TNI's halfhearted reform

TNI's halfhearted reform

The white paper published by the Ministry of Defense last
month is a clear attempt to put the brakes on the ongoing reform
within the Indonesian Military (TNI). It is regrettable that
those who are in charge of the TNI, or those who are running the
Ministry of Defense, are about to squander or even roll back much
of the significant progress they themselves made in reforming the
military over these last four years.

The white paper, titled Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad
21 (Defending the Land and Water at the Start of the 21st
Century), is a welcome attempt by the Ministry of Defense to
become more transparent about what it is doing. The paper
outlines the government's perception of the threats to the
country and the strategies needed to deal with these threats.

National defense is not solely the concern of the Ministry of
Defense and the TNI, but also concerns the entire nation. Making
public the perception of the threats facing the country and the
strategies needed to deal with them is therefore important and
most welcome.

It would have been better, however, if the white paper had
also been drawn up after a thorough public debate. As it is, the
white paper reflects the domination of military views and
interests. This comes as no surprise considering that although
the Ministry of Defense may be led by a civilian, those running
the show, including those who drafted the white paper, come from
the TNI.

The first of the two most controversial points in the paper
concerns the need for the TNI to play a role in maintaining
domestic security along with the National Police (Polri). The
second point, consistent with the first, concerns the need for
the TNI to maintain its presence among the people, through its
huge network of territorial commands.

Both points run counter to one of the goals of reform, which
is to demilitarize the nation as we march toward civil society.

The ultimate goal of military reform must be to return the
soldiers to their barracks, and to leave the task of maintaining
national security to the police. The TNI could provide assistance
to the police if and when needed, but this role must be at the
discretion of the president, who is also the supreme commander of
the TNI.

The legal framework for this clear division of labor between
the TNI and Polri is provided in a decree issued in 2000 by the
People's Consultative Assembly. But it appears that the defense
white paper is an attempt to blur the distinction between defense
and security.

The paper, for example, states that while Indonesia does not
face any immediate threat of foreign invasion, it does face
nontraditional threats ranging from terrorism, radicalism,
separatist movements and communal conflicts, to drug smuggling,
human smuggling and illegal fishing.

The paper proposes that since these threats could ultimately
endanger the territorial integrity of the unitary state, it is
incumbent upon the TNI to take part in dealing with the problems.
After all, it is the task of the TNI to safeguard the nation.

The TNI's role in dealing with these nontraditional threats,
according to the paper, should be adjusted according to the
degree of the threat. The more threatening the situation becomes,
the greater degree to which the TNI should be brought in to help
the police.

The paper distinguishes between military operations for
warfare and nonwar military operations, and argues that there
must be an urgency in developing the TNI's nonwar military
operations given the more immediate threat of the nontraditional
kind.

While we may recognize the shortcomings of our police force in
dealing with national security, this in no way should be used as
a pretext for returning authority and power back to the TNI from
the hands of the police force. If the police are deemed incapable
of dealing with these problems, the solution would be for the
nation to empower them and to give them the necessary resources
to do their jobs effectively.

The white paper's proposal that the Polri and TNI share
between them the tasks of national security would revive the old
problem of overlapping authority, and possibly even revive their
rivalry. For the military to make this suggestion at this early
stage of the separation of the two forces' powers is tantamount
to a vote of no confidence in our police, and probably even
amounts to an insult.

The white paper also seeks to put an end to the debate about
the TNI's current territorial structure by stating that those
calling for its abolition are denying the fact that the military
and the people are one, and cannot be separated.

Yet we know that the presence of military commands all the way
down to the village level creates the impression of a heavily
militarized nation that is seemingly in a perpetual state of
emergency. We also have learned that through these commands the
military has continued to exercise political influence, even
though the institution is legally no longer in politics.

For what it is worth, the defense white paper provides a rare
glimpse into the thinking of the people who are in charge of
national defense. And what we have learned from this glimpse is
quite disturbing for the pace of national reform, and for our
march toward democracy and civil society.