Troubled Indonesia: It is sailing around a flat earth

By Kusnanto Anggoro

JAKARTA (JP): Post-Soeharto Indonesia has learned the nuances of democracy: from street demonstrations to party organizing, from "retreat of the general" to militarizing civilian, from utopian philosophizing to the beginnings of coalition building.

But nobody knows what direction Indonesia is taking and if its fractured societies can coexist within one nation. It is impossible to overestimate the sheer magnitude and complexity of Indonesia's economic and political problems. Paradoxes abound, threatening the newly born democracy and the (multi) nation-state of Indonesia as well.

The New Order's end has not brought eternal peace but a resurgence of old conflicts. Disintegrating forces have come full circle with ethnic conflict in Maluku, and an independence movement at both ends of Indonesia's frontier: Aceh and Irian Jaya.

No less important, muted calls for self-government are reverberating in Riau, East Kalimantan and North Sulawesi. In West Kalimantan, gruesome clashes involving Malays and other indigenous groups against settlers have flared periodically in the region. Social unrest in urban areas has seriously challenged the authority. A new movement for democracy is growing around the issues of violence and politics.

Meanwhile, national politics has become a failing spectator sport. Transitional politics have bedeviled the political elite, who, in the past, joined forces against the Soeharto regime. President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid is locked in a take-no- prisoners battle with his opponents.

The House of Representatives (DPR), far from functioning as a legislative body, has presented itself as a collection of people serving either their selfish interests or the interests of parties to which they belong. They are all too busy in a Darwinian struggle for survival.

The President's second Cabinet, inaugurated on Aug. 23 last year, was initially welcomed as a move to get the haphazard governmental system under control. It consists of more professionals, and also reflects the President's consolidation of power, after his distress during the Annual Session of the People's Consultative Assembly in August.

Yet the political team is struggling to cope with the country's challenges of settling regional conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya. The economic team started "flirting" with the country's unscrupulous tycoons, who owe enormous debts to the government.

A tug-of-war between President Abdurrahman and the House will likely reach an apex again early this year. Dozens of legislators are preparing a motion to use the right of inquiry over Buloggate and Bruneigate.

Early last month (December), more than 150 delegates formed a political caucus. The way ahead could well be more perilous to the President, though, according to House Speaker Akbar Tandjung, who is also the leader of the Golkar Party, the right of interpellation does not carry any political consequences and will not harm the President's position. Abdurrahman could well share the same fate as Joseph Estrada of the Philippines and Chen Shui- bian of Taiwan.

Certainly, no one ever said achieving a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Indonesia would be easy. All of us should not despair just because things are messy at the moment.

Indonesia is a pluralistic community. Unlike modern (nation- )states of Western Europe, in which nations exist before states, the state institutions in Indonesia were meant to become instrumental of nation-building. Civilian and military bureaucracy, state ideology and an education system were meant to integrate the country. All have achieved nothing, and have derailed the country.

The roots of conflict are not so much in the struggle for economic and political resources as in a whole range of recognition, which was ignored or simply suppressed during the three decades of authoritarian rule.

Other contemporary factors have made matters much worse. The unseen hands behind them may include military plotters, local power blocs, ambitious politicians and people from the former government.

In Maluku, for instance, the arrival of thousands of well- funded Muslim militants from Java was detrimental to a resolution of the conflict and/or the restoration of peace.

Some sections of the political and military elite are at least tacitly encouraging violence. Evidence is hard to come by. But such a pattern has been emerging since the mid-1990s.

Unrest and political intrigue follow every struggle that takes place among the elite. Various people in Jakarta have a lot of money, and it is easy for them to take advantage of young, unemployed people. Many suspect that wealthy people from Soeharto's circle are behind the recent outbreaks of unrest in Indonesia, including in Maluku. Their message is: "Back off or we'll make problems".

Indonesia is in a race of Balkanizing tendencies and attempts at dissolving the central authority by establishing autonomous regions. This could well be the answer for some cases, especially in Aceh and Irian Jaya. In other cases, Maluku included, the most pressing concern is reconciliation, both at local and national levels.

The government of Abdurrahman will not be able to go forward until this reconciliation is accomplished. An appropriate formula for reconciliation is a must. A blanket amnesty would ease the pressure on the President from the status quo elite, but could erode popular support for him.

At a systemic level, unnecessarily related to the need for national reconciliation, the installation and consolidation of democratic institutions are all the more problematic.

Indonesia may have a fair and free election. But democracy is still a far way off. We have no more than a democratic charade.

What last year's elections brought home was something we already know. Voting in Indonesia is not a means by which citizens discipline their rulers. The elections do not create power but only mirror the power that already exists. Candidates find their supporters in hidden networks and do not draw their power, in any way, from the majority of average voters. The failure of Megawati Soekarnoputri to clinch the presidency is a case in point, though she enjoyed massive popular support.

To put it another way, authority lies somewhere else. This is a gigantic challenge for Indonesia. It is imperative to argue that democratic procedures are of value only if they establish some sort of dependency of public officials on ordinary citizens.

In a democratic society, there ought to be a kind of "political contract between the political elite and voters". While citizens are dependent on the government for the exercise of their rights, incumbents elected popularly and pro tempore presumably have a reason to behave responsibly, to act as the agent of society and to produce benefits of palpable value to the majority of voters.

Indonesia seems to be a broken hourglass society, in which the privileged do not exploit or oppress or even govern, but simply ignore the majority. Many officials live in a secretive bubble, supported -- here I exaggerate to make a point -- by stolen assets, the International Monetary Fund and various cliental affiliations.

There is a strong tendency that the underlying character of social contract in Indonesia can probably be described as an exchange of unaccountable power for untaxable wealth. This is a contract among the elite, a sleazy deal between political and economic insiders -- who, in bed with each other, engage in mutually beneficial unpunishable misdeeds, much like the Indonesian version of criminal -- nomenclature symbiosis in Russia.

Our new millennium is an age of reckoning, and among our primary tasks at the century's end is to reconcile the democratic institution with citizen politics. The time is ripe for Indonesians to develop a new, value-based approach to nationhood and politics in which citizens and politicians can articulate issues in the public arena without being sectarian.

Among the political elite, searching for a common ground must become more important than merely organizing against opponents. Meanwhile, people should move beyond the old entrenched battle lines, and talk about democratic values that should undergird its social and political life.

Indonesia must find an antidote for the violence and democratic malnutrition that can result in terrible tragedies. This is exactly where problems lie. While there is still no direction as to whether Indonesia will land in a more democratic polity, national leadership requires the ability to keep public impatience in check, to convince the people to endure the current situation and to assure them of the sunshine behind the clouds.

Needless to say, such an ability can come only from someone with a clear vision and a strong commitment to the future as well as a consistent rulership to lead and a solid leadership to rule.

Sadly, those in the current national leadership are far from being the answer to Indonesia's needs. Abdurrahman fails to exercise his authority to set a completely new image of a clean and transparent government.

We are sailing around a flat earth.

The writer is a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and a lecturer at the Postgraduate Studies Program of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.