Trends in internal security problems in 2006

Ikrar Nusa Bhakti Jakarta

The year 2005 will end in just a few days. During the year, Indonesia faced quite a number of internal security problems, such as the prolonged communal conflicts in Poso and Palu in Central Sulawesi, the terrorist attacks in Jimbaran and Kuta in Bali in October 2005, conflicts related to industrial relations following the fuel price increases in October 2005 in some areas in Java and so on.

However, 2005 was also an important year for Indonesia when the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a memorandum of understanding in Helsinki, Finland, to end the separatist conflict in Aceh. It is hoped that in the near future Aceh will no longer be a "flash point" in Southeast Asia.

We also saw in 2005 that Indonesia still has problems handling its internal security issues. Since the separation of the National Police from the Indonesian Military (TNI) in April 1999, which was formalized through People's Consultative Assembly Decree No. VI/2000 on the separation of the police from the (TNI) and Assembly Decree No. VII/2000 on the role of the TNI and the police, there have been problems between the two institutions about who should handle internal security issues.

According to Law No. 34/2004 on the military, the TNI has the obligation to undertake military operations other than war, most of which are related to internal security issues, such as handling armed separatist movements and armed rebellions, fighting terrorism and dealing with piracy and illegal immigrants.

This is why after the Bali bombings on Oct. 1, 2005, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in a speech to mark the anniversary of the TNI on Oct. 5, asked the military to assist the government in the fight against terrorism. The military responded to the President's request by offering to reintroduce its territorial commands from the provincial level to the village level. The military also established a new antiterror detachment in several regional military commands, similar to the National Police's Detachment 88.

Although high-ranking officers said the military's response to internal security issues would depend on requests from the political authorities (the President), and the guidelines set down in the law, there are still no regulations about when and how the military will assist the police in dealing with internal security.

There is also still a question about how to coordinate the military, the police, intelligence agencies, government ministries and other institutions in the fight against terrorism. There are still no new rules of engagement for the military in dealing with terrorism. Apart from that, the antiterror desk at the Office of the Coordinating Minister for Social, Legal and Political Affairs has not been upgraded to become a national antiterror board able to coordinate the fight against terrorism. It is necessary that the President do something about this issue.

However, if the military reestablishes its territorial command structure down to the village level, it will be a waste of money and resources. It is better for the military to focus on promoting a maritime strategy to face security threats related to transnational crimes or any conflict related to boundary disputes, such as Ambalat, and to guard all of the maritime and land borders between Indonesia and neighboring countries.

It seems that terrorism will remain a security issue in 2006. Although Azahari was killed in Malang in November, 2005, another alleged terrorist mastermind from Malaysia, Noordin M. Top, and his followers are still around. There are also quite a number of small independent terrorist groups in Indonesia with no links to Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) or al-Qaeda.

Apart from that, there are also a small number of police and military deserters in Aceh, Maluku and Central Sulawesi who are able to destabilize the security situation in those areas or other places in Indonesia.

Besides terrorism, it is possible for communal conflicts and conflicts related to local elections to occur in areas around the country, particularly in conflict areas such as Central Sulawesi, West and Central Kalimantan, Papua and Aceh.

In Aceh, for example, security forces must maintain their preparedness so they can respond to possible conflicts during elections for the governor and district heads. Apart from that, there have been political activities in Aceh and Jakarta to establish two new provinces in Aceh, namely Aceh Leuser Antara (ALAS) and South West Aceh (Abas), which is not in line with the Helsinki agreement that states the 1956 borders are the official borders of Aceh.

Security problems could also occur in Aceh when the government stops its financial assistant to former GAM members. So far, for security reasons, GAM leaders have never submitted the names of their members. It is possible that after the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) completes its mission in Aceh in 2006, there will be a new conflict between former GAM members and the security apparatus in Aceh.

However, if the reintegration of former GAM members into society, the process of making a new law on Aceh province, which has to be finalized by the end of March 2006, the process of holding local elections and reconstruction and rehabilitation in the province all go well, there will be no big conflicts in Aceh.

Papua is another potential conflict area that must be managed carefully. Vice President Jusuf Kalla's decision in November, 2005, to postpone the election for the governor of West Irian Jaya were welcomed by Papuans. In accordance with Law No. 21/2001 on special autonomy for Papua, it is up to the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) and the local legislature to decide whether to approve the establishment of West Irian Jaya province.

If these two bodies do so, there will be two local elections in Papua, namely to elect the new governor of Papua province and the new governor of West Irian Jaya province. Although clanism is still part of local politics in Papua, it seems that local elections in Papua will go well. Papuans are tired of conflict, so local communities, NGOs and religious leaders have all agreed to help prevent any big conflicts in Papua.

Maluku and Central Sulawesi are two conflict areas where "invisible hands" are still trying to disturb the peace. Although there is still segregation between Muslims and Christians, it is highly likely that both Islamic and Christian leaders in those two areas are trying to communicate with each other and work together to prevent any small communal conflict from blowing up, as happened in 1999-2000.

Ambon and Poso are also two areas where the intelligence apparatus is very active gathering information. The problem is how the intelligence apparatus from the police and the military are able to share information about sociopolitical and security conditions in those areas in order to prevent conflict.

People in Ambon and Poso are tired of the violence and they know exactly who are the "actors" trying to create conflict in their areas. However, because there is no protection for people who come forward, they are reluctant to inform security authorities about the actors.

There were communal conflicts between the Dayaks and Madurese in West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan several years ago. Unless these two communities resolve their disputes and deal with the roots of the problem, it is possible the communal conflicts could flare up again.

In conclusion, conflict is possible in a multiethnic society like Indonesia. There is no one formula or remedy to prevent conflict in the country. It depends on local leaders and the security forces to handle these issues, and also the political leaders to decide whether to enhance the police's capability or to use the military to handle conflicts or specific internal security issues such as terrorism.

The writer is a senior researcher at the Research Center for Politics at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P-LIPI).