Understanding the past and predicting the future

Understanding the past and predicting the future

By Lance Castles

YOGYAKARTA (JP): After four decades of dictatorship, thought
control, world record nepotism and cronyism and some of the worst
massacres the century has seen, democracy has broken out all over
Indonesia and developments are showing encouraging signals for
the future.

How strange it is then, that reviews of the past year are
mostly steeped in doom and gloom, and predictions of the future
speak of chaos, anarchy, disintegration, a return to military
dictatorship and above all warn us against "euphoria".

At best they tell us "nothing has actually improved", without
explaining that, in their mental scheme, there is no way an
improvement could be recognized if there was one. Even the
leading foreign experts on Indonesia say the future is impossible
to predict, but they are, in any case, still pessimistic.

Let us begin by admitting that, ultimately, we cannot predict
the future with certainty. Anything can happen, as some famous
existentialist said. Furthermore, one could argue nothing matters
to human beings except birth, copulation and death (a character
in T.S. Eliot).

International surveys show people in poor countries say they
are happier than those in rich ones, something any globe-trotter
can confirm by a smile and conversation check. And yet many
readers attribute some importance to justice, prosperity,
democracy, cultural freedom and protection from gross human
rights violations. They would like to know if it is true that a
lifetime of abuse is over, and freedom is here to stay. But when
they ask for bread, they are given a stone.

So why did Soeharto fall when he did? Was he forced out?
(Indonesians love to say he was dilengserkan or dilongsorkan,
meaning "pushed aside" or "forced to step down".) In fact he did
step down, or, as he envisioned it, stepped back, probably in the
belief he would be able to come forward again in more favorable
times. (Note his remark on television implying B.J. Habibie as
President was an absurd idea).

Though he had the character of a lone fighter who would put up
the fiercest fight precisely when his back was to the wall, he
failed to fight at the crucial juncture when he still could have
won. Out of a mixture of complacency and confusion understandable
in one who was surrounded by sycophants for decades, he dropped
his guard and now no doubt bitterly regrets it.

One reason he was so complacent was because he had maneuvered
the Army into helplessness. Especially after he ensured that in
Jakarta the preponderance of military force was under the control
of one ("green") faction; to wit Prabowo of the Army's Special
Force (Kopassus), Muchdi of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command
(Kostrad) and Sjafrie of the Jakarta Military Command (Kodam),
while the formal leadership lay with "red-and-whites". If he got
wind of a coup from either side (and he was suspicious of both),
he could turn to the other and authorize them to stage a
countercoup.

Many of our leading international pundits fail to understand
this because they do not wish to be thought naive enough to
believe the New Order, at least in its last two decades, was a
personal, not a military, dictatorship. But how right military
observer Salim Said was when he wrote recently that under the New
Order the military took their orders from Cendana (Soeharto's
residence), not military headquarters.

Was it the economic disaster which brought Soeharto down? It
is true that without the dramatic economic turnaround from bubble
to bust (it was not really a disaster except in terms of the
money illusion; the upheavals in prices and rates), Soeharto
would still be in power. We know many strong and determined
regimes survive much worse economic times -- the North Korean
Communists, Castro, Saddam Hussein and the Burmese military junta
(SLORC). Furthermore, the money economy (the rate of the rupiah
to the dollar) reached its nadir in January and February 1998, so
a golden constitutional opportunity lay at hand in the impending
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to elect a successor to
Soeharto, preferably a trusted economic technocrat like Emil
Salim or Mar'ie Muhammad. Instead they reelected Soeharto 1,000-
0, even though Soeharto seemed dismayed and confused by the
economic developments.

This is indicated by the fact he repeatedly entertained Steve
Hanke, yet refrained from taking the plunge of openly defying the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). But he had no intention of
stepping down, and behaved even more arrogantly than before, as
shown by his controversial appointments of Habibie, businessman
Bob Hasan, daughter Siti Hardijanti and others.

The actual precipitating event to Soeharto's downfall was his
return from Cairo after days of unprecedented rioting. He decided
to reshuffle the Cabinet, making Armed Forces Commander Gen.
Wiranto "carry the can" for the security breakdown.

Wiranto, though a cautious, routine-oriented man, decided
that, to save himself, Soeharto would have to go. He pressured
the chairman of the House of Representatives (DPR), Harmoko, to
call on Soeharto to resign.

