TNI must not repeat E. Timor mistakes

TNI must not repeat E. Timor mistakes

Ardimas Sasdi, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta,
ardimas@thejakartapost.com

The process of ending hostilities in troubled Aceh, which has
been underway for the last five months, has entered a new,
critical phase, which if not handled properly, could wreck the
peace plan.

Two of the most worrying developments threatening to derail
the peace efforts were an attack by an angry mob of 1,500, who
ransacked and burned a Joint Security Committee (JSC) office in
the East Aceh town of Langsa on Sunday, and the killing of nine
rebels by the police and military in four incidents on Tuesday.

The JSC withdrew its peace monitors from the regencies to
Banda Aceh on Tuesday following Tuesday's killings.

Sunday's incident was the second attack by a mob on a JSC
office in less than one month. Last month, hundreds of people,
whose identities are still unknown, attacked a JSC office in
Takengon, Central Aceh, ostensibly over what the attackers'
called the committee's failure to maintain impartiality.

The attack, which could be categorized as a criminal act, has
the potential to ruin the peace process, which had been
proceeding relatively well since the government and the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) signed a truce brokered by the Swiss-based non-
governmental organization, the Henry Dunant Centre, in Geneva on
Dec. 9.

The JSC was formed by the HDC to supervise the implementation
of programs to end the hostilities in Aceh. It comprises
representatives from the Indonesian Military (TNI), GAM and
international peace monitors, mostly from Thailand, a country
viewed by both GAM and Indonesia as neutral.

In response to Sunday's attack, the HDC has asked the
government to take the necessary steps to prevent similar
incidents, and provide security for JSC members as all the JSC
offices in Aceh's eight regencies have faced the threat of
attack.

The attacks on the JSC have occurred after a drive by GAM to
recruit new members as part of its campaign for independence, and
the failure to meet the deadline to disarm as stipulated in the
Geneva accord -- things considered by the military to be blatant
breaches of the peace deal.

This view has toughened the stance of the TNI and police
against GAM. The TNI is still the dominant force, at least as far
as Aceh and GAM are concerned. The Army, for instance, held a
meeting of its top brass in Lhokseumawe, one of the hottest spots
in Aceh, a move seen by observers as a nothing less than a show
of force.

The latest developments in Aceh, including the violations of
the peace accord by both sides and exchanges of harsh words, have
sparked concerns in many quarters.

Senior diplomat Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, the Indonesian
government's chief negotiator with GAM, had earlier called on the
secessionist movement to comply with the peace deal to avoid
plunging the province back into a bloody conflict with the TNI,
while a Golkar legislator from Aceh, T.M. Nurlif, urged the
government and GAM not to abandon the peace agreement.

The Dec. 9, 2002, peace agreement was seriously flawed from
the beginning by GAM's refusal to renounce its 26-year-old armed
struggle for independence.

The road to peace between a government and rebels in any part
of the world is not easy as evidenced by the ongoing talks
between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil rebels, which are
brokered by the government of Norway and hosted by Thailand. Both
Colombo and the rebels treaded lightly at the outset of the peace
talks by discussing relatively uncontentious issues so as to
ensure they would be able to move on to trickier issues during
the later stages.

Most Acehnese, as reflected by the turnouts for the
establishment of the new peace zones and their expressed wishes
for the extension of such zones, support the existing peace
process. The HDC, while not ignoring the violations, was also
quite happy with the way the efforts to end the hostilities were
proceeding.

In addition, the international community had also invested
high hopes in the peaceful solution of the Aceh issue as
reflected in the commitment of world organizations and a number
of countries to take part in the reconstruction of basic
infrastructure in the resource-rich province, such as the
building of new schools, roads and irrigation schemes.

The future of the peace deal in Aceh will largely depend upon
the political will of GAM and Indonesian government leaders.

The rebels, for instance, must forget their desire for
independence, and instead accept Jakarta's offer of special
autonomy, while Jakarta also has its work cut out for it so as to
ensure justice for the Acehnese.

The military must shift from a heavy-handed approach to a more
humane one in order to supplement concrete development programs
in a bid to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese. The
military and police will also have to train their personnel in
sociology, religion and communications, and tighten up the
selection procedures for the officers who are to be sent to the
staunchly Muslim province.

The military could also learn from the approach adopted by the
former Dutch colonial government in Aceh to end the bloody
conflict, which has claimed more than 10,000 lives. The Dutch at
one time employed Islamic scholar C. Snouck Hurgronye to research
an effective approach toward the Acehnese, who are known as
simple but brave people who are immensely proud of their culture
and religion. For them, respect is worth much more than wealth.

The military must also resist the temptation to take advantage
of the fact that the world's attention is currently focused on
Iraq by launching a campaign of uncontrolled violence to crush
GAM as it did against the East Timorese following their decision
to secede from Indonesia in a referendum in 1999. Should
something like this happen again, it is unlikely it will be
forgotten, if not actually forgiven, so quickly by the world
community.

Evidence is mounting that the military intends to use force to
try once again to exterminate the rebels. This may be gleaned
from the statement made by Megawati ordering the police and
military to prepare themselves for an anti-insurgency operation,
and the preparations being made for the dispatch of a large
number of additional troops to the province.

If the senior military leaders in Jakarta choose this path,
they will be condemning themselves, as well as the younger
officers who have no choice but to obey the orders of their
superiors, and run the risk of some time in the future being
hauled before an international court for crimes against humanity.