TNI at 54
TNI at 54
It was a fitting sign of the times as much a token of good
judgment on the part of the Indonesian Military (TNI) that it
chose to celebrate the 54th anniversary of its formation on
Tuesday in a relatively low-key manner.
Following tradition, President B.J. Habibie presided over the
ceremony, which was attended by a range of the country's leaders
and famous figures. Patriotic songs were sung and military bands
performed as troops paraded before the grandstand.
However, much of the pompous show of military force that
highlighted the anniversary during the Soeharto era was absent.
In fact, celebrations this year were shadowed in a number of
regions by the specter of death and discord.
In the eastern province of Maluku, for example, local military
commander Army Brig. Gen. Max Tamaela spent a good deal of the
day ensuring two of his men who died recently while attempting to
intervene in sectarian clashes received a proper military send
off for their burials.
Reports of deadly clashes between insurgents and the military
in Aceh continue to make headlines, and in Jakarta, Bandung,
Semarang, Banda Aceh and a number of other cities, students
staged demonstrations to demand an end to the military's
dwifungsi, or dual military and sociopolitical role.
The most formidable political force in Indonesia until a
little less than two years ago, the TNI's prestige is at its
nadir as it marks its 54th anniversary. It is befitting to ask
what was behind this sudden decline in the Indonesian Military's
fortunes. Given the revelations since Soeharto's downfall in May
1998, the answer to this question seems obvious.
From the violent takeover of the Jakarta headquarters of the
dissenting Indonesian Democratic Party in 1997 and the abduction
of political activists in the months that followed, to the May
1998 riots that devastated parts of Jakarta and the fatal
shootings of protesters, a trail of circumstantial evidence
implicates elements of the military in many of the outbursts of
violence and human rights abuses the country has been subject to
over the past few years.
The government's -- including the military leadership --
inability or unwillingness to resolve even one of these human
tragedies to the public's satisfaction has not helped restore
public confidence in the armed forces. The inevitable conclusion
the public draws from this is that the so-called dwifungsi
doctrine, which allows the military to take on a dual role in
social and political affairs as well as security and defense, is
at the heart of the problem.
Even top military leaders agree with this conclusion. However,
not all agree on what should be done to correct the problem.
Abdul Haris Nasution, a highly respected former Army general who
is now in his 70s, believes that under Soeharto's New Order
regime the dwifungsi doctrine was abused. He maintains that
while correction is necessary, the doctrine itself should be
maintained.
Others, particularly younger Indonesians and the majority of
students and intellectuals, however, believe allowing soldiers to
run the country is wrong and detrimental to the growth of
democracy. Soldiers, they argue, as killers by training, will
easily be tempted to use this training in politics, rather than
resolving conflicts through compromise and negotiation.
What this amounts to is a general belief among Indonesians
that the dwifungsi doctrine provides the military with more power
than is good for it.
Hopefully, as it enters the 55th year of its existence, TNI
will be able to learn from past mistakes. A positive first step
in this direction would be to listen, really listen, to the
criticism which is presently being leveled at it. What Indonesia
needs is a strong and professional military that can effectively
use its strength and professionalism to defend the people against
foreign enemies, while allowing civilians to run the country.