Uniting ethnic groups key to Afghan future

Riza Sihbudi, Chairman, Indonesian Society of Middle Eastern Studies, Jakarta

The swift defeat of the Taliban was due to two factors. First, they do not have a military force and structure like in other countries - they do not even wear military uniforms. Most members of the Taliban militia consist of ordinary citizens who are called upon to be soldiers whenever required. While their main asset is a fighting spirit, their military skills tend to be somewhat basic. As a consequence, the U.S.-led military attacks, which used the latest modern weaponry, easily split the Taliban apart. Their situation has been worsened by their few, outdated weapons.

Second, albeit a smaller possibility, the Taliban are deliberately "conceding defeat" by retreating from urban areas to avoid civilian victims during the holy month of Ramadhan. It is also an attempt to lead the fighting into mountainous terrain, an environment they are better accustomed to. They seem to be fully aware that their advantages lie in guerrilla warfare. As frequently asserted by their leaders, they will continue their struggle even after being forced out from strategic cities, such as Mazar-i Sharif, Kabul and Kandahar.

By their reckoning, the Northern Alliance's current superiority is only due to the support of the United States and Britain. When the time comes for these two powers to leave Afghanistan, then it is almost certain that the strength of the Northern Alliance will crumble.

Since the Taliban's defeat, the future of Afghanistan is becoming ever more uncertain.

First, what is known as the Northern Alliance is in fact no more than a loose coalition formed for the sole temporary objective of fighting the Taliban. Hence, after defeating the Taliban, the Northern Alliance is likely to face internal friction, especially on issues such as the form of government and leadership. The latter is thornier because the three largest groups dominating the Northern Alliance have different ethnic and ideological backgrounds: The Tajik with their Sunni Islam, the Hazara embracing Syiah Islam and the predominantly pro-communist Uzbeks.

Second, there is a difference in interests between the Northern Alliance and its supporting countries, particularly Pakistan and the United States. These two countries obviously want the formation of a government with a wider base, which means the inclusion of the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns.

On the other hand, conflict between the Northern Alliance and the mostly pro-Taliban Pashtuns has long been deeply rooted and will be hard to solve in the near future. Furthermore, the United States clearly wishes the return of Afghanistan's former king, Zahir Syah, even though he is not popular among the majority of Afghans and, to top it off, he is not well liked by many in the Northern Alliance.

Third, the strength of the Taliban has not been depleted entirely. This means there is a great possibility that the Taliban could retaliate with the support of huge funding from Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda group. Past experience also indicates it is likely that a certain faction in the Northern Alliance, feeling discontented with the power-sharing setup, might flirt with the Taliban.

It is also common knowledge that, so far, the friendship and enmity among Afghanistan's warlords have always been based on their own temporary or short-term interests, rather than long- term benefits for the public and the nation.

Traditional politics in Afghanistan is not easily separable from its three divisions of communal identity -- qawm (solidarity group), tribe and ethnic group.Qawm is the communal segmentation bound by feelings of solidarity such as large families, clans, groups of immigrants and villages. The formation of qawm is based on family and patron-client relationships and ranks below tribal or ethnic groups rather than particular districts.

Tribalism is the main feature of the Pashtun in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The Pashtun have the Pashtunwali -- a set of values, customs and laws to adhere to. They also have an institutional framework called jirga or tribal council with a role to draw up and adopt policies through a consensus under the leadership of the elders.

Ethnic units in Afghanistan are akin to a maze, each having a different authority from the other. And ethnic groups do not show much symmetry.

A Pashtun, for example, is not merely a person who speaks in the Pashtun vernacular but also one of tribal identity. While, the Haraza refers more to a religious sect, such as Shia or Shiite, rather than ethnicity. It is therefore difficult to define the ethnic groups as a heterogeneous and symmetrical unit.

The war that broke out in 1978 caused dramatic social changes such as urbanization, particularly Kabul and Mazar-i Sharif, as well as migration to other countries. Since then, an estimated five million people have fled the country to seek refuge in Iran, Pakistan and other countries.

Afghan politics has become more complex due to several factors such as qawm, tribes and ethnicity as well as ideological and political elements and the strong influence of other countries, especially Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. At the local level, the main issue is still qawm affiliation.

Therefore, the future of post-Taliban Afghanistan depends heavily on the kind of agreement reached by the large ethnic groups -- Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek -- as well as the warlords. A sincere willingness is also called for from outside parties involved in the Afghan conflict, especially Pakistan and the United States. Otherwise, stability for Afghanistan will remain a distant hope and the suffering of its people will continue for a long time to come.