The usually unctuous and beaming face of Harmoko, pale and
tense, berated on television by Buyung Nasution and other
lawyers, was witness to the nation's viewers of the pressure he
was under. At the same time, DPR deputy chairman Syarwan Hamid's
thumbs up indicated at least a part of the Army had at last
joined the far more courageous students, intellectuals, human
rights groups and some retired generals and senior statesmen in
demanding the president make good his hinted willingness to step
down and become a sage.

But then the anxious disappointment when, nearly an hour, if I
remember correctly, after the announcement, Wiranto appeared to
endorse Soeharto, dismissing Harmoko's call as a personal opinion
and threatening to crack down violently on demonstrators. Perhaps
this was part of a deal between the president and Wiranto.

In return for the latter's support, Soeharto promised to step
down at his own pace, as the nation also observed on television
the next day. Perhaps there was a further part of the deal:
Soeharto conceded the removal of Prabowo and Muchdi. That night
Soeharto learned coordinating minister for economic and financial
affairs Ginandjar Kartasasmita had resigned with the other
economic ministers, and the people he wanted for his reformation
council would not play ball. Such refusals were unknown to the
political culture of the New Order.

But the bite to Soeharto was that he believed only Army
pressure produced such events. Perhaps weary, but also still
hoping to reculer pour mieux sauter (reverse for a better jump),
he stepped down. For a couple more days the city was tense.

Would armed units do battle in the streets? Senior generals,
reputedly for security purposes, were sleeping in secret places.
Why did Prabowo, with a character and ideology so different from
Wiranto, not fight? Respect for Soeharto? Patriotism? Fear of
failure? Perhaps we will never know. But remember that no putsch
from below has ever succeeded in Indonesian history.

Only two days after Prabowo was transferred, Harold Crouch was
reported as saying by phone from Canberra that Wiranto now had
Habibie where he wanted him, i.e. he could depose him any time he
wanted. This describes the power situation ever since. Wiranto's
relationship to Habibie is quite different from his relationship
to Soeharto. This can be shown by a simple exercise in empathy.

Suppose Wiranto had decided in February 1998 to depose
Soeharto. He summons his most loyal major and tells him to take a
crack company to Jalan Cendana and arrest the president.
Presumably the major could refuse, declaring the order illegal.
In the event that he attempted it, he probably would be arrested
by his own men to the hilarity of the Soeharto entourage.

But if Wiranto were to decide to end Habibie's presidency, he
would have no such problem. He would simply invite him to
military headquarters and give him a letter of resignation to
sign.

He would, of course, not do this because he is a routine man
and is under no compulsion to change his routine. But if Habibie
were to decide to stay on after the electoral decision, the law
as Wiranto perceives it would take its course. He may already
have shown his ascendancy by insisting the President immediately
meet Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, even though Habibie had said he
did not wish to do so.

To understand Wiranto's position, we have only to realize the
vast majority of armies happily accept being just armies and
leaving politics to the politicians.

Things are happening which are quite contrary to the New Order
recipe of rigged elections, tame media and "floating mass". The
new parties are building parallel organizations right down to the
village level. (Any idea that the ruling Golkar will do well
because only it has a presence in the village is a myth).

The media blare into most homes the message that the New Order
is discredited and criminal, and Habibie, the ministers and the
DPR are Soeharto cronies.

Even the Army and its dwi-fungsi (dual sociopolitical
function) come in for their share of abuse. But presumably the
Wiranto leadership can live with that. They are certainly not so
unprofessional as to do what the SLORC did -- hold an election,
and then prevent the winner from taking office.

To repeat, there is nothing especially self-denying about what
the Wiranto leadership is doing. But couldn't we have a
moratorium on the constant criticism, ridicule and impossible
demands? What is the man supposed to be able to do better?

To sum up, it is not true that nothing has really happened.
Just as it was impossible to predict until early 1998 that
democracy was coming to Indonesia, so it is now hard to see how
it will go away. And within a year or so economic growth will
resume its upward trend, though perhaps at a slower rate than
before. So what about a bit of elation instead of gloom? For the
religiously minded: Praise God from whom all blessings flow.
Instead, the tone of media comment is: "How long, O Lord, how
long?"