TNI's role in RI power struggles

By Riza Sihbudi

JAKARTA (JP): After the fall of president Sukarno in 1966, Indonesia's political life was dominated by the military under the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine. The doctrine permits the Armed Forces (ABRI), now the Indonesian Military (TNI), to be active in social and political affairs as well as security and defense.

During the era of Sukarno (1945 to 1966), the three main actors and rivals were: Sukarno himself, who among other appellations was dubbed the "great leader of the Indonesian revolution", the military, especially the Army (Angkatan Darat) and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

In politics there is a motto that "the enemy of my enemy is my ally". During the power struggle that occurred in the last days of the Sukarno era, the president made a strategic coalition with the PKI to counter the military.

In 1965, the military succeeded in defeating the PKI, and later they also succeeded in overthrowing the president in a "constitutional coup". In the context of the Cold War, the U.S. and its Western allies did not like the close relationship between Sukarno's regime and communist states such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and North Korea. America's CIA was thus charged with playing a role in the defeat of both the PKI and Sukarno.

In the following years, which were dominated by the military, as David Jenkins wrote: "the experiences of army leaders during these critical formative years gave birth to a strongly shared ethos, as well as a range of arguments about the role that the armed forces should play in society." (Soeharto and his generals, 1984.)

The social and economic crisis after the 1965-1966 power struggle led the new regime to prioritize political stability and economic development policies. These policies succeeded in producing both sociopolitical stability and economic growth. However, increasing military involvement and intervention led to political, social and economic damage.

First was the death of sociopolitical freedom, including the freedom of the press and freedom of speech, and freedom to establish associations or political parties.

Second was the spread of corruption, collusion and nepotism within circles of the political elite and in civilian and military bureaucracies nationwide.

Third was the potential of regional disintegration, such as in the provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya, West Kalimantan, East Timor and Maluku.

Those problems worsened with the economic crisis in Southeast Asia and contributed to the fall of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. Phillips Shively wrote that the main factors leading to democracy are "fatigue of some authoritarian regimes, international pressures, people's desire for security against abuse, and their desire for economic development". (Power and Choice, 1993.)

As deterioration in the ABRI-dominated Soeharto regime occurred within itself, its surviving members -- whether inside or outside the system -- were unable to sustain the system, and had to reform themselves as best they could, as did the third president, B.J. Habibie.

During Habibie's transitional regime from May 21, 1998, to Oct. 20, 1999, and in line with reform demands around the country, TNI formulated what they called a "redefinition, reposition and reactualization" of their sociopolitical role.

Unfortunately, their "new paradigm" is still political rhetoric. A study by the Center for Political and Regional Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) on TNI's role in the reform movement reveals that the new concept of the military is only halfhearted. The "new paradigm" emerged only in response to public criticism and insults, especially from students, against the military's past actions.

The military elite's inability or unwillingness to resolve tragedies such as the abduction and shootings of political activists and protesters, the May 1998 riots, and the "killing fields" in Aceh, Maluku, West Kalimantan, etc. to the public's satisfaction has not helped restore public confidence in TNI.

Last but not least, the military remained a key factor in the rise and fall of Habibie's regime. That Habibie remained in power for 512 days was only possible because the military was behind him. When military commander Gen. Wiranto rejected Habibie's offer to run for the vice presidency, Habibie's regime finally collapsed.

There are two arguments explaining Gen. Wiranto's rejection. Some analysts say it was related to the military's "new paradigm". Wiranto's rejection reflected the military's "good will" to remain neutral in the power struggle, especially between the "Islamic-nationalists" who supported Habibie, the "militant- nationalist" force supporting Megawati Soekarnoputri (now Vice President), and the "axis force" supporting Abdurrahman Wahid (now President). In a nationally televised statement, Wiranto said he had decided not to enter the political contest at this time.

The other argument contended that Wiranto's rejection was related to Habibie's bad image. Habibie's nomination for a second presidential term faced strong opposition from most Indonesians, especially the students, the media and the "middle class". If Wiranto had become Habibie's vice president, he and TNI in general would have had to come face to face with the people.

During demonstrations in several cities, protesters stated that "Habibie plus Wiranto equals Soeharto".

Although TNI has introduced its "new paradigm," the Army is still the deciding factor in Indonesian politics. TNI's "new paradigm" has not led the military to withdraw from politics.

Therefore, in the euphoria greeting the new democratically elected leadership, the people, including critical students and the media, should keep their eyes open. The "new Indonesia" we need is a real democratic civilian supremacy and military professionalism. As Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri said, we need the military as "a provider of a sense of peace and security".

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Political & Regional Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in Jakarta.