TNI's role in RI power struggles
TNI's role in RI power struggles
By Riza Sihbudi
JAKARTA (JP): After the fall of president Sukarno in 1966,
Indonesia's political life was dominated by the military under
the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine. The doctrine permits the
Armed Forces (ABRI), now the Indonesian Military (TNI), to be
active in social and political affairs as well as security and
defense.
During the era of Sukarno (1945 to 1966), the three main
actors and rivals were: Sukarno himself, who among other
appellations was dubbed the "great leader of the Indonesian
revolution", the military, especially the Army (Angkatan Darat)
and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
In politics there is a motto that "the enemy of my enemy is my
ally". During the power struggle that occurred in the last days
of the Sukarno era, the president made a strategic coalition with
the PKI to counter the military.
In 1965, the military succeeded in defeating the PKI, and
later they also succeeded in overthrowing the president in a
"constitutional coup". In the context of the Cold War, the U.S.
and its Western allies did not like the close relationship
between Sukarno's regime and communist states such as the Soviet
Union, the People's Republic of China and North Korea. America's
CIA was thus charged with playing a role in the defeat of both
the PKI and Sukarno.
In the following years, which were dominated by the military,
as David Jenkins wrote: "the experiences of army leaders during
these critical formative years gave birth to a strongly shared
ethos, as well as a range of arguments about the role that the
armed forces should play in society." (Soeharto and his generals,
1984.)
The social and economic crisis after the 1965-1966 power
struggle led the new regime to prioritize political stability and
economic development policies. These policies succeeded in
producing both sociopolitical stability and economic growth.
However, increasing military involvement and intervention led to
political, social and economic damage.
First was the death of sociopolitical freedom, including the
freedom of the press and freedom of speech, and freedom to
establish associations or political parties.
Second was the spread of corruption, collusion and nepotism
within circles of the political elite and in civilian and
military bureaucracies nationwide.
Third was the potential of regional disintegration, such as in
the provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya, West Kalimantan, East Timor
and Maluku.
Those problems worsened with the economic crisis in Southeast
Asia and contributed to the fall of the Soeharto regime in May
1998. Phillips Shively wrote that the main factors leading to
democracy are "fatigue of some authoritarian regimes,
international pressures, people's desire for security against
abuse, and their desire for economic development". (Power and
Choice, 1993.)
As deterioration in the ABRI-dominated Soeharto regime
occurred within itself, its surviving members -- whether inside
or outside the system -- were unable to sustain the system, and
had to reform themselves as best they could, as did the third
president, B.J. Habibie.
During Habibie's transitional regime from May 21, 1998, to
Oct. 20, 1999, and in line with reform demands around the
country, TNI formulated what they called a "redefinition,
reposition and reactualization" of their sociopolitical role.
Unfortunately, their "new paradigm" is still political
rhetoric. A study by the Center for Political and Regional
Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) on TNI's
role in the reform movement reveals that the new concept of the
military is only halfhearted. The "new paradigm" emerged only in
response to public criticism and insults, especially from
students, against the military's past actions.
The military elite's inability or unwillingness to resolve
tragedies such as the abduction and shootings of political
activists and protesters, the May 1998 riots, and the "killing
fields" in Aceh, Maluku, West Kalimantan, etc. to the public's
satisfaction has not helped restore public confidence in TNI.
Last but not least, the military remained a key factor in the
rise and fall of Habibie's regime. That Habibie remained in power
for 512 days was only possible because the military was behind
him. When military commander Gen. Wiranto rejected Habibie's
offer to run for the vice presidency, Habibie's regime finally
collapsed.
There are two arguments explaining Gen. Wiranto's rejection.
Some analysts say it was related to the military's "new
paradigm". Wiranto's rejection reflected the military's "good
will" to remain neutral in the power struggle, especially between
the "Islamic-nationalists" who supported Habibie, the "militant-
nationalist" force supporting Megawati Soekarnoputri (now Vice
President), and the "axis force" supporting Abdurrahman Wahid
(now President). In a nationally televised statement, Wiranto
said he had decided not to enter the political contest at this
time.
The other argument contended that Wiranto's rejection was
related to Habibie's bad image. Habibie's nomination for a second
presidential term faced strong opposition from most Indonesians,
especially the students, the media and the "middle class". If
Wiranto had become Habibie's vice president, he and TNI in
general would have had to come face to face with the people.
During demonstrations in several cities, protesters stated
that "Habibie plus Wiranto equals Soeharto".
Although TNI has introduced its "new paradigm," the Army is
still the deciding factor in Indonesian politics. TNI's "new
paradigm" has not led the military to withdraw from politics.
Therefore, in the euphoria greeting the new democratically
elected leadership, the people, including critical students and
the media, should keep their eyes open. The "new Indonesia" we
need is a real democratic civilian supremacy and military
professionalism. As Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri said,
we need the military as "a provider of a sense of peace and
security".
The writer is a researcher at the Center for Political & Regional
Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in
Jakarta.