdeveloped world has a right to catch up economically. In principle, there is little dispute on this view.

Excluding non-Annex 1 countries from any new treaty could, however, mean that even if the EU's strict targets are met by 2010 GHG emissions would keep rising. By 2020, discharges from non-Annex 1 states are projected to exceed those from Annex 1 countries.

The Senate resolution is likely to increase the pressure for non-Annex 1 countries to be involved in the process. This will most likely occur through 'joint implementation' programs in which countries could get credit for GHG reductions by building environmentally friendly projects in developing states. The Group of 77 (G-77)'s 132 developing member-states and China, however, are unenthusiastic about any formal commitment.

Another issue that some Annex 1 countries would like to pursue is what constitutes non-Annex 1 states. It is regarded as widely unfair that countries such as Rumania, Russia and Turkey are Annex 1 states -- with respective per capita gross domestic products (GDP) of US$4,620, $4,065 and $5,559 -- committed to reducing GHG emissions, while much wealthier countries like Argentina, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Singapore -- with respective per capita GDPs of $9,349, $21,866, $10,238 and $25,649 -- are categorized as non-Annex 1 countries and therefore do not need to take any action.

Informal discussions at COP3 are likely to focus on a 'graduation' process, so that when countries reach a certain level of economic prosperity, they assume new responsibilities. However, this idea is contentious and is unlikely to be agreed at the conference. Nevertheless, it will remain on the agenda for future negotiations.

Europe believes climate change to be a major problem needing dramatic solutions soon; the U.S. -- with a good deal of sympathy from Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand -- agrees that it is an important issue, but thinks that it would be better addressed through a gradual, long-term approach. Non-Annex 1 countries acknowledge that global warming is a problem, but they argue that solving it is not their responsibility.

There is considerable pressure on participating states at the Kyoto summit to agree on a legally binding treaty. However, prospects for agreement are not promising given that after more than five years of discussion, and two years of hard bargaining, differences between the U.S. and its European allies still run very deep.

The most likely outcome is that a deal will be reached similar to that which the U.S. proposed. Anything tougher will be rejected by Congress, and the U.S. may abandon negotiations altogether. If that happens, other states will inevitably reconsider their positions.