TNI faces legal barriers to resolving Aceh problem
TNI faces legal barriers to resolving Aceh problem
More than 600 people have been killed in Aceh this
year alone and the government is considering the possibility of
imposing a state of emergency in the province. The Jakarta Post's
Yogita Tahilramani and Edith Hartanto talked to Iskandar Muda
Military Commander Maj. Gen. Djali Jusuf in Lhokseumawe this week
about Aceh Free Movement (GAM).
Question: The minister of home affairs has said that Aceh's
local administration has not been functioning, particularly in
addressing the worsening security conditions in the province.
What will happen if a civilian state of emergency were imposed?
Answer: The provincial administration here has completely
failed to perform their duties. Of the central government's six
programs for Aceh, only the security scheme was implemented.
Other matters such as economic and social development have
become completely stagnant.
The administration fails to understand Aceh's immediate
problems. It should be more proactive and join the security
forces (Indonesian military and police) in formulating programs
to stabilize Aceh's security conditions.
While the Indonesian Military (TNI) is paying over Rp 10
billion (US$1.1 million) per month to feed some 22,000 soldiers
all across Aceh, the administration spends billions to run
secondary and non-essential schemes, like building a new town
hall instead of repairing roads. I believe we have to meet the
people's needs.
On the other hand, negotiations between GAM and Indonesian
officials have come to a low point. It does not seem to be
working.
What about imposing martial law in Aceh?
That should always be the last resort. Why? The TNI is
functioning under the order and control of the government, and
the military does not want to repeat past mistakes.
The risks of implementing martial law is too high. There will
be casualties on all sides including civilians and our troops
too.
On Wednesday, a member of the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus)
First. Sgt. Made Sukarna was shot dead by GAM members in the West
Aceh village of Teunom.
As Minister Susilo said, the best possible option is the
special autonomy for Aceh. Since the implementation of
Presidential Instruction No. 4/2001, on the handling of Aceh's
conflicts and Aceh's rehabilitation on May 2 last year, 947
people suspected to be GAM members have been killed.
The total TNI personnel is 22,000 in Aceh compared to 3,600
GAM members, why can't you stop them?
GAM members hide behind and amongst the general Acehnese
public. They extort and scare the public into keeping their
mouths shut.
If we ran a repressive military operation against the rebels,
with no legal grounds and could do whatever we wanted to, we
might be able to fix this problem, but we will be blamed for
committing human rights violations.
What are we to do? The local Acehnese administration is no
help at all.
The last time we did an update on GAM, there were 3,692 armed
separatists. We may have 22,000 TNI personnel deployed across
Aceh, but the coverage areas are also very wide and remote.
GAM members often hide high up in the mountains or hide in
thick dense forests surrounding those mountains. They also use
villagers as shields, so it is impossible for us to open fire
because civilians will most likely get killed.
Another problem is that since the removal of the 10-year
military operation (DOM) in 1998, GAM has gained a stronghold in
mountains and remote villages and they have had the opportunity
to build their network by recruiting criminals. So basically they
are in the business of conflict, unlike the original GAM movement
in the mid 1970s.
Where are the primary hotspots in Aceh?
Out of 13 regencies, the most troubled areas are in East Aceh
and some parts of North Aceh regencies. There rebels extort money
and run violent sweeping operations, but we have deployed troops
reinforcements there. But as shown in previous patterns, the
rebels are based in the mountains or remote villages.
What do you think about Aceh's freedom movement?
It started (against the Republic of Indonesia) in 1953, when
first president Sukarno rejected Aceh's demand as a new and
separate province, as at that time Sumatra was one province, but
still part of Indonesia. That's what Tengku Daud Beureuh fought
for.
Then after Aceh got its status as a province in the mid 1970s,
people like Hassan Tiro (leader of separatist movement) emerged
and tried to resume Daud Beureuh's struggle but in a different
way, that is, he wanted to establish an independent Islamic
state, completely separate from Indonesia.
I know this because Hassan Tiro was born in the same village
as I was, in Bereunen in Aceh Pidie. So I learned, from the time
I was a little Acehnese boy, and I know about the people's
resentment towards the central government.
Had the previous government built a strong base of economics
and social affairs, Aceh would not be in such a mess like now.
Separatists would not have gained as much support from people, if
the economy and the social conditions in Aceh were relatively
prosperous.
The government has to come through on some of its promises to
Aceh soon, because people here are tired of empty promises. I
believe that it will take time to resolve this matter. We need
patience.