Two forces work in favor of China
By Lie Tek Tjeng
JAKARTA (JP): How should we interpret the historic handover of Hong Kong? After 156 years under British colonial rule, Hong Kong was returned to China on midnight June 30 based on a joint declaration signed on Dec. 19, 1984 by the then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her Chinese counterpart Zhao Ziyang.
It seems that in the past, realpolitik (meaning Britain's economic interests) "persuaded" the governments of the time to force open China under the banner of free trade (starting with the first Opium War of 1839-1842).
Similarly it can perhaps be said that contemporary realpolitik (meaning Britain's present and future economic stake in the immense China market) seems to have prevailed over idealism (primarily human rights and morality) in the decision as to how to return Hong Kong to China.
This seems to be inevitable since China has shown determination to reassert its sovereignty over its "lost territory", following the expiration of the 99-year lease of the New Territories.
In other words, yielding to the seemingly inevitable appears to have been, and will continue to be, the best course of action for practitioners of Britain's realpolitik-guided foreign policy. This is especially the case now because antagonizing Beijing could be detrimental to Britain's present and future economic interests in China, which is predicted by the World Bank to emerge as an economic superpower in the 21st century.
However this view is not shared by idealists, moralists and their sympathizers who decried the decision as a betrayal of Hong Kong and a late 20th century manifestation of the duplicity of "perfide Albion" (treacherous Britain).
They say only this can explain why Britain's "iron lady" (Thatcher) signed the joint declaration. As a member of the Conservative Party, a party traditionally recognized as the champion of Britain's national interest as expressed in the slogan "right or wrong, my country", she could have been expected to have acted differently.
One could also wonder whether the Joint Declaration was intended to strengthen the reformist/right wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as it was negotiated and signed when reformists Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang held the top party and government posts of CCP general secretary and prime minister respectively.
However if this consideration persuaded the British Foreign Office to approve the Joint Declaration, then they must have since been disappointed because subsequent political developments in China "necessitated" paramount leader Deng Xiaoping to replace them with leaders more acceptable to the left-wingers.
Li Peng, the adopted son of the late PM Zhou Enlai and the protege of the late conservative economist Chen Yun, became prime minister in 1987 and Jiang Zemin, who hailed from the radical stronghold Shanghai, took over as party general secretary the following year. Jiang was subsequently also given the additional post as chairman of the People's Republic of China
All patriotic Chinese, regardless of origin, cannot but hail the return of Hong Kong as the symbolic ending of China's period of national humiliation that had started with the Opium War and reduced China to a "semi-colony", to use Mao Zedong's famous words.
But it must not be forgotten that some Koumintang (KMT) fanatics, who are still obsessed with the extermination of the communist threat no matter what the cost and how long it will take, cannot look on the mainlanders as fellow Chinese.
Still influenced by Cold War anticommunist propaganda, the People's Republic of China (PRC) evokes the image of their arch- enemy, the ruling CCP elite and not the millions of long- suffering fellow Chinese who are longing for a better life and need to be helped.
Hence, the reunification of Hong Kong and perhaps Taiwan -- whose prosperity are recognized to be dependent on their relations with the mainland -- cannot but be viewed as the sacrifice of democracy to "godless communism/socialism with Chinese characteristics" as so vocally expressed by Western and other international media.
However if the division and hatred among the Chinese people cannot somehow be bridged, then the Asia-Pacific region is heading for continued turmoil and war and not for stability, prosperity and peace, as hoped for by everyone.
Seen in this context, the Taiwan government's outright rejection of Beijing's offer of "one country, two systems" for the reunification of Taiwan without awaiting its concrete manifestation in the case of Hong Kong is regrettable for the sake of stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific region, even though it can be understood psychologically.
In the 1930s and early 1940s the CCP's policy of "all Chinese should unite and not fight each other in facing the common foreign Japanese enemy" proved to be more appealing to Chinese patriotism than the KMT policy of "first exterminating the communist bandits before turning on the foreign Japanese enemy".
This resulted in the majority of people supporting, either actively or passively, the CCP against its opponent, hence leading to its victories on the mainland in 1949 after which its enemy fled to Taiwan.
Similarly, Beijing's policy of championing the national aspiration of the reunification of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan with the mainland cannot but appeal to all Chinese nationalists as the restoration of China's long-lost territorial integrity.
In contrast, Taiwan's advocacy of "an independent Taiwan" policy cannot but sound like separatism to true patriots, even evoking the image of a disintegrating China being left at the mercy of foreign powers, as was really the case from the Opium War until the founding of the PRC in 1949.
If this is true, then we have to conclude objectively that Beijing seems to have the better argument, which should triumph eventually, and people who are really concerned with the bigger picture of stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific region are perhaps well-advised to pay attention to this.
Moreover Beijing can reassure itself about the reunification of Taiwan, by keeping its promises regarding the reunification of Hong Kong. Two powerful historical forces, Taiwan's economic interests and Chinese nationalism, are working in favor of Beijing.
Talking about nationalism in general, and Chinese nationalism in particular, reminded me of a conversation with a Chinese student I had in 1954, my first year at Harvard.
When he heard I came from Indonesia, he asked whether I was planning to go back after I had completed my studies. I answered: "Yes, I think so, because if I have a historical role to play, I feel it is in my country." When I asked him the same question, he answered: "Yes, I am going back to China."
When I, remembering the civil war between the CCP and the KMT, asked: "Do you mean the PRC or Taiwan?" he answered with the counter question, "Don't you agree that China is the country containing most of the Chinese people?"
He continued: "I have until now not paid much attention to politics. I have in the past, not tried to join the ruling KMT elite, and I do not intend to join the ruling CCP elite in the near future; my commitment is to the common people who have suffered so much since the 19th century."
We never ran into each other again but his commitment to the people, as stated more than forty years ago, has remained engraved in my mind forever.
The writer is an expert at the Institute of Strategic Studies of Indonesia and an observer of international affairs.