UNCHR statement good deal for RI

UNCHR statement good deal for RI

By Dino Patti Djalal

GENEVA (JP): The big question faced by Indonesia in the 54th
session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) was finally
answered Thursday when the commission produced a chairman's
statement on East Timor. But laymen in the wider public will ask
the same question my mother asked me over the phone. What does
this mean exactly? Is this good news or bad news?

A chairman's statement is indeed good news. The statement
means that there will be no UNCHR resolution on East Timor. The
EU's acceptance of the chairman's statement simultaneously means
that it withdraws the draft resolution on East Timor which it had
already submitted to the commission this year.

It also means that a voting showdown over the East Timor
resolution has been avoided, as it spares the 53 country
delegates from the discomfort of having to choose sides in an
atmosphere which, like last year, was likely to be
confrontational and divisive.

Moreover, because a chairman's statement is the outcome of a
negotiated document, its contents are more balanced than those of
a resolution (which is unilaterally drafted), hence, the
commission's "recognition of the positive steps taken by
Indonesia to promote human rights".

The statement is also a blow to Indonesia's opponents,
particularly the variety of political activists who had
intensively worked the UN corridors in a concerted effort to
demonize Indonesia. In short, the statement augurs well for
Indonesia's interests.

The statement, of course, does come with a price tag. A key
point in it is the decision of the Indonesian government to
invite the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to visit East
Timor prior to the convening of the next UNCHR session in March
1999. (The working group consists of five members from different
continents: in this case, an Indian, a French, a Chilean, a
Senegalese and a Czech).

This decision highlights Indonesia's openness and commitment
to cooperate with UNCHR mechanism. Which is not the first time:
in the past, Indonesia invited Special Rapporteurs on Torture
(1991), and on Summary or Arbitrary Executions (1994), and the
High Commissioner on Human Rights (1995), among others. The
report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention's visit to
East Timor will be presented to the 55th session of UNHRC Session
next year.

There are those who say that this decision was a gamble,
Jakarta disapproved the previous reports filed by the special
rapporteurs who visited East Timor. Delegates in Geneva also know
that special rapporteurs are not without shortcomings. For
instance, the report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial
or Summary Executions on his recent visit to the United States
was criticized by the American delegation in Geneva as containing
serious flaws.

From this light, Indonesia's decision to invite the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention, particularly at a time when
domestic conditions are delicate, speaks volumes of its
confidence and continued commitment to pursue human rights
diplomacy through a policy of cooperation and openness.

Another point worth noting in the statement is Indonesia's
stated willingness to allow access to the "program officer"
assigned by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UNHCHR) to East Timor within the context of technical
cooperation. This is actually nothing new, for it has always been
understood by Jakarta that the officer in question would have
access to all parts of Indonesia, including East Timor, in the
fulfillment of his task. In effect, the chairman's statement only
made this more explicit.

While Indonesia is expected to keep its end of the bargain,
the larger question is whether the EU can also undertake an
equally constructive policy toward East Timor.

Throughout the conference, the Indonesian delegation pointedly
expressed its concern to the commission regarding the "rising
wave of terror, intimidation and provocation" carried out by
separatist groups against the population of East Timor.

This message was directly brought by a number of East Timorese
who for the first time took part in the UNCHR conference as
Indonesian delegates. Domingos Policarpo, for example, challenged
the EU delegates to directly discuss their human rights
assessment with him and his colleagues who had come from East
Timor. At a public hearing later on, the East Timorese gave a
detailed and moving expose, furnished by statistics and
photographs (some of which were too gruesome to be shown
publicly), of the human rights violations by Falintil/Fretilin
separatists.

Even as Indonesian and EU delegates were negotiating the
chairman's statement, news broke out from East Timor that the
authorities had found a number of separatist bunkers which were
stacked with weapons, ammunitions and detonators. All these very
serious concerns were left unanswered by the EU.

EU's indifference to the situation on the ground may further
desensitize Indonesia to future attempts to submit resolutions,
as Jakarta grows tired of having to put up with the partial
nature of the EU Portugal-driven human rights diplomacy. The
challenge for the EU, therefore, is to project a posture of
credibility, fairness and objectivity in its human rights policy
toward East Timor.

The EU must also rethink its well-worn habit of using the
chairman's statement and resolution as carrot and stick. Year by
year, the EU has used a "good cop, bad cop" tactic: on the one
hand, the good cop tries to extract as many concessions as
possible from Indonesia with the reward of a chairman's
statement, while on the other hand, the bad cop threatens
Indonesia with a draft resolution on East Timor at any sign of
resistance.

By now, the EU must know that there is no point in it issuing
a nonbinding resolution which Indonesia would, as a matter of
certainty, reject. But the EU must also realize that a resolution
is an improper means to extract concessions, impose conditions,
or clobber a country into submission.

Indeed, as Cuba's surprise victory (the first in 10 years)
over the U.S.-sponsored resolution against it well indicates, the
merit of a resolution as a means to promote human rights is being
highly questioned by most of the country delegates in the UNCHR,
as they are becoming increasingly resentful of the politicization
of human rights by western countries in the UN system at the
expense of the developing countries.

Henceforth, the challenge facing the EU in the coming year is
to become more than just a mouthpiece of Portugal (which will
always be partial to the view of the Timorese separatists) but to
also demonstrate that it can also act in the wider interests of
all the people of East Timor.

At the 55th Session of the UNCHR next year, East Timor will
again be on the agenda. It remains to be seen whether the EU will
again submit a draft resolution on East Timor.

If so, Indonesia is likely to play hardball; but I gather it
will also be willing to discuss a reasonable chairman's
statement.

However, Indonesia certainly cannot be expected to be
exclusively at the receiving end and make all the concessions.
After all, as Indonesia's Ambassador to the UN Agus Tarmidzi puts
it, "It takes two to tango".

Indeed.

The writer is a member of the Indonesian delegation to the
54th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. The
views expressed here are strictly personal.

Window A: The challenge for the EU, therefore, is to project a
posture of credibility, fairness and objectivity in its human
rights policy toward East Timor.

Window B: By now, the EU must know that there is no point in it
issuing a nonbinding resolution which Indonesia would, as a matter
of certainty, reject.