TNI makes strategic retreat from formal politics

TNI makes strategic retreat from formal politics

Tiarma Siboro, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The Indonesian Military (TNI) sprang a major surprise in
August when it announced that it would relinquish all its seats
both in the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) as of 2004, five years earlier than
originally scheduled.

Because the TNI took the nation completely by surprise --
there was not a single hint of any of this before the MPR's
annual session opened in August -- the announcement was greeted
with skepticism and not a small dose of suspicion.

Most analysts agreed that the TNI's withdrawal from politics
(at least relinquishing one of its political privileges) was a
calculated move that would leave the military in an even more
powerful position than had it insisted on retaining the seats.

This is more a strategic retreat.

The move will free the TNI from the constraints of formal
politics without its relinquishing its real political power.

After 2004, the TNI will remain one of the best organized and
disciplined institutions in the country, unequaled by any
civilian institution. It would be naive to suggest that the TNI
will not exert its power and influence given its massive
political clout.

The TNI is not quitting politics. It is simply going to play
the game differently, and in all likelihood, far more
effectively, hopefully, for better.

At any event, the TNI's decision to relinquish its DPR and MPR
seats after 2004 removed one of the many contentious issues that
the MPR had to overcome as it debated the fourth package of
amendments to the 1945 Constitution in August.

There were signs that the talks over the constitutional
amendments would be deadlocked in the MPR in August because of
major disagreements on several issues. Agreement was essential,
however, as the nation must begin preparations for the 2004
general election based on the amended Constitution.

TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto moved the debate forward
with a stern warning that lest the MPR political factions come to
an agreement, the nation might be forced to return to the
original text of the basic law as it was written in 1945.

But he also made it easy for the MPR.

Had it not been for the surprise announcement, the MPR would
have been faced with the awkward question of what to do with the
TNI's representation in the two state organs. On the one hand,
the proposed constitutional amendments abolished the TNI seats in
the DPR and MPR. On the other hand, a 2000 MPR ruling states that
the TNI can maintain its seats until 2009.

This dilemma was resolved by the TNI's own decision.

Lt. Gen (ret.) Agus Widjojo, who led the TNI/Police faction in
MPR, explained the rationale for quitting formal politics early:
"We might as well start focusing on our primary function as the
national defense force".

But there were other indicators during 2002 which suggested
that the TNI would continue to be a political force to be
reckoned with and that it would not hesitate to flex its muscles
from time to time.

The Army, by far the most powerful of the three services, for
example, wrested back the TNI leadership with the appointment of
Gen. Endriartono in April to replace Navy Admiral Widodo A.S.

Endriartono virtually muscled his way through, giving no
option to President Megawati but to appoint him, even though it
was supposed to have been the turn of the Air Force to take over
the joint chiefs of staff baton.

In another exercise in influence, the Army managed to persuade
President Megawati to approve the sending of additional Army
battalions to troubled Aceh throughout the year to crack down on
the separatist rebels there.

Any suggestions that the Army should dismantle its territorial
command structures, through which it exercises political control
more effectively than any of the formal political institutions,
have been sidelined.

Nothing like such a dismantling is likely to happen any time
soon. In fact, the revival of the Aceh military command points in
the opposite direction.

The military remains undecided about whether or not to allow
its troops to vote in the 2004 elections. The TNI relinquished
the rights of its personnel to vote in previous elections in
return for guaranteed seats in the DPR and MPR. Now that it is no
longer represented in these institutions, technically, the TNI
should allow its members to vote. This issue remains unresolved.

The military's decision to withdraw from formal politics also
comes with a big price tag: the TNI says that its budget must be
bolstered in order to turn it into a professional fighting force.

The sad, if not pathetic, reality is that the money the
government forks out on the defense sector each year barely
covers about 30 percent of the TNI's operational needs. The
shortfall has been covered all these years by the respective
services through the businesses that they own and manage.

The military businesses, however, only supplement the
operational budget, and not the budget for the procurement of
military equipment.

In an apparently open display of rivalry for a greater share
of the budget, the Navy and the Air Force both exposed the
weaknesses of their outdated equipment, even to the point of
compromising national defense capabilities.

The Navy, for example, suggested that its warships were not
combat-ready, while the Air Force claimed that the nation could
no longer patrol, let alone protect, the airspace of the entire
archipelago.

The military's extensive involvement in business has attracted
a lot of criticism, but it seems unrealistic to demand the
military to quit the corporate world without proposing how the
TNI should plug the hole in its budget.

As Gen. Endriartono has repeatedly said: "We (the TNI) will
happily leave our businesses once the country is able to provide
us with a sufficient budget".

Even with the hefty increase in defense spending in 2003 to Rp
17.8 trillion from Rp 9.5 trillion in 2002, the country is still
a long way from meeting the TNI's budget needs so as to ensure
its professionalism.

For some years to come, it looks like the military's
involvement in business will be the norm. But at least, the
government has finally required the TNI to audit all its
businesses to ensure a modicum of transparency and
accountability.

The global war on terror has been something of a blessing in
disguise for the TNI.

In 2001, when the National Police was formally separated from
the military, the TNI's job was reduced solely to national
defense. National security became solely and exclusively the
domain of the police. The military would only be brought in if
the police needed assistance.

But that distinction was blurred by the increasing global
concerns about terrorism after the Sept. 11, 2001, attack in the
United States, and reinforced after the Oct. 12, 2002, attack in
Bali.

The military has since been brought back into the fold in the
fight against terrorism and, effectively, national security
issues, and the government has even asked the intelligence unit
of Kopassus (the Army's Special Forces), to help the police in
tracking down the terrorists in this country.

The police, while doing a good job in investigating the
terrorist attacks in Bali, simply cannot be expected to do the
job of countering the threat of terrorism effectively by
themselves.

This has also been fully recognized by the United States to
the point where the White House is now lobbying congress to lift
the military embargo against Indonesia, imposed after the 1999
military fiasco in East Timor.

To begin with, the United States has revived the International
Military and Education Training (IMET) program for Indonesian
officers. Talks are now underway on having the embargo on the
sale of lethal weapons to Indonesia lifted.

There is no doubt, however, that with the TNI moving out of
formal politics as well as national security, the military should
now face less criticism than before.

This should allow the military to proceed with its internal
reforms at a pace it is more comfortable with.

The events of 2002 indicate that reforms in the TNI are taking
place probably faster than many people had anticipated, and
certainly faster than the slow-moving reforms in the civilian
organizations, like the bureaucracy, the legal institutions and
the political institutions.

Given that these reforms are designed to bolster the TNI's
overall strength, the question is then, where will the TNI stand
vis-vis the civilian political institutions in 2009?