TNI faces legal barriers to resolving Aceh problem
More than 600 people have been killed in Aceh this year alone and the government is considering the possibility of imposing a state of emergency in the province. The Jakarta Post's Yogita Tahilramani and Edith Hartanto talked to Iskandar Muda Military Commander Maj. Gen. Djali Jusuf in Lhokseumawe this week about Aceh Free Movement (GAM).
Question: The minister of home affairs has said that Aceh's local administration has not been functioning, particularly in addressing the worsening security conditions in the province. What will happen if a civilian state of emergency were imposed?
Answer: The provincial administration here has completely failed to perform their duties. Of the central government's six programs for Aceh, only the security scheme was implemented. Other matters such as economic and social development have become completely stagnant.
The administration fails to understand Aceh's immediate problems. It should be more proactive and join the security forces (Indonesian military and police) in formulating programs to stabilize Aceh's security conditions.
While the Indonesian Military (TNI) is paying over Rp 10 billion (US$1.1 million) per month to feed some 22,000 soldiers all across Aceh, the administration spends billions to run secondary and non-essential schemes, like building a new town hall instead of repairing roads. I believe we have to meet the people's needs.
On the other hand, negotiations between GAM and Indonesian officials have come to a low point. It does not seem to be working.
What about imposing martial law in Aceh?
That should always be the last resort. Why? The TNI is functioning under the order and control of the government, and the military does not want to repeat past mistakes.
The risks of implementing martial law is too high. There will be casualties on all sides including civilians and our troops too.
On Wednesday, a member of the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus) First. Sgt. Made Sukarna was shot dead by GAM members in the West Aceh village of Teunom.
As Minister Susilo said, the best possible option is the special autonomy for Aceh. Since the implementation of Presidential Instruction No. 4/2001, on the handling of Aceh's conflicts and Aceh's rehabilitation on May 2 last year, 947 people suspected to be GAM members have been killed.
The total TNI personnel is 22,000 in Aceh compared to 3,600 GAM members, why can't you stop them?
GAM members hide behind and amongst the general Acehnese public. They extort and scare the public into keeping their mouths shut.
If we ran a repressive military operation against the rebels, with no legal grounds and could do whatever we wanted to, we might be able to fix this problem, but we will be blamed for committing human rights violations.
What are we to do? The local Acehnese administration is no help at all.
The last time we did an update on GAM, there were 3,692 armed separatists. We may have 22,000 TNI personnel deployed across Aceh, but the coverage areas are also very wide and remote.
GAM members often hide high up in the mountains or hide in thick dense forests surrounding those mountains. They also use villagers as shields, so it is impossible for us to open fire because civilians will most likely get killed.
Another problem is that since the removal of the 10-year military operation (DOM) in 1998, GAM has gained a stronghold in mountains and remote villages and they have had the opportunity to build their network by recruiting criminals. So basically they are in the business of conflict, unlike the original GAM movement in the mid 1970s.
Where are the primary hotspots in Aceh?
Out of 13 regencies, the most troubled areas are in East Aceh and some parts of North Aceh regencies. There rebels extort money and run violent sweeping operations, but we have deployed troops reinforcements there. But as shown in previous patterns, the rebels are based in the mountains or remote villages.
What do you think about Aceh's freedom movement?
It started (against the Republic of Indonesia) in 1953, when first president Sukarno rejected Aceh's demand as a new and separate province, as at that time Sumatra was one province, but still part of Indonesia. That's what Tengku Daud Beureuh fought for.
Then after Aceh got its status as a province in the mid 1970s, people like Hassan Tiro (leader of separatist movement) emerged and tried to resume Daud Beureuh's struggle but in a different way, that is, he wanted to establish an independent Islamic state, completely separate from Indonesia.
I know this because Hassan Tiro was born in the same village as I was, in Bereunen in Aceh Pidie. So I learned, from the time I was a little Acehnese boy, and I know about the people's resentment towards the central government.
Had the previous government built a strong base of economics and social affairs, Aceh would not be in such a mess like now. Separatists would not have gained as much support from people, if the economy and the social conditions in Aceh were relatively prosperous.
The government has to come through on some of its promises to Aceh soon, because people here are tired of empty promises. I believe that it will take time to resolve this matter. We need patience.