Ulemas and Politics: The case of the NU `kiyai'

Ulemas and Politics: The case of the NU `kiyai'

Nahdlatul Ulama politicians, disappointed by the recent
congress of the United Development Party, are contemplating
joining the Indonesian Democratic Party, while others are toying
with the idea of setting up a new political entity. Moslem
intellectual Azyumardi Azra sees this thinking as unrealistic.

JAKARTA (JP): Some interesting developments have unfolded in
the aftermath of the recent third congress of the United
Development Party (PPP). Even though some observers and certain
PPP functionaries are calling the congress a success for Moslem
democracy in Indonesia, some leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU --
whose name literally means the Revival of Moslem Scholars) are
finding it a very disappointing defeat.

The congress was a victory for the Muslimin Indonesia (MI)
faction within the PPP. It is seen as having effectively stamped
'ulema' politics out of the party. The blocking of Matori Abdul
Djalil, former secretary-general of the party, from election to
the post of party chairman during the congress, has left a bitter
aftertaste for the NU kiyai (ulemas), more precisely the "Rembang
Group" who steadfastly stood behind him.

The NU's disappointment with the congress has led certain
circles within the faction to contemplate joining the Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDI). Furthermore, some NU leaders have been
thinking of establishing a new Moslem party, exclusively reserved
for members of their organization. They feel that a new party
would satisfy NU's political aspirations.

How feasible are these two alternatives? For several reasons,
it is hard to imagine that the NU could successfully achieve
their political aspirations in the PDI. Ideologically, the PDI is
not a Moslem-oriented party.

Risky

In fact it is an uneasy amalgamation of largely nationalist
and Christian factions. The PDI includes a section of Moslem
groups, but that is no guarantee that the party will fight for
Islamic ends. Among many strict Moslems, the party has gained
notoriety for opposing certain bills considered to have contained
Islamic factors.

Thus, ideologically the PDI is not wholly compatible with
genuine Islamic political aspirations. Joining the PDI,
therefore, involves some risky ideological repercussions for the
NU, especially its kiyai.

With respect to Islamic religious sentiments it is reasonable
for Moslems -- possibly including some members of NU -- to have
doubts about the integrity of the ulemas now looking toward the
PDI. They run the risk of being accused of being political
opportunists rather than genuine champions of Islamic
aspirations.

Moreover, the PDI itself may be worse than the PPP in terms of
the conflicts and power struggles that have inflicted both
parties throughout their history. The PDI congress in Medan last
year ended in fiasco. Even the election of Megawati Soekarnoputri
in the subsequent emergency congress in Jakarta has not resolved
the conflicts within the party. New troubles, the latest being
the refusal of the leadership of PDI's East Java chapter to meet
the wishes of the party's national leadership, have continuously
prevented Megawati from consolidating the party.

Endless tumult

For the NU, joining the PDI would only mean involving itself
in that party's endless tumult. It is also unreasonable to expect
that the various original factions within the PDI would submit to
making substantial concessions to the NU.

As for the formation of a new "NU party", it is clearly not a
viable alternative at least with respect to the current political
system in Indonesia. Under the Law on Political Parties of 1985,
the number of political parties in this country is confined to
only three. There is in no way for any group of people to
establish a new party, except by changing the Law. And it is
highly unlikely that this would be acceptable to the ruling
political group, Golongan Karya (Golkar), or the military.

For Golkar and the military, allowing the foundation of more
political parties would simply mean returning to the traumatic
multi-party system of Indonesia's liberal democratic period of
the Sukarno era.

From another perspective, the attempts of the NU kiyai to
meddle in PPP's affairs indicate that many NU leaders could not
resist the temptation to play their part in politics. This runs
contrary to NU's policy, adopted in 1983, to return to the
Khittah 26, that is, the original principle of not being involved
in politics, but only paying attention to the social and economic
welfare of the ummah (Moslem community).

What could be the most regrettable element of all of this is
the fact that the NU kiyai are not ingenuous enough to fully
comprehend Indonesia's complex political processes. Their
political naivete has been taken full advantage of by certain NU
politicians for their own ends.

The kiyai still exert considerable influence among the NU
masses, but NU's tradition of using the charisma of the kiyai for
political ends has become increasingly ineffective. And this
could constitute a boomerang in terms of the now respectable
position of the kiyai in the eyes of Indonesian Moslems, as well
as vis-a-vis the ruling power.

The writer is a lecturer at the Istitute of Islamic Studies
(IAIN), Jakarta, and a fellow of the Oxford Center for Islamic
Studies, England.