UN to face challenges in East Timor

UN to face challenges in East Timor

By Omar Halim

JAKARTA (JP): Discussions on who is at fault for the East
Timor tragedy should start with acknowledgment of the fact that
the territory was colonized by Portugal for many centuries.

If we look at the problems in many countries in the developing
world, particularly in Africa, the colonial factor plays an
important role in shaping them.

The fact was that the East Timorese were in conflict with each
other when the Portuguese -- perhaps with the good intentions by
the more progressive military regime that took power in 1974 --
abruptly and irresponsibly left without handing the territory to
the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. Blood was shed
everyday from then on.

This division continued, and perhaps was exacerbated by the
incorporation of the territory into Indonesia through misrule,
exploitation and disregard for Timorese aspirations.

Exploitation by powerful interests in faraway Jakarta was no
doubt seen as serving Jakarta's interests, instead of theirs.
Corruption by officials appointed by Jakarta made clear to the
Timorese that the relatively high allocation of budgetary
resources per capita was only valid on paper.

On the other hand, the radical changes taking place in Jakarta
must have made the Timorese feel that changes in the attitude of
the central government in Jakarta toward East Timor could take
place in the foreseeable future. Hope was lifted that the
territory might gain broad or full autonomy, or perhaps even
independence. While hope was raised among those who favored
independence, trepidation sank in among those who favored a
continued association with Indonesia. The contrasting viewpoints
became more acute and emotions started rising. This was the
situation at the beginning of the year.

Then the government announced a radical change in policy by
providing an option that the Timorese could opt for total
independence. After the announcement of this policy early in
February, it was clear that emotions in East Timor had been
raised much further.

As if this was not sufficient to upset the delicate
equilibrium of 'peace' among the Timorese, the government
required them to make their choice within a few months, that is
in August 1999. It was clear to some observers that this was a
recipe for disaster.

In addition, it was learned later on that this principal
policy -- which could affect the unity of the nation -- was
formulated and decided upon without the full consultation and the
full support required.

A few days before the announcement of this policy, prominent
Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) proposed to Bishop Belo
-- as potential mediators -- a nine-point framework for the long-
term settlement of East Timor. The proposal included a ten-year
handover period, when the East Timorese would have full autonomy
and, at the end of the period, an opportunity to express their
choice in a fully transparent referendum.

This 10-year period would have provided an opportunity for the
new, reformist and elected Indonesian central government to show
the East Timorese that they would be treated decently and
honorably as Indonesian citizens. It would also provide ample
opportunity to calm the emotions of the contending East Timorese,
with both sides knowing that each side will have the opportunity
to express their views at the end of the ten-year period.

This period could be utilized by Bishop Belo and Gus Dur to
mediate not only between the contending East Timorese parties but
also with those concerned outside East Timor, particularly in
Jakarta. Finally, it was proposed that because of the colonialist
role of Portugal, formalities aside, direct negotiation should be
undertaken with the contending parties of East Timor, including
the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT).

The use of the United Nations forum should be suspended for a
period, e.g. one year, to reach agreements with all parties that
are directly involved. Portugal, as a colonial power, should not
be given the opportunity of being the "good guy", as it is at
present.

If the government felt that the East Timorese would vote in
favor of the integration (without the long-term option of
independence), the estimation was grossly wrong. Emotions have
been so high, and continued to increase before the voting, that
violence -- whether supported or fanned by non-East Timorese --
escalated.

After the voting, the pro-integration group knew that they
were the loser, and being the loser, we were told in the East
Timor cultural context, is the vanquished. This explains the
tremendous violence that has been taking place since then. The
arrival of a fully armed United Nations peacekeeping force in the
Indonesian territory is a big slap in the face at the sovereignty
of the country. The government and the people of Indonesia will
be the big losers.

However the East Timorese have perhaps been the biggest
losers. Besides the loss of life and property, they have, most of
all, been inflicted with much deeper divisions among themselves.
This, such as in Somalia where the United Nations exacerbated
their division during the war with them in 1993, will be very
hard to heal in a relatively short period of time.

The United Nations should have known the risks in accepting
its role under the above circumstances. It should have counseled
for the holding of a fully transparent referendum and also the
postponement of such a referendum until the newly elected
government is installed. It should not have bowed to the pressure
of western countries which had the admirable, but myopic, view
that the right of self-determination of the East Timorese should
be upheld, without understanding how important it was to cool
emotions and hold the referendum under completely different
circumstances.

Blame can not be assigned to developed countries that
genuinely wanted to see that oppressed people should be given the
opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination.
However it is different if they encouraged the present East
Timorese solution because their aim is to have large developing
countries break into smaller pieces.

What is the prospect of East Timor? Not very hopeful, it
seems. The United Nations peace-keeping force will face
resistance and will fail unless it is prepared to use military
force against such resistance. The United Nations will also
suffer casualties. This happened in Somalia, and the United
Nations deserted Somalia. Now, Somalia is still in conflict with
itself.

In the eyes of Indonesian people, the United Nations has so
far lost considerable credibility because of its staffing policy
as well as its lack of impartiality. The Indonesian military
force (TNI), reportedly will remain in East Timor while the
United Nations force is there. Potentially, this is a source of
conflict, especially when interests or interpretation of events
do not coincide. No two forces, under different command, should
co-exist within the same territory.

The present Indonesian government has opened the door,
presumably not by design, for international pressure to have a
decisive influence on national policies in the future. Let us
hope that we will not lose our sovereignty and national pride as
well.

The seemingly balanced and thoughtful Xanana Gusmao will have
a difficult task to reconcile the contending parties in his new
country. This will become even more difficult if there is to be
meddling from outside independent East Timor. At the beginning,
Timor Lorosae will get substantial help from the west, but this
assistance will not last for a long time and, as an independent
country, this small country has to subsist and prosper on its own
natural and human resources.

The writer worked for the United Nations for almost thirty
years and served in UN peacekeeping missions in Namibia, Lebanon,
Somalia and Liberia. He also served as special envoy of the
secretary-general of the United Nations to Armenia and Azerbaijan
on the question of Nagorno-Karabakh and to Cameron and Nigeria on
the question of Bakassi Peninsula.