UN intervention in East Timor

UN intervention in East Timor

I was surprised to read an article by former Australian
Ambassador to the United Nations and Australian Ambassador to
Indonesia, Mr. Richard Woolcott, published in this newspaper on
Jan. 29, 2001. The article goes to great lengths to describe what
the writer perceives as the negative consequences of the
international intervention in East timor in September 1999. The
essence of this article appears to be that the international
intervention approved by a 15-0 vote of the United Nations
Security Council was a mistake that has had numerous negative
consequences for the entire region.

He cites a number of very tenuous arguments in support of his
view, including the need to revise the Timor Gap Treaty in order
that additional royalties accrue to the region's inhabitants at
the expense of Australia and the proposition that Indonesia is
less stable now than in 1998 (when I recall Jakarta was engulfed
in massive riots and the rupiah plummeted in value to below Rp
15,000 to the U.S. dollar).

Woolcott makes some rather dubious negative comments about the
role of the United Nations, and particularly Australia, in
curtailing the post-ballot violence in the former Indonesian
administered territory. However, he fails to address the critical
question of what the cost might have been of a failure to act at
this critical juncture in East Timor's history and the failure to
bring a halt to the bloodshed at that time. My suggestion is that
it would have been almost impossible both morally and politically
for the UN not to have taken the action it did by a unanimous
vote of the Security Council on Sept. 15, 1999 that led to the
landing of Interfet forces in East Timor on Sept. 20

One might reasonably question not only the effect on East
Timor of the Indonesian military's failure to stop the violence
and apparent scorched-earth policy (despite the declaration of
martial law on Sept. 7), but also the effect of a failure to act
by the UN on Indonesia itself. However unpalatable it might be
for some Indonesians to consider, it is likely that harsh
Security Council resolutions would have been issued, forcing
Indonesia to bring an end to the violence and to implement the
results of the UN-supervised popular consultation on Aug. 30,
1999 in which 78.5 percent of East Timorese voted in favor of
independence.

Given the behavior of the Indonesia military at the time,
despite their wide-ranging power pursuant to the declaration of
martial law some two weeks before the arrival of the
international force, it might be reasonable to assume that there
would have been no compliance with such a resolution. Having
regard to the degree of international outrage at the time,
Indonesia may well have been left in the position of a virtual
pariah state with total cut-off of IMF, World Bank and other
International funding and a consequent disastrous effect on the
nation's struggling economy.

It is further worth noting that Mr. Woolcott does not have a
particularly good track record in predicting the outcome of
events in this country and the Indonesian people's desire for a
more clean and democratic style of government. One need only
quote his statements published in this newspaper in an article
titled Indonesia is not about to erupt published on Aug. 31, 1996
in the wake of the July 27 riots in which he was quoted: "ABRI
remains the guarantor of the security of the state. The next
president in 1998 could still be Soeharto but, if not, it will be
a Javanese Muslim with a military background like Soeharto"
(wrong on two counts out of three). Even more tellingly, he goes
on in the same article to state that "it would be misguided ...
to expect rapid or radical change or even serious instability in
the near future" in Indonesia.

ROGER SMITH

Jakarta