Ulemas and Politics: The case of the NU `kiyai'

Nahdlatul Ulama politicians, disappointed by the recent congress of the United Development Party, are contemplating joining the Indonesian Democratic Party, while others are toying with the idea of setting up a new political entity. Moslem intellectual Azyumardi Azra sees this thinking as unrealistic.

JAKARTA (JP): Some interesting developments have unfolded in the aftermath of the recent third congress of the United Development Party (PPP). Even though some observers and certain PPP functionaries are calling the congress a success for Moslem democracy in Indonesia, some leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU -- whose name literally means the Revival of Moslem Scholars) are finding it a very disappointing defeat.

The congress was a victory for the Muslimin Indonesia (MI) faction within the PPP. It is seen as having effectively stamped 'ulema' politics out of the party. The blocking of Matori Abdul Djalil, former secretary-general of the party, from election to the post of party chairman during the congress, has left a bitter aftertaste for the NU kiyai (ulemas), more precisely the "Rembang Group" who steadfastly stood behind him.

The NU's disappointment with the congress has led certain circles within the faction to contemplate joining the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Furthermore, some NU leaders have been thinking of establishing a new Moslem party, exclusively reserved for members of their organization. They feel that a new party would satisfy NU's political aspirations.

How feasible are these two alternatives? For several reasons, it is hard to imagine that the NU could successfully achieve their political aspirations in the PDI. Ideologically, the PDI is not a Moslem-oriented party.

Risky

In fact it is an uneasy amalgamation of largely nationalist and Christian factions. The PDI includes a section of Moslem groups, but that is no guarantee that the party will fight for Islamic ends. Among many strict Moslems, the party has gained notoriety for opposing certain bills considered to have contained Islamic factors.

Thus, ideologically the PDI is not wholly compatible with genuine Islamic political aspirations. Joining the PDI, therefore, involves some risky ideological repercussions for the NU, especially its kiyai.

With respect to Islamic religious sentiments it is reasonable for Moslems -- possibly including some members of NU -- to have doubts about the integrity of the ulemas now looking toward the PDI. They run the risk of being accused of being political opportunists rather than genuine champions of Islamic aspirations.

Moreover, the PDI itself may be worse than the PPP in terms of the conflicts and power struggles that have inflicted both parties throughout their history. The PDI congress in Medan last year ended in fiasco. Even the election of Megawati Soekarnoputri in the subsequent emergency congress in Jakarta has not resolved the conflicts within the party. New troubles, the latest being the refusal of the leadership of PDI's East Java chapter to meet the wishes of the party's national leadership, have continuously prevented Megawati from consolidating the party.

Endless tumult

For the NU, joining the PDI would only mean involving itself in that party's endless tumult. It is also unreasonable to expect that the various original factions within the PDI would submit to making substantial concessions to the NU.

As for the formation of a new "NU party", it is clearly not a viable alternative at least with respect to the current political system in Indonesia. Under the Law on Political Parties of 1985, the number of political parties in this country is confined to only three. There is in no way for any group of people to establish a new party, except by changing the Law. And it is highly unlikely that this would be acceptable to the ruling political group, Golongan Karya (Golkar), or the military.

For Golkar and the military, allowing the foundation of more political parties would simply mean returning to the traumatic multi-party system of Indonesia's liberal democratic period of the Sukarno era.

From another perspective, the attempts of the NU kiyai to meddle in PPP's affairs indicate that many NU leaders could not resist the temptation to play their part in politics. This runs contrary to NU's policy, adopted in 1983, to return to the Khittah 26, that is, the original principle of not being involved in politics, but only paying attention to the social and economic welfare of the ummah (Moslem community).

What could be the most regrettable element of all of this is the fact that the NU kiyai are not ingenuous enough to fully comprehend Indonesia's complex political processes. Their political naivete has been taken full advantage of by certain NU politicians for their own ends.

The kiyai still exert considerable influence among the NU masses, but NU's tradition of using the charisma of the kiyai for political ends has become increasingly ineffective. And this could constitute a boomerang in terms of the now respectable position of the kiyai in the eyes of Indonesian Moslems, as well as vis-a-vis the ruling power.

The writer is a lecturer at the Istitute of Islamic Studies (IAIN), Jakarta, and a fellow of the Oxford Center for Islamic Studies, England.