Trace trail of money, power across hot spots

Santi W.E. Soekanto, Contributor, Jakarta

Shortly after Sept. 11, columnists across the globe screamed to President George W. Bush to follow -- as one writer put it -- "the ticklish money trail" in order to sniff out the involvement of Osama Bin Laden and Princess Haifa al-Faisal's millions of dollars in various incidents of violence.

"Let's follow the money," one U.S. senator was quoted as saying last year regarding the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon. "If we follow the money, we're going to get to the truth, and I think the truth will not be very nice."

Putting aside the question of whether following the hot trail of the money has really led to the truth about Sept. 11, the U.S. exhortation appears to have been heeded by the Indonesian authorities dealing with spats of terrorist attacks in the country. They could pinpoint whose money financed which bomb explosions and via what channels. They went further and froze the accounts of some suspected terrorists, including those which had actually been dormant.

One then has to wonder why years have gone by since the first eruption of communal violence in Maluku and Poso, Central Sulawesi -- where collectively tens of thousands people were slaughtered -- and still no one in the government can come up with a better explanation for the recent resurgence of violence than that "the attacks involved some 'untouchable' and/or 'foreign' forces with a 'hidden political agenda'."

To quote TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, the fresh violence in Poso was not simply a "crime, but (was) politically motivated." Further, he said the findings of ammunition produced by army-owned PT Pindad at the scene should not be construed as proof of the military's involvement in the attacks -- after all, there had been occasions when arms were seized or stolen, or simply sold by rogue soldiers.

Has somebody in the intelligence and security forces forgotten to follow the money trail? Certainly it would mean hard work to follow such a route -- a lot of money would have changed hands for those "untouchables" to be able to cut off cellular phone services and intercity phone lines a few hours before the attacks in the predominantly Christian Morowali area and the largely Muslim Coastal Poso area.

Besides, even money is not as important a motivation for some as power. Political and security control over resource-rich Central Sulawesi, for instance, is a much, much sweeter enticement that anyone could dangle before the tongue-lolling power-thirsty elements -- foreign or domestic alike.

Poso is a very wealthy region in terms of natural resources. Maritime reports several years ago said there were 32 areas containing large, untapped oil deposits in northern Tomini Bay -- which could last for hundreds of years. This is also a very fertile land, and the center of the ebony export trade.

As of 2001, 30 percent of the regency's some 7,000 square kilometers was given over to cocoa plantations -- the source of yet another important export for the region and the nation. Poso is also a major producer of palm oil, copra, and cloves. The port of Kolonodale in Morowali district, which is located on the shores of the Banda Sea, can accommodate large ships -- both domestic and foreign -- and plays an important role in economic development.

Anyone wishing to stir up trouble will find in Poso as fertile a spot for communal conflict as Maluku on account of the region's history. Tentena on the Poso Lake, for instance, has been at the heart of Christian missionary activity since the late 1890s -- which some believe explains why the heavily forested inland region has as many as 13 airstrips for the missionaries' Cessna planes and helicopters.

Soeharto's transmigration program and the opening in late 1980s of the Trans Sulawesi highway, which traverses the forested island, however, was soon followed by floods of migrants, especially from the neighboring, predominantly Muslim South Sulawesi.

Indigenous Pamona Christians found themselves pushed further into the island's hinterland. Grand mosques were soon built even in Tentena. The fact that a large number of the migrants prospered financially with their cocoa plantations was soon seen as another factor leading to social disparity and resentment in Poso.

Slowly, an invisible demarcation line developed between the predominantly Christian hinterland and the predominantly Muslim coast. In fact, at the height of the conflict in 2001, for instance, a Muslim could only enter Tentena at the risk of death, while Christian civil servants required paramilitary police Mobile Brigade escorts in order to go to work in Poso town, the capital of the regency, which used to be predominantly Christian but became Muslim-controlled following the unrest.

Vice President Hamzah Haz blamed the fresh violence in Poso on parties unwilling to accept the government-brokered peace deal in the region. That could mean anyone, of course. By following the money trail, however, Hamzah will find them to be individuals who make short-term financial gains from the violence by, for instance, selling weapons and ammunition -- as TNI chief Endriartono Sutarto has suggested -- or by turning the Muslim- Christian conflict into an opportunity for their own small-scale business enterprises, such as offering "security services" and "hired escorts".

Such profiteers can come from among both the civilian population and the security forces. They can be found in Maluku, Poso and in Aceh -- where the violence has yet to die down despite months of military operations, the killing of so many people, and the billions of rupiah spent funding the war.

In case anyone forgets, following the regional autonomy policy, Aceh is no longer one of the "poor little rich provinces" as British economist Anne Booth used to call Indonesia's cash-cow regions that contributed greatly to the country's economy but continued to wallow in poverty under Soeharto's New Order administration. Aceh, an oil and gas-rich region, is now dripping with money because of the massive increases in local budget allocations.

Now, if Hamzah were to follow the power trail, he may just happen to come upon parties who are happy to see violence chipping away at Indonesia's edges because of the political and economic advantages they foresee if Indonesia were to be torn apart by violence -- the way some parties have benefited from the secession of East Timor.

Sadly, should Hamzah try to enumerate the various forms and guises these parties take, all the digits of his four extremities would not be enough as they are probably too numerous to count. Wasn't it much easier in the past when Laskar Jihad was still conveniently around to shoulder all the blame for the unexplained violence?