TNI's halfhearted reform

The white paper published by the Ministry of Defense last month is a clear attempt to put the brakes on the ongoing reform within the Indonesian Military (TNI). It is regrettable that those who are in charge of the TNI, or those who are running the Ministry of Defense, are about to squander or even roll back much of the significant progress they themselves made in reforming the military over these last four years.

The white paper, titled Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21 (Defending the Land and Water at the Start of the 21st Century), is a welcome attempt by the Ministry of Defense to become more transparent about what it is doing. The paper outlines the government's perception of the threats to the country and the strategies needed to deal with these threats.

National defense is not solely the concern of the Ministry of Defense and the TNI, but also concerns the entire nation. Making public the perception of the threats facing the country and the strategies needed to deal with them is therefore important and most welcome.

It would have been better, however, if the white paper had also been drawn up after a thorough public debate. As it is, the white paper reflects the domination of military views and interests. This comes as no surprise considering that although the Ministry of Defense may be led by a civilian, those running the show, including those who drafted the white paper, come from the TNI.

The first of the two most controversial points in the paper concerns the need for the TNI to play a role in maintaining domestic security along with the National Police (Polri). The second point, consistent with the first, concerns the need for the TNI to maintain its presence among the people, through its huge network of territorial commands.

Both points run counter to one of the goals of reform, which is to demilitarize the nation as we march toward civil society.

The ultimate goal of military reform must be to return the soldiers to their barracks, and to leave the task of maintaining national security to the police. The TNI could provide assistance to the police if and when needed, but this role must be at the discretion of the president, who is also the supreme commander of the TNI.

The legal framework for this clear division of labor between the TNI and Polri is provided in a decree issued in 2000 by the People's Consultative Assembly. But it appears that the defense white paper is an attempt to blur the distinction between defense and security.

The paper, for example, states that while Indonesia does not face any immediate threat of foreign invasion, it does face nontraditional threats ranging from terrorism, radicalism, separatist movements and communal conflicts, to drug smuggling, human smuggling and illegal fishing.

The paper proposes that since these threats could ultimately endanger the territorial integrity of the unitary state, it is incumbent upon the TNI to take part in dealing with the problems. After all, it is the task of the TNI to safeguard the nation.

The TNI's role in dealing with these nontraditional threats, according to the paper, should be adjusted according to the degree of the threat. The more threatening the situation becomes, the greater degree to which the TNI should be brought in to help the police.

The paper distinguishes between military operations for warfare and nonwar military operations, and argues that there must be an urgency in developing the TNI's nonwar military operations given the more immediate threat of the nontraditional kind.

While we may recognize the shortcomings of our police force in dealing with national security, this in no way should be used as a pretext for returning authority and power back to the TNI from the hands of the police force. If the police are deemed incapable of dealing with these problems, the solution would be for the nation to empower them and to give them the necessary resources to do their jobs effectively.

The white paper's proposal that the Polri and TNI share between them the tasks of national security would revive the old problem of overlapping authority, and possibly even revive their rivalry. For the military to make this suggestion at this early stage of the separation of the two forces' powers is tantamount to a vote of no confidence in our police, and probably even amounts to an insult.

The white paper also seeks to put an end to the debate about the TNI's current territorial structure by stating that those calling for its abolition are denying the fact that the military and the people are one, and cannot be separated.

Yet we know that the presence of military commands all the way down to the village level creates the impression of a heavily militarized nation that is seemingly in a perpetual state of emergency. We also have learned that through these commands the military has continued to exercise political influence, even though the institution is legally no longer in politics.

For what it is worth, the defense white paper provides a rare glimpse into the thinking of the people who are in charge of national defense. And what we have learned from this glimpse is quite disturbing for the pace of national reform, and for our march toward democracy and civil society.