UN peacekeeping operation

The classic characteristic earmarking the UN peacekeeping operation throughout its history is identified as being not an enforcement action, as envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter.

The enforcement action visualized as such involves action by air, sea, other than land forces, including blockades.

The other classic feature ascribed to the UN peacekeeping operation is that it is carried out with the consent and cooperation of the country concerned. This indicates Indonesia in the present case of East Timor.

Now, the establishment of the multinational force under the authority of the Security Council is legitimately cloaked with the qualification of being made "pursuant to the request of the government of Indonesia conveyed to the secretary-general". This, of course, should be read as a convenient face-saving device, to preserve international political self- respect.

The task of the multinational force is defined to restore peace and security in East Timor and to support UNAMET in carrying out its task and facilitating humanitarian assistance operations.

Meanwhile, within the frame of restoring peace and security, it must be noted that all acts of violence are declared to be condemned. Those responsible for such acts are called upon, or exactly "demanded " in the wording of the Security Council resolution, to be brought to justice. This foresees legal proceedings to be instituted probably before an international tribunal. This may give rise to resentment and indignation as its possible aftermath.

Next follows the dubiously theoretical phase as the collective deployment of multinational force will be replaced by the UN peacekeeping operation proper.

At this stage, the Secretary-General sets out to prepare for the UN transitional administration to operate in East Timor. In this framework, the UN peacekeeping operation is expected to be incorporated. However, with a view to carrying out the orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the UN, the governments of Indonesia, Portugal and the secretary-general are anticipated to make the necessary arrangements toward that end.

Now, the conspicuous feature at this point is that it is the leadership of the multinational force, not the peacekeeping operation, that is requested to cooperate in assisting those arrangements necessary for the peaceful transfer of authority in East Timor to the UN.

This suggests that the role of the multinational force and that of the UN peacekeeping operation, in the case of East Timor, instead of being mutually exclusive one from another, will practically, for one reason or another, rather merge into one single entity, although nominally the impression is created as if one is to be replaced by the other, as envisaged in paragraph 10 of the Security Council Resolution.

S. SUHAEDI

Jakarta