UN reform proposal focuses on peace and security

A high-level panel of 16 eminent figures this month presented a list of recommendations which, if adopted at a summit next year, would introduce the most sweeping changes to the United Nations since its creation in 1945. The Jakarta Post's Sabam Siagian and Meidyatama Suryodiningrat spoke with panel member Lord David Hannay, who previously served as the UK's permanent representative to the UN. Below is an excerpt of the interview: What are the most salient points of the panel's report?

It's a very substantial report. Over 100 recommendations. It's the biggest proposal for reform there's ever been at the UN since 1945. It focuses primarily on peace and security in a much wider sense.

There are proposals on the framework in which the use of force should be contemplated, with a very clear judgment that there should be no change in the provisions for the use of force in self-defense. There are guidelines for the criteria before the UN or individual states contemplate the use of force, like the need to relate to a positive end objective; that the outcome will be more beneficial than if you don't.

There is a substantial portion of the report which relates to economic and social programs. Then there are proposals relating to weapons of mass destruction, with proposals for a moratorium on any new nuclear processing or enrichment plants.

On terrorism, there is a suggestion on the definition of terrorism which would outlaw completely actions against non- combatants and civilians.

There are also a lot of proposals for institutional change. In particular we've recommended needs to get to grips with this phenomenon of failed or failing states. The UN needs to have a continuum of policies to deal with state failure. A system that gives you early warning, preventive measures before a state actually fails, the possibility of intervention as a last resort.

Also a more sustained approach to post-conflict peace building. We've suggested that it be handled by a new institution, called the Peace Building Commission, set up under the aegis of the UN Security Council. It would have a wider membership than the Security Council because it would include representatives from the IMF, World Bank, regional organizations if they were relevant, and also donors and troop contributors.

We've suggested ways of reforming the Security Council, enlarging it to 24 in one of two different methods which we have not chosen between.

One method with new permanent members, the other with non- permanent members with four-year terms with the possibility of renewal. But in neither case would the members have vetoes. In the expansion of the Security Council to 24 members -- under both methods -- the panel divided the membership into four regions (Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe and Americas) and allocated each region six seats. Isn't this unfair to the Asia Pacific, which has the most UN members and some 61 percent of the world's population?

Well, not directly, no. Frankly, if you take the distribution of population in the world then China accounts for an enormous proportion of the world's population and you would have a Security Council in which China would have a quarter of the votes. That is not a practical proposition.

The four divisions we've suggested are just illustrative. But in order to show how you could bring about a better balance and representation of developing countries, we have shown the groupings under these four headings. And you can see how much of an improvement on both those points of view this is from the present situation.

Of course they are not ideal. Nothing ever is. But each of Asia, Africa and Latin America have much stronger representation under both of our reform proposals than they have at the moment.

Despite saying veto rights are "unsuitable", the panel seems to have relented on the subject of removing the veto rights of the current Security Council permanent members.

It (veto rights) was part of the wedding diary of the UN. Everybody knows that there would not have been a UN if Stalin and Roosevelt had not had the veto.

If you ask yourself now which of the five permanent members might be prepared to surrender the veto, well you can be sure that the Americans, Russians and Chinese won't surrender the veto. The British and the French might if everybody else did, but that's not a practical possibility.

What we tried to put forward was not a kind of blue-sky utopian report, one that would have opted for the abolition of the veto, the creation of a rapid reaction force, all these far- reaching, very imaginative ideas, but ones that are not going to be agreed to at this stage by the member states.

We opted for a practical approach. "How could you make the UN more effective, efficient and equitable now?"

There is not one proposal that we made that could not be agreed to within a year if you had the political will.

We have suggested, however, a system by which its use could be a little bit attenuated by proposing the Security Council take two votes on each occasion.

The first vote would be purely indicative and in that vote even a permanent member's negative vote would not be a veto. In the second a permanent member's vote would be a veto.

That would mean that in some cases, we would hope, permanent members having expressed their view on the policy negatively would not feel the need to block it.

For example, in some of the cases in Middle Eastern resolutions. If you look at the number of vetoes cast, a huge number are vetoes by the United States on resolutions which would have condemned Israel but would have no practical effect.

Under the system we proposed the United States, having expressed its view on the policies, would not feel the need to veto them.

What about reforms in the UN General Assembly?

We've suggested that the committees should be smaller in membership and produce more focused agendas. That the General Assembly not focus on recycling endless debates year after year. They should focus on the burning subjects of the hour.

We've also suggested that the General Assembly should be the place where a new consensus on the UN's role on peace and security, for which we've made all these proposals, should be decided at the summit which will be taking place in 2005.

We've also proposed reform in the Secretariat, with a second deputy secretary-general to concentrate exclusively on peace and security with a peace-building bureau which will provide backup for the Peace Building Commission.

(T)he Brahimi Report (in 2000) proposed (something similar) and the General Assembly rejected it. A lot of member states are very suspicious of the UN. They think that if it has an analytical capability it will come and meddle in their affairs.

I think that's a very shortsighted view because many states which are under stress really need help from the international community.

Previous recommendations for UN reforms were rejected. What makes you think the panel's recommendations will eventually be accepted?

The main difference is timing. This panel's report has arrived at a time when the international community is more conscious than it has ever been of the weaknesses of its institutions and mechanisms.

I think there's probably a greater willingness for radical and fundamental thinking than there has been in recent years.

The panel's report, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, can be downloaded at www.un.org/secureworld.