TNI to stay in politics unless new consensus comes

TNI to stay in politics unless new consensus comes

Bob Lowry is Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defense Studies
Center, part of the Australian Defense Force Academy in Canberra,
and describes himself as an independent Indonesia scholar. He
retired from the Australian army in January 1993 as a lieutenant
colonel. He served in a range of regimental and staff
appointments around Australia, in South Vietnam, Singapore and
Indonesia.

His book The Armed Forces of Indonesia was published by Allen
and Unwin in 1996. He also has published monographs, book
chapters and numerous articles on the Indonesian Military (TNI)
and Indonesian politics. He is currently researching a biography
on General L. B. Moerdani.

Mr. Lowry spoke with The Jakarta Post contributor Dewi
Anggraeni over the telephone and via email. The following is an
excerpt of these conversations.

Question: Many things have happened to the Indonesian Military
since you wrote The Armed Forces of Indonesia, which was
published in 1996. What change has had the most impact on the
military as an institution?

Answer: The biggest change has been the demise of Soeharto and
the death of the ideological rationale for military involvement
in politics, dwifungsi. The TNI's firepower and persistent
internal turmoil still allows it a political role but it is
unlikely to be reborn as a political alternative.

Unfortunately, the TNI still lacks any apparent strategic plan
for reform. To some extent that reflects the absence of
government direction as well as the absence of internal cohesion.

Q: How big an impact did the separation of the National Police
(Polri) from TNI have on the country's political map and national
security?

A: This is a critical question, as the poor performance of the
TNI and Polri in Aceh demonstrates. The police are really not
organized or equipped to run the sort of campaign that is needed
in Aceh, and the coordination of the TNI and police leaves much
to be desired.

In large measure, however, this failure is due to the
inability of the government to address the underlying political
issues and appoint a local authority with full control over the
military and police. Moreover, as long as the government chooses
to treat instability as a security issue rather than a political
issue, the TNI and police will continue to be the meat in
the sandwich.

Q: Some observers say that President Abdurrahman Wahid's removal
of Gen. (ret) Wiranto first from the military and then from
politics has not weakened the military to a great extent, because
Wiranto was never fully in control of the institution, that he
was never fully accepted by the whole of the military. What do
you think?

A: The vastness of Indonesia and the military's dependence on its
own financial resources has always given regional commanders and
other commanders a degree of independence and patronage that
other armed forces do not have. However, changing individuals
will not herald systemic change unless there is firm political
direction and definition of military prerogatives.

Q: Do you believe Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah was pushed aside
because of his attempts to uncover corruption in the Army
Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) when he was appointed
commander of Kostrad, or was there another reason?

Agus Wirahadikusumah was probably pushed aside for a number of
reasons -- his courting of political support, his exposure of
corruption within the TNI and his desire to push reform faster
than most officers were comfortable with. In the end he reached
beyond the political support he was able to muster.

Q: Many eyes are on Coordinating Minister for Political, Social
and Security Affairs Lt. Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at
the moment. Some even see him as a presidential candidate. How do
you see him? What are his strong points and his weak points?

A: I do not want to talk too much about individuals because I do
not have intimate knowledge of many. However, democratic politics
will allow a number of presidential prospects to emerge, of which
Bambang could be one. It is early days but his current
performance has not been outstanding or given him a head start.
However, his performance might be buried under an ineffective
government.

Q: How many of the officers in TNI do you think are real
reformists?

A: It is estimated that about 20 percent of the senior officer
corps supported the push for rapid reform.

Q: Will they make a difference?

A: They will not have much influence without political support
from the government. If the government supports and pushes
reform, many other officers will change their attitudes. But
without political support, reform will be a very slow and
grudging process.

Q: The military has been hit hard lately, not only in terms of
its reputation, but also in terms of funding, its room to move
and cohesion. Yet TNI is still a formidable force to contend
with. How does TNI see itself?

A: Some appreciate that they deserved the deluge of criticism
they have received in the last few years. Others feel they are
scapegoats for the failures of others. They see themselves as the
last bastion between inept civilian politicians and the
disintegration of the state, a view reminiscent of the late 1950s
and early 1960s. Thirty years of authoritarian rule, however, has
discredited the military alternative.

Nonetheless, they are making cause with other conservative
political forces to buttress their diminished political
influence.

Q: Would regional autonomy bring complications to the structure
of the military and the police?

A: Regional autonomy will present immense difficulties for the
military and police mainly because they have not been reformed,
and their failings will probably be more readily exposed by local
politicians. There will also be tensions resulting from
conflicting legislation and regulations. The embryonic nature of
institutional development will probably see local
politicians, bureaucrats, military and police reach mutually
beneficial arrangements in the interregnum before reform bites.

Q: Do you mean there is going to be regional corruption until
real reform cleans it up?

A: Yes, you are correct.

Q: Do you think the military will ever leave politics in
Indonesia?

A: The TNI will not leave politics until a new political
consensus is negotiated, including the fate of those regions
seeking independence. Until that occurs the TNI will be engaged
in internal security and will retain a domestic focus and
interests.

Q: How long will they retain this role?

A: How long depends on the capacity of succeeding governments to
renegotiate these issues and push reform with the TNI.

Q: Does Australia still have a role in assisting Indonesia,
considering there is so much mauvaise foi, residue of the anger
among some Indonesians caused by Australia's high-profile
involvement in East Timor?

A: It is in Australia's interest to see a democratic transition
in Indonesia. Consequently, Australian governments, whether Labor
or Liberal, will give priority to assisting reform in Indonesia
as long as that support is welcome.

However, the repair of government-to-government relations is
likely to take some time, and remain hostage to the evolving
domestic political landscape in Jakarta.

Q: How does the Australian Defense Force see the situation?

A: The Australian Defense Force is keen to see a successful
democratic transition in Indonesia for a number of reasons. Like
other militaries, the ADF (Australian Defense Force) wants
security of passage through the archipelago, but it also wants to
reduce its troop commitment to East Timor, a secure Irian/PNG
border and a potential long-term ally to its north.

Q: There is a push for a stronger defense force in Australia. Do
you think this will affect Australian-Indonesian relations? Will
it be seen by Indonesians as a sign of increased hostility toward
countries in the region, including Indonesia?

A: Those seeking to make political capital will portray increased
funding of Australian defense as a threat to Indonesia's
security. An objective assessment, however, would show that the
level of funds likely to be committed will do nothing more than
stop the decline in Australian military capabilities.

The ADF certainly does not have the manpower to pose a threat
to the territory of another nation on a long-term basis.

Q: What do you see as the biggest challenge in maintaining good
relations with Indonesia?

A: The biggest challenge will come from continuing turmoil in
Irian Jaya. Although governments will continue to adhere to the
post-World War II convention of recognizing postcolonial borders,
some community groups in Australia will support the independence
ambitions in Irian, irritating nationalists in Indonesia.

The religious affiliation of some of these groups will
stimulate the hostility of some religious groups in Indonesia,
complicating government-to-government relations.

The main requirement for meeting this challenge is honesty.
Britain and France still have fundamental disagreements in some
areas of policy, but they also cooperate in many areas. The same
will apply to the Australia-Indonesia relationship.

A democratic Indonesia will be more volatile, but common
interests abound. The key is to accept differences and
concentrate on the common interests.