Uncertainty shadows road to a coalition government
By Asip Agus Hasani
YOGYAKARTA (JP): Many experts believe only several parties will win significant votes from Monday's polls and they will be forced to form a coalition government. How are they going to go about it?
Political expert Riswandha Imawan from Gadjah Mada University thinks even the road to a coalition government is uncertain, given emergent signs of "coalition" among status quo groups while those which are called reform parties are split into Islam versus nationalist secular.
The following is an excerpt from his interview with The Jakarta Post.
Question: What are President Habibie's chances for the next presidential election?
Answer: President Habibie's asset is his public image. He has been personified as the cleverest man in Indonesia. You'd be surprised that many villagers do pray that children will be as smart as Pak Habibie. They are not aware that Habibie is indeed intelligent in technology matters but 'naive' in politics.
For some Muslims Habibie is the symbol of Muslim awakening because he established the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI).
Why did Habibie recently speak about a direct presidential election? Because he knows very well he has the support of the majority of rural dwellers, while an election through the representatives at the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) is less advantageous for him.
He did say his idea was for the 2004 elections, but at the end of the statement he said, "Who knows if it will be accepted by the MPR for the election this time."
Q: What are Habibie's chances to remain Golkar's sole presidential candidate?
A: The proposal (to have Habibie as the sole candidate) is a double-edged sword, because it also positions him as a decoy if not a bumper (for Golkar).
We know from Monday's poll there won't be a majority party which can dictate or force will on other parties. The most a party can obtain is between 15 and 20 percent. It needs at least 25 percent of the votes in order to be able to dictate interests to other parties.
There are five indicators which measure to what extent a political party is established, i.e. a clear basis of supporters, a clear basis of ideology, a strong leadership, a strong infrastructure and a big fund resource.
Based on the five indicators, there will be at least six main political parties which will obtain the highest number of votes, namely Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-Perjuangan), National Mandate Party (PAN), National Awakening Party (PKB), Golkar, United Development Party (PPP) and possibly Crescent Star Party (PBB).
If we want to simplify matters further, the four main parties are PDI-Perjuangan, PAN, PKB and Golkar. They will each get between 10 to 20 percent.
There is only a small possibility for any of the bigger parties to obtain 25 percent of the votes. The total number of votes will be equally distributed among the four main parties mentioned.
In this context, Habibie's candidacy ... will marginalize him in Indonesian politics. He will be sidelined.
Now, we have the following candidates: Megawati Soekarnoputri from PDI Perjuangan, Amien Rais of PAN and Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) of PKB. Together, they can "annul" Habibie's candidacy. But the emergence of either one of the candidates can also be negated by the others.
Q: How will Golkar fare in the vote counting?
A: Golkar is disparaged everywhere especially in Java, but we should not forget it is still a party with the sturdiest infrastructure and fund resource support. It may no longer have supporters in Java's urban centers, but it enjoys support in some of the rural areas and especially outside Java. The party will get a high number of votes with the strong support of money and infrastructure.
Who is the real organizer of the general election although the responsibility is shouldered by the General Elections Commission (KPU) and the political parties? The answer is the government, the bureaucracy. Would the bureaucrats be willing to lose jobs after the general election? Certainly not and they will try to find the means to let Golkar win again.
In fact it is not possible to separate bureaucracy from Golkar in a very short time. The situation applies to Golkar and the Indonesian Military (TNI).
Q: What do you think of some reform parties' campaign to block the reemergence of status quo forces represented among others by Golkar?
A: Reform forces must gather together if they do not want the old status quo forces to return to power. The problem is, the major reform parties have yet to share the same focus of interest that would enable them to coalesce to confront the status quo forces.
What worries me is the likelihood that some small parties, which are actually Golkar's splinter groups, will decide to back Akbar Tandjung (Golkar chairman) at the MPR. Now, that would be the "new Golkar" (which would be pro status quo), which is unlike the so-called New Golkar that Akbar boasted about in campaign rallies.
Another weakness of the big reformist parties is the insistence on having presidential candidates win under any conditions.
Amien Rais has vowed he would become either president or opposition. Megawati, too, has said the same thing ... (It seems) PKB, PAN and PDI Perjuangan would not stay together for long, while the real fight (against status quo forces) will only take place at the MPR general session (in November).
Q: What do you think of the recent vote sharing deals among eight Islamic parties?
A: There is a positive side to the agreement, namely there wouldn't be any wasted votes, but I also see it as a trend toward a polarization of Indonesian political forces which is like a return to the political map even before the New Order. The political forces will be divided into two big forces, i.e. secular nationalist and modernist Islam.
This may cause a parliamentary deadlock or a high-level political deadlock in policy making at the House of Representatives (DPR) or MPR. A parliamentary deadlock occurred after the 1955 general election resulting in the dissolution of the Konstituante (constituent assembly) and the consolidation of the then Armed Forces' political role.
If there's no force or figure to bridge the two large political forces, a third party will take advantage of the situation. It is none other than the old status quo force, namely that "new Golkar." I am convinced they (the third party) are already aware of the benefits they can obtain from a parliamentary deadlock later on.
Q: What should the reformist parties do?
A: First, focus on common interests ... as a basis for uniting forces. I think the agreement among reformist parties to make Golkar the common foe is an effective means to unite forces.
Second, the reform parties should be willing to exercise greater compromise especially if they make a political transaction among them. For example who will become the president.
Although Amien Rais and Megawati have both stated they would settle for nothing less than presidency, let's hope that later on they would be willing to compromise.
It would be good if somebody among them would position himself or herself as DPR or MPR chief or chairman of the DPA (Supreme Court) or as the vice president. Yusril Ihza Mahendra could replace Attorney General Andi Ghalib, otherwise the trial of former president Soeharto would only be a dream.
Q: Back to Habibie. If he is used as a decoy only, who will Golkar propose as its real candidate?
A: If Golkar is still lucky to be able to propose another candidate, they should choose a person... with good access to... influential political figures. In other words, the person should be acceptable to Megawati, Gus Dur and Amien Rais.
Who would he be? Among others, Yogyakarta monarch Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X and Muslim scholar Nurcholis Madjid.
Q: What would the military role be in the establishment of the new government and during the presidential election?
A: It looks fairly certain the next government will be a coalition administration. It is most important the new government must be accommodative and willing to compromise with the military which could not possibly be willing to leave the political arena, at least not at this period.
If PAN dominates the establishment of the government, it cannot maintain its extreme stance toward TNI. PAN, PDI Perjuangan and PKB can only demand that TNI withdraw from politics in accordance with its own commitment.