TNI at 54

It was a fitting sign of the times as much a token of good judgment on the part of the Indonesian Military (TNI) that it chose to celebrate the 54th anniversary of its formation on Tuesday in a relatively low-key manner.

Following tradition, President B.J. Habibie presided over the ceremony, which was attended by a range of the country's leaders and famous figures. Patriotic songs were sung and military bands performed as troops paraded before the grandstand.

However, much of the pompous show of military force that highlighted the anniversary during the Soeharto era was absent. In fact, celebrations this year were shadowed in a number of regions by the specter of death and discord.

In the eastern province of Maluku, for example, local military commander Army Brig. Gen. Max Tamaela spent a good deal of the day ensuring two of his men who died recently while attempting to intervene in sectarian clashes received a proper military send off for their burials.

Reports of deadly clashes between insurgents and the military in Aceh continue to make headlines, and in Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Banda Aceh and a number of other cities, students staged demonstrations to demand an end to the military's dwifungsi, or dual military and sociopolitical role.

The most formidable political force in Indonesia until a little less than two years ago, the TNI's prestige is at its nadir as it marks its 54th anniversary. It is befitting to ask what was behind this sudden decline in the Indonesian Military's fortunes. Given the revelations since Soeharto's downfall in May 1998, the answer to this question seems obvious.

From the violent takeover of the Jakarta headquarters of the dissenting Indonesian Democratic Party in 1997 and the abduction of political activists in the months that followed, to the May 1998 riots that devastated parts of Jakarta and the fatal shootings of protesters, a trail of circumstantial evidence implicates elements of the military in many of the outbursts of violence and human rights abuses the country has been subject to over the past few years.

The government's -- including the military leadership -- inability or unwillingness to resolve even one of these human tragedies to the public's satisfaction has not helped restore public confidence in the armed forces. The inevitable conclusion the public draws from this is that the so-called dwifungsi doctrine, which allows the military to take on a dual role in social and political affairs as well as security and defense, is at the heart of the problem.

Even top military leaders agree with this conclusion. However, not all agree on what should be done to correct the problem. Abdul Haris Nasution, a highly respected former Army general who is now in his 70s, believes that under Soeharto's New Order regime the dwifungsi doctrine was abused. He maintains that while correction is necessary, the doctrine itself should be maintained.

Others, particularly younger Indonesians and the majority of students and intellectuals, however, believe allowing soldiers to run the country is wrong and detrimental to the growth of democracy. Soldiers, they argue, as killers by training, will easily be tempted to use this training in politics, rather than resolving conflicts through compromise and negotiation.

What this amounts to is a general belief among Indonesians that the dwifungsi doctrine provides the military with more power than is good for it.

Hopefully, as it enters the 55th year of its existence, TNI will be able to learn from past mistakes. A positive first step in this direction would be to listen, really listen, to the criticism which is presently being leveled at it. What Indonesia needs is a strong and professional military that can effectively use its strength and professionalism to defend the people against foreign enemies, while allowing civilians to run the country.