Uncertainties cloud RI political sky up to March 1998
The following article is based on a recent interview with a prominent visiting Indonesianist, Dr. Harold Crouch. Now a senior fellow at the Australian National University, Dr. Crouch has been researching Indonesian army politics over the last 25 years. His book, Army and Politics in Indonesia (1978), is a classic on the subject.
Question: As a long time observer of Indonesian politics did you find anything particularly interesting this visit?
Answer: I think the title of Adam Schwarz' book, A Nation in Waiting, is very true in the sense that everybody is waiting to see what will happen with the succession, and particularly who will become the new vice president, who will be in the next cabinet and who the military leaders will be.
There are a lot of uncertainties which will not be resolved until the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) convenes in March 1998. People are in waiting. There are a lot of theories and different views about who will be the next vice president, but there will not be an answer until March next year.
And secondly, because of the economic climate, there have been a lot of uncertainties and many different views on the worsening situation, it makes Indonesian polities more unpredictable and uncertain.
Q: Do you think that the monetary crisis will affect the military's role?
A: I am not an economist, but if the economy gets worse, as some people predict, tension in society will increase, more rioting may happen, and ABRI (the Indonesian Armed Forces) will be directly involved in controlling the situation. The worse the economy is, the more likely the military will become directly involved in politics.
Q: The country has been plagued by riots over the last three years, which is reminiscent of the early 1960s. Some observers believe the military has not taken strong action against the rioters. How do you read this?
A: I don't know much in detail. It is clear that the military has cause to think that future threats will not come from China or Japan, but rather from within the country. The way they handle riots now, such as the increasing role of the police and the way they use rubber bullets, shows the military is rather nervous of taking any strong action. A change of approach in dealing with political turmoil is taking place. They no longer simply blame a "third party" as the mastermind of a riot as they used to do.
Q: In relation to these riots, how is the army going to handle security in the short run?
A: Until the MPR General Assembly, or as long as Soeharto is the highest commander, the President, they can wait for his command, they won't take independent action.
I mean, over the last few years ABRI has been able to carry out its social and political roles, in the sense that they are an independent political force, but now they are very much controlled by the President. In the long run it depends on who the commander is, but as long as Soeharto is there and the officers loyal to him are still in power, no drastic change will happen and there is nothing to be worried about.
Q: The military seems to have become less and less violent in handling riots over the last few years. Can you explain this new stance?
A: It is clear that the military won't take strong action because they are rather nervous. There is a change, especially since the Dili incident when an honorary council was established under Feisal Tanjung and some high ranking officers were court- martialled and punished.
Since then the military has been trying to avoid violence and confrontation with civilians. They used violence in Nipah in late 1993, which lead to some officers being dismissed. They take a while before taking violent action now. For instance, in the Medan riot in mid 1994, no one was actually shot. And despite taking part in the attack on the PDI headquarters, in the riot following the attack nobody was killed by the military. They are very careful not to kill people.
In the last couple of riots, like in Ujungpandang, they seem to have been very careful, officers realize that handling the riots is the job of the people, not the army. But it doesn't mean that in an emergency situation they won't use violence.
Q: Is it partly due to international pressure and the human rights issue?
A: I think international pressure is a factor, and also globalization and the rapid spread of information which makes them ashamed to do something like shooting people. Another factor is that some officers come from a middle class background, and they just feel ashamed with their relatives, while some other officers are really genuine.
Q: Last month, Maj. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono made a statement during a seminar at CSIS, arguing that ABRI is to reject any political reform...
A: I think ABRI take the stance of rejecting any drastic political reform, the military is still searching for a concrete format for political reform. They accept the general idea, but the realization of it is obscure to them. Like Soeharto saying that he wanted a stronger parliament, but how should it be made stronger? It was not defined.
Q: Many believe that ABRI (in particular Gen. Feisal Tanjung) and Habibie's relationship is getting closer, on the other hand many officers seem to be disappointed simply because Habibie has taken over ABRI's strategic industries, and determined the purchase of ABRI's weapons...
