UN to face challenges in East Timor

By Omar Halim

JAKARTA (JP): Discussions on who is at fault for the East Timor tragedy should start with acknowledgment of the fact that the territory was colonized by Portugal for many centuries.

If we look at the problems in many countries in the developing world, particularly in Africa, the colonial factor plays an important role in shaping them.

The fact was that the East Timorese were in conflict with each other when the Portuguese -- perhaps with the good intentions by the more progressive military regime that took power in 1974 -- abruptly and irresponsibly left without handing the territory to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. Blood was shed everyday from then on.

This division continued, and perhaps was exacerbated by the incorporation of the territory into Indonesia through misrule, exploitation and disregard for Timorese aspirations.

Exploitation by powerful interests in faraway Jakarta was no doubt seen as serving Jakarta's interests, instead of theirs. Corruption by officials appointed by Jakarta made clear to the Timorese that the relatively high allocation of budgetary resources per capita was only valid on paper.

On the other hand, the radical changes taking place in Jakarta must have made the Timorese feel that changes in the attitude of the central government in Jakarta toward East Timor could take place in the foreseeable future. Hope was lifted that the territory might gain broad or full autonomy, or perhaps even independence. While hope was raised among those who favored independence, trepidation sank in among those who favored a continued association with Indonesia. The contrasting viewpoints became more acute and emotions started rising. This was the situation at the beginning of the year.

Then the government announced a radical change in policy by providing an option that the Timorese could opt for total independence. After the announcement of this policy early in February, it was clear that emotions in East Timor had been raised much further.

As if this was not sufficient to upset the delicate equilibrium of 'peace' among the Timorese, the government required them to make their choice within a few months, that is in August 1999. It was clear to some observers that this was a recipe for disaster.

In addition, it was learned later on that this principal policy -- which could affect the unity of the nation -- was formulated and decided upon without the full consultation and the full support required.

A few days before the announcement of this policy, prominent Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) proposed to Bishop Belo -- as potential mediators -- a nine-point framework for the long- term settlement of East Timor. The proposal included a ten-year handover period, when the East Timorese would have full autonomy and, at the end of the period, an opportunity to express their choice in a fully transparent referendum.

This 10-year period would have provided an opportunity for the new, reformist and elected Indonesian central government to show the East Timorese that they would be treated decently and honorably as Indonesian citizens. It would also provide ample opportunity to calm the emotions of the contending East Timorese, with both sides knowing that each side will have the opportunity to express their views at the end of the ten-year period.

This period could be utilized by Bishop Belo and Gus Dur to mediate not only between the contending East Timorese parties but also with those concerned outside East Timor, particularly in Jakarta. Finally, it was proposed that because of the colonialist role of Portugal, formalities aside, direct negotiation should be undertaken with the contending parties of East Timor, including the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT).

The use of the United Nations forum should be suspended for a period, e.g. one year, to reach agreements with all parties that are directly involved. Portugal, as a colonial power, should not be given the opportunity of being the "good guy", as it is at present.

If the government felt that the East Timorese would vote in favor of the integration (without the long-term option of independence), the estimation was grossly wrong. Emotions have been so high, and continued to increase before the voting, that violence -- whether supported or fanned by non-East Timorese -- escalated.

After the voting, the pro-integration group knew that they were the loser, and being the loser, we were told in the East Timor cultural context, is the vanquished. This explains the tremendous violence that has been taking place since then. The arrival of a fully armed United Nations peacekeeping force in the Indonesian territory is a big slap in the face at the sovereignty of the country. The government and the people of Indonesia will be the big losers.

However the East Timorese have perhaps been the biggest losers. Besides the loss of life and property, they have, most of all, been inflicted with much deeper divisions among themselves. This, such as in Somalia where the United Nations exacerbated their division during the war with them in 1993, will be very hard to heal in a relatively short period of time.

The United Nations should have known the risks in accepting its role under the above circumstances. It should have counseled for the holding of a fully transparent referendum and also the postponement of such a referendum until the newly elected government is installed. It should not have bowed to the pressure of western countries which had the admirable, but myopic, view that the right of self-determination of the East Timorese should be upheld, without understanding how important it was to cool emotions and hold the referendum under completely different circumstances.

Blame can not be assigned to developed countries that genuinely wanted to see that oppressed people should be given the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination. However it is different if they encouraged the present East Timorese solution because their aim is to have large developing countries break into smaller pieces.

What is the prospect of East Timor? Not very hopeful, it seems. The United Nations peace-keeping force will face resistance and will fail unless it is prepared to use military force against such resistance. The United Nations will also suffer casualties. This happened in Somalia, and the United Nations deserted Somalia. Now, Somalia is still in conflict with itself.

In the eyes of Indonesian people, the United Nations has so far lost considerable credibility because of its staffing policy as well as its lack of impartiality. The Indonesian military force (TNI), reportedly will remain in East Timor while the United Nations force is there. Potentially, this is a source of conflict, especially when interests or interpretation of events do not coincide. No two forces, under different command, should co-exist within the same territory.

The present Indonesian government has opened the door, presumably not by design, for international pressure to have a decisive influence on national policies in the future. Let us hope that we will not lose our sovereignty and national pride as well.

The seemingly balanced and thoughtful Xanana Gusmao will have a difficult task to reconcile the contending parties in his new country. This will become even more difficult if there is to be meddling from outside independent East Timor. At the beginning, Timor Lorosae will get substantial help from the west, but this assistance will not last for a long time and, as an independent country, this small country has to subsist and prosper on its own natural and human resources.

The writer worked for the United Nations for almost thirty years and served in UN peacekeeping missions in Namibia, Lebanon, Somalia and Liberia. He also served as special envoy of the secretary-general of the United Nations to Armenia and Azerbaijan on the question of Nagorno-Karabakh and to Cameron and Nigeria on the question of Bakassi Peninsula.