Unfairness likely to cloud polls

By J. Sumardianta

YOGYAKARTA (JP): The 1999 general election, scheduled for next June, may be regarded as the "soul" of the entire reform process. Hopefully it will produce a legitimate and credible government.

It has become an important issue since some still question the legitimacy and credibility of President B.J. Habibie's government.

The coming general election has put that government at its greatest political risk. If it fails, there may not be any reason for Habibie to retain his position until the end of 1999.

Some fear that the next general election will be inconsistent with the "reform spirit". Such fear stems from the political bills currently being deliberated by the House of Representatives (DPR).

Domination by government elements and the idea of allocating 55 DPR seats to the Armed Forces (ABRI) are two "fragile spots" in the political bills.

The Golkar ruling party and ABRI still continue to represent the status quo, while they are the major targets of the reform movement. Excessive adherence of the bills to the power machine inherited from the former regime is indeed incompatible with common sense and a sense of justice.

General elections from 1971 through 1997 became national agenda. The major problem was that the general elections were not used as a means of rejuvenating the political system.

Instead, the election process was solely used as a means of gaining political legitimacy. People's participation was only limited to a few minutes of casting votes at the polling stations. It was doubtless a part of the New Order government's political grand design, in which people were only seen as vote givers.

The general elections were a part of contrived political schemes to maintain the status quo and manipulate the formal rules for the interests of the regime. The administration was not yet aware of the importance of transparent leadership regeneration.

During the New Order era, general elections were simply used as a means to extend and preserve the regime's legitimacy. Manipulative practices were plotted at both the conceptual and operational levels.

They were aimed at securing Golkar's targeted number of votes and perpetuation of the political hegemony of the regime. The general election principles of directness, openness, freedom and confidentiality remained a meaningless slogan.

The New Order era's general elections involved three major problems.

First, public participation at the structural level and in the entire election process was lacking. The government dominated the organizing committee and the whole election process -- voter registration, nomination of representatives, campaigns, as well as casting and counting of votes and monitoring. Members of the Indonesian Election Committee, for instance, were all government ministers.

In addition, the General Election Institute was chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs and the Election Monitoring Committee was headed by the Attorney General. At lower levels, election committees were also dominated by government elements.

Second, general elections were always slanted with unfair practices because the bureaucratic apparatus sided with Golkar. It became distorted as government officials in the election committee were also sitting on Golkar's board of directors. Governors and regents, down to village heads, besides chairing regional election committees, also chaired Golkar's advisory boards in their own regions.

Third, vote counting did not involve any personnel from political parties other than Golkar, which subsequently led to unfair and manipulative practices. The government apparatus could not conduct this justly and fairly in view of its commitment to Golkar.

That was why general elections could not represent political legitimacy, or transfer power in a peaceful way and promote political education.

The New Order government's legitimacy obtained through general elections was prone to be formal and procedural rather than moral and essential. It was more pragmatic than ethical.

These typical attributes in turn caused political crisis, removed from internal and external factors. Formal legitimacy of the regime was always loaded with contradictions, one of them being its claim to perpetuate political stability, which then turned out to be the major root of the government's illegitimacy.

The founding fathers' obsession with a true parliament derived from, elected by, and devoted to the people, and able to control the government, did not turn into reality during the New Order era.

The DPRs produced by the 1971 to 1997 general elections were prone to represent the state's corporate interest more than that of the people. Their representativeness was questionable because almost 60 percent of the members came from the Greater Jakarta area.

Turnover of government officials, which usually occurred after general elections, could not be regarded as a process of change in the elite as it was no different from changing "spare parts" for the political machine, which contrived to preserve power.

The political elite were not responsive and sensitive to socio-political dynamics. They continued to carry on with their past ways of imposing their will in order to silence public demands for democratization.

The absence of power limitation led to a simplified function of general elections. Politicians at the infrastructure and superstructure levels were lacking in self-confidence. They were fearful they would be ousted from the political throne.

Overprotection of the DPR compound from outsiders during the MPR's Special Session in November was an instance. That is why this period after the New Order's fall is called the age of extremes.

We must be on the alert for a coming general election that might be carried out in the New Order style because unfair practices still threaten through the political bills. Efforts to deflect the coming general election into a means of perpetuating the status quo still prevail.

According to the political bills, the new MPR will be composed of 700 seats, including 150 seats divided between 81 regional delegates and 69 group delegates. The problem is that the 81 delegates will not be appointed by the president but by members of local councils (DPRD), which resulted from the 1997 Golkar- dominated general election.

It is very likely that those seats will be controlled by those who support the status quo. On the other hand, the 69 group delegates will likely represent organizations such as the Indonesian National Youth Committee (KNPI), the Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI), the Indonesian Farmers Association (HKTI) and the Federation of Indonesian Workers Associations (FSPSI), which actually served as political machines of the New Order government.

Thus, those who back the status quo will definitely earn 69 seats. As a result, 150 seats in the MPR will still be controlled by Golkar. If these are combined with 55 seats for ABRI, the 205 seats are already at hand. To win the presidential election, they will only need 351 out of the 700 seats in the MPR. That means that Golkar will only need to gain 146 more seats in the DPR from the 1999 general election.

Golkar will only need 30 percent of the collected votes to win by practicing money politics. During the New Order era, money proved itself to be a powerful tool to prop up power. Newly- formed political parties are unlikely to win the coming general election.

The solution is for pro-reform parties, such as the National Mandate Party (PAN), Megawati Soekarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the People's Awakening Party (PKB), all of which have a huge level of support, to form a coalition party to intercept the return of Soehartoism.

The urgency of election reform does not lie in the system, be it district or proportional representation. Rather it lies in the committee structure and the election process. The organizing committee and the monitoring committee for the 1999 general election should be an institution independent from intervention by the military, bureaucracy and Golkar.

It is high time ABRI started to consider withdrawing its intervention from the DPR and DPRD because it has proved that it blocks the democratization process.

The writer is a researcher at Lembaga Studi Sovranita Indonesia and a teacher at the Kolese De Britto High School in Yogyakarta.

Window: We must be on the alert for a coming general election that might be carried out in the New Order style because unfair practices still threaten through the political bills. Efforts to deflect the coming general election into a means of perpetuating the status quo still prevail.