A: I think if ABRI officers were asked who they want as vice president, few would say Habibie. Feisal Tanjung might support Habibie. The majority are not quite comfortable with the idea of Habibie as vice president. The question is could ABRI accept Habibie? Maybe Habibie would not be their first choice, but if Habibie were to be elected president or vice president, would ABRI accept him? It is really an unanswerable question. In the past they were strongly against Habibie, but now they are thinking about how to deal with him.
Q: Talking about the relationship between ABRI and Habibie, many observers suggest that there is no longer any tension between the military and Islam...
A: It has changed a lot, I mean up to the mid 1980s the military was saying that radical Islam was a threat, now the Islam phobia is not there as obviously as it was. At the same time there has been a change within the Islamic movement, and the military has also followed Soeharto's changing policy toward Islam in the late 1980s. And anyway the Moslems were not from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) but from the Masyumi sphere. When Gen. Hartono was the Army Chief of Staff a lot of Moslem officers had better opportunities than before, but now we are back to normal. I don't think that the military is particularly phobic about Islam. However, the military political philosophy is not based on Islam, but on the Sapta Marga (oath), it has no connection to Islam, but at the same time Moslem officers have good chances for promotion.
Q: Why did Soeharto change his policy toward Islam?
A: It is because he (Soeharto) realized that the army and Benny Moerdani (former Armed Forces commander) were a potential problem. Afterward, Soeharto gradually regained his control over the military, and after five years the army was completely under his control.
Q: There has been tension between ABRI and Golkar, such as in 1993 when a senior army officer resisted the election of Harmoko as Golkar chairman, and in the DPRD (Provincial Legislative Council), where Golkar and ABRI compete for the position of DPRD speakers...
A: First of all Golkar was created by ABRI, but at the same time ABRI needs Golkar, otherwise ABRI would have to hold the whole government by themselves. I don't know to what extent Golkar needs ABRI's support in the election, many retired ABRI people are in Golkar and some of them are heads of Golkar at a local level. In some circumstances, such as in provincial or kabupaten (regional) level, it is not surprising that they fight each other. The keluarga besar (extended family) of ABRI always supports Golkar. The reality is that Golkar depends on ABRI, although the relationship is mutual. Basically Soeharto is both the head of Golkar and ABRI, it does not mean that ABRI is dominating Golkar, or Golkar is dominating ABRI.
Q: Gen. Wiranto just replaced Gen. Hartono as the Army Chief of Staff, can you explain the different styles of these two generals?
A: I have no experience with either, I have not met either of them. Wiranto is a very professional officer, and Hartono is also a professional officer.
Q: What is your comment on the 1997 ABRI Defense White Paper?
A: I haven't read it. I cannot remember the points. Compared to the white papers in other countries which are very detailed, ABRI's white paper is very general.
Q: What is the political significance of the five stars awarded to the three generals recently?
A: I really don't know.
Q: Gen. Ne Win visited Indonesia last month, his first public appearance in the last few years, do you think that his visit has any connection to the Myanmar military's intention to learn from and copy the politics of the Indonesian military?
A: After the military regime in Myanmar held elections in 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi's party won 80 percent of the seats in parliament. The Myanmar military officers started thinking about how they could win the election, and they knew that Golkar always wins more than 70 percent in every election. What is the secret? The Myanmar officers believe that there are a lot of interesting aspects in Indonesian politics, in the last three or four years many Myanmar military officers have come to Indonesia to learn about the military and Golkar's political machine. They want to follow Indonesia in terms of having the military serve as parliamentarians. I think they believe that Indonesia is a good model for them.
Q: Are there any other Asian countries which are interested in Indonesian army politics?
A: In 1982, I was in Thailand and talked with Thai military officers, they were quite interested in the Indonesian model of army politics, but then the development of Thai politics has been quite different since then. There was an interest from the military in controlling politics, how they could create a party which always wins the election.
-- Benny Subianto