Troubled Indonesia: It is sailing around a flat earth
Troubled Indonesia: It is sailing around a flat earth
By Kusnanto Anggoro
JAKARTA (JP): Post-Soeharto Indonesia has learned the nuances
of democracy: from street demonstrations to party organizing,
from "retreat of the general" to militarizing civilian, from
utopian philosophizing to the beginnings of coalition building.
But nobody knows what direction Indonesia is taking and if its
fractured societies can coexist within one nation. It is
impossible to overestimate the sheer magnitude and complexity of
Indonesia's economic and political problems. Paradoxes abound,
threatening the newly born democracy and the (multi) nation-state
of Indonesia as well.
The New Order's end has not brought eternal peace but a
resurgence of old conflicts. Disintegrating forces have come full
circle with ethnic conflict in Maluku, and an independence
movement at both ends of Indonesia's frontier: Aceh and Irian
Jaya.
No less important, muted calls for self-government are
reverberating in Riau, East Kalimantan and North Sulawesi. In
West Kalimantan, gruesome clashes involving Malays and other
indigenous groups against settlers have flared periodically in
the region. Social unrest in urban areas has seriously challenged
the authority. A new movement for democracy is growing around the
issues of violence and politics.
Meanwhile, national politics has become a failing spectator
sport. Transitional politics have bedeviled the political elite,
who, in the past, joined forces against the Soeharto regime.
President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid is locked in a take-no-
prisoners battle with his opponents.
The House of Representatives (DPR), far from functioning as a
legislative body, has presented itself as a collection of people
serving either their selfish interests or the interests of
parties to which they belong. They are all too busy in a
Darwinian struggle for survival.
The President's second Cabinet, inaugurated on Aug. 23 last
year, was initially welcomed as a move to get the haphazard
governmental system under control. It consists of more
professionals, and also reflects the President's consolidation of
power, after his distress during the Annual Session of the
People's Consultative Assembly in August.
Yet the political team is struggling to cope with the
country's challenges of settling regional conflicts in Aceh and
Irian Jaya. The economic team started "flirting" with the
country's unscrupulous tycoons, who owe enormous debts to the
government.
A tug-of-war between President Abdurrahman and the House will
likely reach an apex again early this year. Dozens of legislators
are preparing a motion to use the right of inquiry over Buloggate
and Bruneigate.
Early last month (December), more than 150 delegates formed a
political caucus. The way ahead could well be more perilous to
the President, though, according to House Speaker Akbar Tandjung,
who is also the leader of the Golkar Party, the right of
interpellation does not carry any political consequences and will
not harm the President's position. Abdurrahman could well share
the same fate as Joseph Estrada of the Philippines and Chen Shui-
bian of Taiwan.
Certainly, no one ever said achieving a peaceful, prosperous
and democratic Indonesia would be easy. All of us should not
despair just because things are messy at the moment.
Indonesia is a pluralistic community. Unlike modern (nation-
)states of Western Europe, in which nations exist before states,
the state institutions in Indonesia were meant to become
instrumental of nation-building. Civilian and military
bureaucracy, state ideology and an education system were meant to
integrate the country. All have achieved nothing, and have
derailed the country.
The roots of conflict are not so much in the struggle for
economic and political resources as in a whole range of
recognition, which was ignored or simply suppressed during the
three decades of authoritarian rule.
Other contemporary factors have made matters much worse. The
unseen hands behind them may include military plotters, local
power blocs, ambitious politicians and people from the former
government.
In Maluku, for instance, the arrival of thousands of well-
funded Muslim militants from Java was detrimental to a resolution
of the conflict and/or the restoration of peace.
Some sections of the political and military elite are at least
tacitly encouraging violence. Evidence is hard to come by. But
such a pattern has been emerging since the mid-1990s.
Unrest and political intrigue follow every struggle that takes
place among the elite. Various people in Jakarta have a lot of
money, and it is easy for them to take advantage of young,
unemployed people. Many suspect that wealthy people from
Soeharto's circle are behind the recent outbreaks of unrest in
Indonesia, including in Maluku. Their message is: "Back off or
we'll make problems".
Indonesia is in a race of Balkanizing tendencies and attempts
at dissolving the central authority by establishing autonomous
regions. This could well be the answer for some cases, especially
in Aceh and Irian Jaya. In other cases, Maluku included, the most
pressing concern is reconciliation, both at local and national
levels.
The government of Abdurrahman will not be able to go forward
until this reconciliation is accomplished. An appropriate formula
for reconciliation is a must. A blanket amnesty would ease the
pressure on the President from the status quo elite, but could
erode popular support for him.
At a systemic level, unnecessarily related to the need for
national reconciliation, the installation and consolidation of
democratic institutions are all the more problematic.
Indonesia may have a fair and free election. But democracy is
still a far way off. We have no more than a democratic charade.
What last year's elections brought home was something we
already know. Voting in Indonesia is not a means by which
citizens discipline their rulers. The elections do not create
power but only mirror the power that already exists. Candidates
find their supporters in hidden networks and do not draw their
power, in any way, from the majority of average voters. The
failure of Megawati Soekarnoputri to clinch the presidency is a
case in point, though she enjoyed massive popular support.
To put it another way, authority lies somewhere else. This is
a gigantic challenge for Indonesia. It is imperative to argue
that democratic procedures are of value only if they establish
some sort of dependency of public officials on ordinary citizens.
In a democratic society, there ought to be a kind of
"political contract between the political elite and voters".
While citizens are dependent on the government for the exercise
of their rights, incumbents elected popularly and pro tempore
presumably have a reason to behave responsibly, to act as the
agent of society and to produce benefits of palpable value to the
majority of voters.
Indonesia seems to be a broken hourglass society, in which the
privileged do not exploit or oppress or even govern, but simply
ignore the majority. Many officials live in a secretive bubble,
supported -- here I exaggerate to make a point -- by stolen
assets, the International Monetary Fund and various cliental
affiliations.
There is a strong tendency that the underlying character of
social contract in Indonesia can probably be described as an
exchange of unaccountable power for untaxable wealth. This is a
contract among the elite, a sleazy deal between political and
economic insiders -- who, in bed with each other, engage in
mutually beneficial unpunishable misdeeds, much like the
Indonesian version of criminal -- nomenclature symbiosis in
Russia.
Our new millennium is an age of reckoning, and among our
primary tasks at the century's end is to reconcile the democratic
institution with citizen politics. The time is ripe for
Indonesians to develop a new, value-based approach to nationhood
and politics in which citizens and politicians can articulate
issues in the public arena without being sectarian.
Among the political elite, searching for a common ground must
become more important than merely organizing against opponents.
Meanwhile, people should move beyond the old entrenched battle
lines, and talk about democratic values that should undergird its
social and political life.
Indonesia must find an antidote for the violence and
democratic malnutrition that can result in terrible tragedies.
This is exactly where problems lie. While there is still no
direction as to whether Indonesia will land in a more democratic
polity, national leadership requires the ability to keep public
impatience in check, to convince the people to endure the current
situation and to assure them of the sunshine behind the clouds.
Needless to say, such an ability can come only from someone
with a clear vision and a strong commitment to the future as well
as a consistent rulership to lead and a solid leadership to rule.
Sadly, those in the current national leadership are far from
being the answer to Indonesia's needs. Abdurrahman fails to
exercise his authority to set a completely new image of a clean
and transparent government.
We are sailing around a flat earth.
The writer is a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies and a lecturer at the Postgraduate
Studies Program of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.