Tsunami moves geopolitical ground too

Tsunami moves geopolitical ground too

Rob Goodfellow, New South Wales

An unexpected consequence of the Aceh Tsunami Disaster has
been a movement in the geopolitical ground.

Behind the scenes the "tectonic plates" of regional power are
shifting.

The first movement is from the north. It is based on the fact
that control of the Indian Ocean has hitherto been integral to
India's interests.

The Indian Navy is the world's seventh largest. It consists of
two fleets, the Western Fleet, homeported in Bombay on the
Arabian Sea, and the Eastern Fleet, homeported in Visakhapatnam,
on the Bay of Bengal.

The Americans, who are primarily a Pacific Ocean naval power,
have suddenly and unexpectedly established an Indian Ocean
presence, through their military-led tsunami relief efforts.

The complicating factor is that the Chinese Navy, which
comprises the Northern Fleet (based in Qingdao), the Eastern
Fleet (Shanghai), the Southern Fleet (Zhanjiang) and a roving
fourth force, is also projecting naval power into the South China
Sea and the Indian Ocean.

In a game of tactics and position, the Americans have ensured
that their presence in Aceh isolates the Indian Navy and
strategically neutralizes the potential influence of the Chinese.

American interest in the region has a long history dating back
to the 1950s. At this time the North Sumatra-based, CIA-backed,
Pemerintah Revolusionir Republik Indonesia -- Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of Indonesia, or PRRI-Rebellion,
directly challenged Indonesia's foreign policy drift towards the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

In particular, the U.S was preoccupied with the rise of the
Partai Komunis Indonesia -- the PKI, then the third largest
Communist Party in the world.

During the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
Indonesia was known as the U.S foreign policy's "southern
anchor". When President Sukarno told the U.S "to go to hell with
your aid" in March 1964, the Americans believed the Indonesian
"ship had run aground".

The pro-U.S, Soeharto-led military countercoup of the early
morning of Oct. 1, 1965, re-set the "anchor".

Today things are much more complicated than during the Cold
War. The ability to positively influence, rather than merely
control Indonesia, numerically the world's largest Muslim nation
(230 million), remains paramount to the U.S "War on Terror".

The Americans are clearly concerned that the new "fault line"
in Asia is the threat of a pan-Islamist movement, one that
potentially unites the mass-base of Indonesian Islam, the
rallying-cry of resentment over the mistreatment of southern Thai
Muslims, Malaysian organizational capability and Mindanao-based
Moro Islamic Liberation Front experience in guerrilla-warfare.

The second "tectonic" movement is from the south. Australia's
diplomatically sophisticated response to the tsunami disaster has
surprised everyone. The Australian Government is the largest
single government-to-government donor to disaster relief efforts
in Indonesia, contributing a staggering A$1 billion in addition
to the proceeds of the largest public fundraising effort in
Australian history.

All of Prime Minister John Howard's previous diplomatic
shortcomings have been temporarily set aside.

Unlike the U.S, Australia's interests in the region are more
about trade and security than ideology and global power.
Australia is a highly successful trading nation with an economy
valued at some US$800 billion -- which dwarfs Indonesia's $180
billion economy and eclipses the combined economies of the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

With a population of only 20 million, Australia's continued
prosperity relies on security, stability, innovation, trade and
growth.

Australia's tsunami response has redefined Australia's role in
Asia practically overnight. The established momentum for change,
from a proto-European, Western-oriented, resources-based economy,
to a fully integrated, knowledge-based, regional partner has
accelerated. Australians are beginning to genuinely understand
that Indonesia really is their gateway to the markets of Asia.
Indeed, Australia's trade security relies on the free movement of
shipping along lines that extend from West Timor to the Straits
of Malacca.

Indonesia, on the other hand, is beginning to recognize that
Australia is an asset and not a threat.

This new found goodwill has reinforced the idea that Indonesia
and Australia have at least two things in common. Both have
strategic interests that lay to the north. Indonesia and
Australia are in fact natural strategic allies. Both are cultural
bridges between East and West. Indonesia has the capacity to
explain Australia to Asia. Australia is able to explain Indonesia
to the U.S. and Europe.

However, despite diverse North/South motives, the
extraordinary global response to the tsunami disaster is evidence
that the world will not allow "the southern anchor" to drift into
un-chartered waters; Indonesia is too important. All of the key
players, the U.S., China, India, Japan and Australia, while
advancing their own interests, at least appreciate that a
prosperous, democratic, secular, and unitary Indonesian State
will guard against a different sort of upheaval to the one
experienced on the morning of Dec. 26, 2004.

Dr Rob Goodfellow is a CAPSTRANS Fellow of the University of
Wollongong. He can be contacted by e-mail on
robgoodfellow@ozemail.com.au