UNCHR statement good deal for RI

By Dino Patti Djalal

GENEVA (JP): The big question faced by Indonesia in the 54th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) was finally answered Thursday when the commission produced a chairman's statement on East Timor. But laymen in the wider public will ask the same question my mother asked me over the phone. What does this mean exactly? Is this good news or bad news?

A chairman's statement is indeed good news. The statement means that there will be no UNCHR resolution on East Timor. The EU's acceptance of the chairman's statement simultaneously means that it withdraws the draft resolution on East Timor which it had already submitted to the commission this year.

It also means that a voting showdown over the East Timor resolution has been avoided, as it spares the 53 country delegates from the discomfort of having to choose sides in an atmosphere which, like last year, was likely to be confrontational and divisive.

Moreover, because a chairman's statement is the outcome of a negotiated document, its contents are more balanced than those of a resolution (which is unilaterally drafted), hence, the commission's "recognition of the positive steps taken by Indonesia to promote human rights".

The statement is also a blow to Indonesia's opponents, particularly the variety of political activists who had intensively worked the UN corridors in a concerted effort to demonize Indonesia. In short, the statement augurs well for Indonesia's interests.

The statement, of course, does come with a price tag. A key point in it is the decision of the Indonesian government to invite the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to visit East Timor prior to the convening of the next UNCHR session in March 1999. (The working group consists of five members from different continents: in this case, an Indian, a French, a Chilean, a Senegalese and a Czech).

This decision highlights Indonesia's openness and commitment to cooperate with UNCHR mechanism. Which is not the first time: in the past, Indonesia invited Special Rapporteurs on Torture (1991), and on Summary or Arbitrary Executions (1994), and the High Commissioner on Human Rights (1995), among others. The report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention's visit to East Timor will be presented to the 55th session of UNHRC Session next year.

There are those who say that this decision was a gamble, Jakarta disapproved the previous reports filed by the special rapporteurs who visited East Timor. Delegates in Geneva also know that special rapporteurs are not without shortcomings. For instance, the report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial or Summary Executions on his recent visit to the United States was criticized by the American delegation in Geneva as containing serious flaws.

From this light, Indonesia's decision to invite the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, particularly at a time when domestic conditions are delicate, speaks volumes of its confidence and continued commitment to pursue human rights diplomacy through a policy of cooperation and openness.

Another point worth noting in the statement is Indonesia's stated willingness to allow access to the "program officer" assigned by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) to East Timor within the context of technical cooperation. This is actually nothing new, for it has always been understood by Jakarta that the officer in question would have access to all parts of Indonesia, including East Timor, in the fulfillment of his task. In effect, the chairman's statement only made this more explicit.

While Indonesia is expected to keep its end of the bargain, the larger question is whether the EU can also undertake an equally constructive policy toward East Timor.

Throughout the conference, the Indonesian delegation pointedly expressed its concern to the commission regarding the "rising wave of terror, intimidation and provocation" carried out by separatist groups against the population of East Timor.

This message was directly brought by a number of East Timorese who for the first time took part in the UNCHR conference as Indonesian delegates. Domingos Policarpo, for example, challenged the EU delegates to directly discuss their human rights assessment with him and his colleagues who had come from East Timor. At a public hearing later on, the East Timorese gave a detailed and moving expose, furnished by statistics and photographs (some of which were too gruesome to be shown publicly), of the human rights violations by Falintil/Fretilin separatists.

Even as Indonesian and EU delegates were negotiating the chairman's statement, news broke out from East Timor that the authorities had found a number of separatist bunkers which were stacked with weapons, ammunitions and detonators. All these very serious concerns were left unanswered by the EU.

EU's indifference to the situation on the ground may further desensitize Indonesia to future attempts to submit resolutions, as Jakarta grows tired of having to put up with the partial nature of the EU Portugal-driven human rights diplomacy. The challenge for the EU, therefore, is to project a posture of credibility, fairness and objectivity in its human rights policy toward East Timor.

The EU must also rethink its well-worn habit of using the chairman's statement and resolution as carrot and stick. Year by year, the EU has used a "good cop, bad cop" tactic: on the one hand, the good cop tries to extract as many concessions as possible from Indonesia with the reward of a chairman's statement, while on the other hand, the bad cop threatens Indonesia with a draft resolution on East Timor at any sign of resistance.

By now, the EU must know that there is no point in it issuing a nonbinding resolution which Indonesia would, as a matter of certainty, reject. But the EU must also realize that a resolution is an improper means to extract concessions, impose conditions, or clobber a country into submission.

Indeed, as Cuba's surprise victory (the first in 10 years) over the U.S.-sponsored resolution against it well indicates, the merit of a resolution as a means to promote human rights is being highly questioned by most of the country delegates in the UNCHR, as they are becoming increasingly resentful of the politicization of human rights by western countries in the UN system at the expense of the developing countries.

Henceforth, the challenge facing the EU in the coming year is to become more than just a mouthpiece of Portugal (which will always be partial to the view of the Timorese separatists) but to also demonstrate that it can also act in the wider interests of all the people of East Timor.

At the 55th Session of the UNCHR next year, East Timor will again be on the agenda. It remains to be seen whether the EU will again submit a draft resolution on East Timor.

If so, Indonesia is likely to play hardball; but I gather it will also be willing to discuss a reasonable chairman's statement.

However, Indonesia certainly cannot be expected to be exclusively at the receiving end and make all the concessions. After all, as Indonesia's Ambassador to the UN Agus Tarmidzi puts it, "It takes two to tango".

Indeed.

The writer is a member of the Indonesian delegation to the 54th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. The views expressed here are strictly personal.

Window A: The challenge for the EU, therefore, is to project a posture of credibility, fairness and objectivity in its human rights policy toward East Timor.

Window B: By now, the EU must know that there is no point in it issuing a nonbinding resolution which Indonesia would, as a matter of certainty, reject.