Trends in internal security problems in 2006

Trends in internal security problems in 2006

Ikrar Nusa Bhakti
Jakarta

The year 2005 will end in just a few days. During the year,
Indonesia faced quite a number of internal security problems,
such as the prolonged communal conflicts in Poso and Palu in
Central Sulawesi, the terrorist attacks in Jimbaran and Kuta in
Bali in October 2005, conflicts related to industrial relations
following the fuel price increases in October 2005 in some areas
in Java and so on.

However, 2005 was also an important year for Indonesia when
the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
signed a memorandum of understanding in Helsinki, Finland, to end
the separatist conflict in Aceh. It is hoped that in the near
future Aceh will no longer be a "flash point" in Southeast Asia.

We also saw in 2005 that Indonesia still has problems handling
its internal security issues. Since the separation of the
National Police from the Indonesian Military (TNI) in April 1999,
which was formalized through People's Consultative Assembly
Decree No. VI/2000 on the separation of the police from the (TNI)
and Assembly Decree No. VII/2000 on the role of the TNI and the
police, there have been problems between the two institutions
about who should handle internal security issues.

According to Law No. 34/2004 on the military, the TNI has the
obligation to undertake military operations other than war, most
of which are related to internal security issues, such as
handling armed separatist movements and armed rebellions,
fighting terrorism and dealing with piracy and illegal
immigrants.

This is why after the Bali bombings on Oct. 1, 2005, President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in a speech to mark the anniversary of
the TNI on Oct. 5, asked the military to assist the government in
the fight against terrorism. The military responded to the
President's request by offering to reintroduce its territorial
commands from the provincial level to the village level. The
military also established a new antiterror detachment in several
regional military commands, similar to the National Police's
Detachment 88.

Although high-ranking officers said the military's response to
internal security issues would depend on requests from the
political authorities (the President), and the guidelines set
down in the law, there are still no regulations about when and
how the military will assist the police in dealing with internal
security.

There is also still a question about how to coordinate the
military, the police, intelligence agencies, government
ministries and other institutions in the fight against terrorism.
There are still no new rules of engagement for the military in
dealing with terrorism. Apart from that, the antiterror desk at
the Office of the Coordinating Minister for Social, Legal and
Political Affairs has not been upgraded to become a national
antiterror board able to coordinate the fight against terrorism.
It is necessary that the President do something about this issue.

However, if the military reestablishes its territorial command
structure down to the village level, it will be a waste of money
and resources. It is better for the military to focus on
promoting a maritime strategy to face security threats related to
transnational crimes or any conflict related to boundary
disputes, such as Ambalat, and to guard all of the maritime and
land borders between Indonesia and neighboring countries.

It seems that terrorism will remain a security issue in 2006.
Although Azahari was killed in Malang in November, 2005, another
alleged terrorist mastermind from Malaysia, Noordin M. Top, and
his followers are still around. There are also quite a number of
small independent terrorist groups in Indonesia with no links to
Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) or al-Qaeda.

Apart from that, there are also a small number of police and
military deserters in Aceh, Maluku and Central Sulawesi who are
able to destabilize the security situation in those areas or
other places in Indonesia.

Besides terrorism, it is possible for communal conflicts and
conflicts related to local elections to occur in areas around the
country, particularly in conflict areas such as Central Sulawesi,
West and Central Kalimantan, Papua and Aceh.

In Aceh, for example, security forces must maintain their
preparedness so they can respond to possible conflicts during
elections for the governor and district heads. Apart from that,
there have been political activities in Aceh and Jakarta to
establish two new provinces in Aceh, namely Aceh Leuser Antara
(ALAS) and South West Aceh (Abas), which is not in line with the
Helsinki agreement that states the 1956 borders are the official
borders of Aceh.

Security problems could also occur in Aceh when the government
stops its financial assistant to former GAM members. So far, for
security reasons, GAM leaders have never submitted the names of
their members. It is possible that after the Aceh Monitoring
Mission (AMM) completes its mission in Aceh in 2006, there will
be a new conflict between former GAM members and the security
apparatus in Aceh.

However, if the reintegration of former GAM members into
society, the process of making a new law on Aceh province, which
has to be finalized by the end of March 2006, the process of
holding local elections and reconstruction and rehabilitation in
the province all go well, there will be no big conflicts in Aceh.

Papua is another potential conflict area that must be managed
carefully. Vice President Jusuf Kalla's decision in November,
2005, to postpone the election for the governor of West Irian
Jaya were welcomed by Papuans. In accordance with Law No. 21/2001
on special autonomy for Papua, it is up to the Papuan People's
Assembly (MRP) and the local legislature to decide whether to
approve the establishment of West Irian Jaya province.

If these two bodies do so, there will be two local elections
in Papua, namely to elect the new governor of Papua province and
the new governor of West Irian Jaya province. Although clanism is
still part of local politics in Papua, it seems that local
elections in Papua will go well. Papuans are tired of conflict,
so local communities, NGOs and religious leaders have all agreed
to help prevent any big conflicts in Papua.

Maluku and Central Sulawesi are two conflict areas where
"invisible hands" are still trying to disturb the peace. Although
there is still segregation between Muslims and Christians, it is
highly likely that both Islamic and Christian leaders in those
two areas are trying to communicate with each other and work
together to prevent any small communal conflict from blowing up,
as happened in 1999-2000.

Ambon and Poso are also two areas where the intelligence
apparatus is very active gathering information. The problem is
how the intelligence apparatus from the police and the military
are able to share information about sociopolitical and security
conditions in those areas in order to prevent conflict.

People in Ambon and Poso are tired of the violence and they
know exactly who are the "actors" trying to create conflict in
their areas. However, because there is no protection for people
who come forward, they are reluctant to inform security
authorities about the actors.

There were communal conflicts between the Dayaks and Madurese
in West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan several years ago.
Unless these two communities resolve their disputes and deal with
the roots of the problem, it is possible the communal conflicts
could flare up again.

In conclusion, conflict is possible in a multiethnic society
like Indonesia. There is no one formula or remedy to prevent
conflict in the country. It depends on local leaders and the
security forces to handle these issues, and also the political
leaders to decide whether to enhance the police's capability or
to use the military to handle conflicts or specific internal
security issues such as terrorism.

The writer is a senior researcher at the Research Center for
Politics at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P-LIPI).