TNI to stay in politics unless new consensus comes
Bob Lowry is Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defense Studies Center, part of the Australian Defense Force Academy in Canberra, and describes himself as an independent Indonesia scholar. He retired from the Australian army in January 1993 as a lieutenant colonel. He served in a range of regimental and staff appointments around Australia, in South Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia.
His book The Armed Forces of Indonesia was published by Allen and Unwin in 1996. He also has published monographs, book chapters and numerous articles on the Indonesian Military (TNI) and Indonesian politics. He is currently researching a biography on General L. B. Moerdani.
Mr. Lowry spoke with The Jakarta Post contributor Dewi Anggraeni over the telephone and via email. The following is an excerpt of these conversations.
Question: Many things have happened to the Indonesian Military since you wrote The Armed Forces of Indonesia, which was published in 1996. What change has had the most impact on the military as an institution?
Answer: The biggest change has been the demise of Soeharto and the death of the ideological rationale for military involvement in politics, dwifungsi. The TNI's firepower and persistent internal turmoil still allows it a political role but it is unlikely to be reborn as a political alternative.
Unfortunately, the TNI still lacks any apparent strategic plan for reform. To some extent that reflects the absence of government direction as well as the absence of internal cohesion.
Q: How big an impact did the separation of the National Police (Polri) from TNI have on the country's political map and national security?
A: This is a critical question, as the poor performance of the TNI and Polri in Aceh demonstrates. The police are really not organized or equipped to run the sort of campaign that is needed in Aceh, and the coordination of the TNI and police leaves much to be desired.
In large measure, however, this failure is due to the inability of the government to address the underlying political issues and appoint a local authority with full control over the military and police. Moreover, as long as the government chooses to treat instability as a security issue rather than a political issue, the TNI and police will continue to be the meat in the sandwich.
Q: Some observers say that President Abdurrahman Wahid's removal of Gen. (ret) Wiranto first from the military and then from politics has not weakened the military to a great extent, because Wiranto was never fully in control of the institution, that he was never fully accepted by the whole of the military. What do you think?
A: The vastness of Indonesia and the military's dependence on its own financial resources has always given regional commanders and other commanders a degree of independence and patronage that other armed forces do not have. However, changing individuals will not herald systemic change unless there is firm political direction and definition of military prerogatives.
Q: Do you believe Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah was pushed aside because of his attempts to uncover corruption in the Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) when he was appointed commander of Kostrad, or was there another reason?
Agus Wirahadikusumah was probably pushed aside for a number of reasons -- his courting of political support, his exposure of corruption within the TNI and his desire to push reform faster than most officers were comfortable with. In the end he reached beyond the political support he was able to muster.
Q: Many eyes are on Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs Lt. Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the moment. Some even see him as a presidential candidate. How do you see him? What are his strong points and his weak points?
A: I do not want to talk too much about individuals because I do not have intimate knowledge of many. However, democratic politics will allow a number of presidential prospects to emerge, of which Bambang could be one. It is early days but his current performance has not been outstanding or given him a head start. However, his performance might be buried under an ineffective government.
Q: How many of the officers in TNI do you think are real reformists?
A: It is estimated that about 20 percent of the senior officer corps supported the push for rapid reform.
Q: Will they make a difference?
A: They will not have much influence without political support from the government. If the government supports and pushes reform, many other officers will change their attitudes. But without political support, reform will be a very slow and grudging process.
Q: The military has been hit hard lately, not only in terms of its reputation, but also in terms of funding, its room to move and cohesion. Yet TNI is still a formidable force to contend with. How does TNI see itself?
A: Some appreciate that they deserved the deluge of criticism they have received in the last few years. Others feel they are scapegoats for the failures of others. They see themselves as the last bastion between inept civilian politicians and the disintegration of the state, a view reminiscent of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Thirty years of authoritarian rule, however, has discredited the military alternative.
Nonetheless, they are making cause with other conservative political forces to buttress their diminished political influence.
Q: Would regional autonomy bring complications to the structure of the military and the police?
A: Regional autonomy will present immense difficulties for the military and police mainly because they have not been reformed, and their failings will probably be more readily exposed by local politicians. There will also be tensions resulting from conflicting legislation and regulations. The embryonic nature of institutional development will probably see local politicians, bureaucrats, military and police reach mutually beneficial arrangements in the interregnum before reform bites.
Q: Do you mean there is going to be regional corruption until real reform cleans it up?
A: Yes, you are correct.
Q: Do you think the military will ever leave politics in Indonesia?
A: The TNI will not leave politics until a new political consensus is negotiated, including the fate of those regions seeking independence. Until that occurs the TNI will be engaged in internal security and will retain a domestic focus and interests.
Q: How long will they retain this role?
A: How long depends on the capacity of succeeding governments to renegotiate these issues and push reform with the TNI.
Q: Does Australia still have a role in assisting Indonesia, considering there is so much mauvaise foi, residue of the anger among some Indonesians caused by Australia's high-profile involvement in East Timor?
A: It is in Australia's interest to see a democratic transition in Indonesia. Consequently, Australian governments, whether Labor or Liberal, will give priority to assisting reform in Indonesia as long as that support is welcome.
However, the repair of government-to-government relations is likely to take some time, and remain hostage to the evolving domestic political landscape in Jakarta.
Q: How does the Australian Defense Force see the situation?
A: The Australian Defense Force is keen to see a successful democratic transition in Indonesia for a number of reasons. Like other militaries, the ADF (Australian Defense Force) wants security of passage through the archipelago, but it also wants to reduce its troop commitment to East Timor, a secure Irian/PNG border and a potential long-term ally to its north.
Q: There is a push for a stronger defense force in Australia. Do you think this will affect Australian-Indonesian relations? Will it be seen by Indonesians as a sign of increased hostility toward countries in the region, including Indonesia?
A: Those seeking to make political capital will portray increased funding of Australian defense as a threat to Indonesia's security. An objective assessment, however, would show that the level of funds likely to be committed will do nothing more than stop the decline in Australian military capabilities.
The ADF certainly does not have the manpower to pose a threat to the territory of another nation on a long-term basis.
Q: What do you see as the biggest challenge in maintaining good relations with Indonesia?
A: The biggest challenge will come from continuing turmoil in Irian Jaya. Although governments will continue to adhere to the post-World War II convention of recognizing postcolonial borders, some community groups in Australia will support the independence ambitions in Irian, irritating nationalists in Indonesia.
The religious affiliation of some of these groups will stimulate the hostility of some religious groups in Indonesia, complicating government-to-government relations.
The main requirement for meeting this challenge is honesty. Britain and France still have fundamental disagreements in some areas of policy, but they also cooperate in many areas. The same will apply to the Australia-Indonesia relationship.
A democratic Indonesia will be more volatile, but common interests abound. The key is to accept differences and concentrate on the common interests.