Uniting ethnic groups key to Afghan future

Uniting ethnic groups key to Afghan future

Riza Sihbudi, Chairman, Indonesian Society of Middle Eastern
Studies, Jakarta

The swift defeat of the Taliban was due to two factors. First,
they do not have a military force and structure like in other
countries - they do not even wear military uniforms. Most members
of the Taliban militia consist of ordinary citizens who are
called upon to be soldiers whenever required. While their main
asset is a fighting spirit, their military skills tend to be
somewhat basic. As a consequence, the U.S.-led military attacks,
which used the latest modern weaponry, easily split the Taliban
apart. Their situation has been worsened by their few, outdated
weapons.

Second, albeit a smaller possibility, the Taliban are
deliberately "conceding defeat" by retreating from urban areas to
avoid civilian victims during the holy month of Ramadhan. It is
also an attempt to lead the fighting into mountainous terrain, an
environment they are better accustomed to. They seem to be fully
aware that their advantages lie in guerrilla warfare. As
frequently asserted by their leaders, they will continue their
struggle even after being forced out from strategic cities, such
as Mazar-i Sharif, Kabul and Kandahar.

By their reckoning, the Northern Alliance's current
superiority is only due to the support of the United States and
Britain. When the time comes for these two powers to leave
Afghanistan, then it is almost certain that the strength of the
Northern Alliance will crumble.

Since the Taliban's defeat, the future of Afghanistan is
becoming ever more uncertain.

First, what is known as the Northern Alliance is in fact no
more than a loose coalition formed for the sole temporary
objective of fighting the Taliban. Hence, after defeating the
Taliban, the Northern Alliance is likely to face internal
friction, especially on issues such as the form of government and
leadership. The latter is thornier because the three largest
groups dominating the Northern Alliance have different ethnic and
ideological backgrounds: The Tajik with their Sunni Islam, the
Hazara embracing Syiah Islam and the predominantly pro-communist
Uzbeks.

Second, there is a difference in interests between the
Northern Alliance and its supporting countries, particularly
Pakistan and the United States. These two countries obviously
want the formation of a government with a wider base, which means
the inclusion of the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns.

On the other hand, conflict between the Northern Alliance and
the mostly pro-Taliban Pashtuns has long been deeply rooted and
will be hard to solve in the near future. Furthermore, the United
States clearly wishes the return of Afghanistan's former king,
Zahir Syah, even though he is not popular among the majority of
Afghans and, to top it off, he is not well liked by many in the
Northern Alliance.

Third, the strength of the Taliban has not been depleted
entirely. This means there is a great possibility that the
Taliban could retaliate with the support of huge funding from
Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda group. Past experience also indicates
it is likely that a certain faction in the Northern Alliance,
feeling discontented with the power-sharing setup, might flirt
with the Taliban.

It is also common knowledge that, so far, the friendship and
enmity among Afghanistan's warlords have always been based on
their own temporary or short-term interests, rather than long-
term benefits for the public and the nation.

Traditional politics in Afghanistan is not easily separable
from its three divisions of communal identity -- qawm (solidarity
group), tribe and ethnic group.Qawm is the communal segmentation
bound by feelings of solidarity such as large families, clans,
groups of immigrants and villages. The formation of qawm is based
on family and patron-client relationships and ranks below tribal
or ethnic groups rather than particular districts.

Tribalism is the main feature of the Pashtun in southern and
eastern Afghanistan. The Pashtun have the Pashtunwali -- a set of
values, customs and laws to adhere to. They also have an
institutional framework called jirga or tribal council with a
role to draw up and adopt policies through a consensus under the
leadership of the elders.

Ethnic units in Afghanistan are akin to a maze, each having a
different authority from the other. And ethnic groups do not show
much symmetry.

A Pashtun, for example, is not merely a person who speaks in
the Pashtun vernacular but also one of tribal identity. While,
the Haraza refers more to a religious sect, such as Shia or
Shiite, rather than ethnicity. It is therefore difficult to
define the ethnic groups as a heterogeneous and symmetrical unit.

The war that broke out in 1978 caused dramatic social changes
such as urbanization, particularly Kabul and Mazar-i Sharif, as
well as migration to other countries. Since then, an estimated
five million people have fled the country to seek refuge in Iran,
Pakistan and other countries.

Afghan politics has become more complex due to several
factors such as qawm, tribes and ethnicity as well as ideological
and political elements and the strong influence of other
countries, especially Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. At the
local level, the main issue is still qawm affiliation.

Therefore, the future of post-Taliban Afghanistan depends
heavily on the kind of agreement reached by the large ethnic
groups -- Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek -- as well as the
warlords. A sincere willingness is also called for from outside
parties involved in the Afghan conflict, especially Pakistan and
the United States. Otherwise, stability for Afghanistan will
remain a distant hope and the suffering of its people will
continue for a long time to come.